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WISCONSIN CONSUMER ACT-A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS
EDWARD J. HEISER, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 1, 1973, the Wisconsin Consumer Act ("WCA" or
"Act") became effective in the State of Wisconsin and ushered in
what is probably the most sweeping consumer credit legislation yet
enacted in any state.' Although many states, including those which
have adopted the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, have enacted
some consumer protection provisions similar to those contained in
the WCA on a piecemeal basis, the Wisconsin legislation appears
to be the first code which not only includes most, if not all, of the
provisions enacted in other states, but also, a variety of new con-
trols and regulations enacted for the first time anywhere.
The provisions of the WCA regulate almost all aspects of the
consumer debtor-creditor relationship, from the creation of the
indebtedness to the provisions permitted in the contract itself, as
well as the enforcement of the agreement through informal and
formal methods of collection. Also, the Act, for the first time in
Wisconsin, provides for broad regulatory powers by a state admin-
istrator over all consumer credit grantors, not just licensed lenders
* B.A. 1965, University of Michigan; J.D. 1968 University or Michigan Law School:
member of Whyte, Hirschboeck, Minahan, Harding & Harland S.C., Milwaukee, Wiscon-
sin.
1. The WCA was originally enacted in March, 1972, Wis. Laws 1971, ch. 239 (effective
March I, 1973) and consisted ofWIs. STAT. chs. 421-427. Since passage of the WCA, three
sets of amendments have been enacted in Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 2 (effective March I, 1973)
which made a number of technical modifications, Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 3 (approved February
22, 1973, effective March 1, 1973) which clarified a number of provisions of the Act and
contained substantial revisions to ch. 424, and Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 18, (effective April 22,
1973) which essentially substituted ch. 428 in place of the WCA to govern all first mortgage
real estate loans under $25,000 having an annual percentage rate of 12% or less. This article
discusses the WCA as amended by these three session laws, and for ease of reference refers
to the "'February 22, 1973 Amendments" (Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 3) and "April 22, 1973
Amendments" (Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 18) where appropriate.
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and othe previously licensed credit grantors which have tradition-
ally been subject to regulation.
This article will point out to the practicing attorney the sub-
stantial changes which the WCA has made from prior Wisconsin
law, and provide a critical analysis of the statutory provisions and
some of the problems which are presented by the language of the
new legislation. Where important, the philosophies of consumer
and creditor interests with respect to certain provisions are also
explained.
Before discussing the particular provisions of the WCA, it may
be helpful to mention the basic underlying objectives which appear
to have guided the various consumer and creditor groups which
contributed to drafting and promoting the legislation. The main
objectives espoused by the consumer groups which have supported
the "consumer protections" of the WCA were essentially to elimi-
nate and prevent alleged harsh and abusive credit practices and to
attempt to make the consumer more aware of the nature of his
objections.
On the other hand, the creditor groups involved in creating the
legislation claimed that their main objective was to provide legisla-
tion which would correct credit abuses without becoming so unduly
burdensome on creditors as to unfairly limit legitimate extensions
of credit. Also, a primary objective was to limit the possibility of
exorbitant penalties for technical violations of what was known
would be a highly technical act. Both groups agreed that the addi-
tional obligations imposed on creditors would result in higher oper-
ating costs, which would necessitate increased allowable interest
rates and finance charges.
Perhaps the most important aspect to be noted concerning the
objectives of each of the groups is that the creditors were not
diametrically opposed to the consumers' purposes as has been the
case in other states, but agreed to work with the consumers' main
attempt to produce agreeable legislation.2 This is not to say that
the opposing factions did not differ on the wording of the various
2. The fact that creditors were interested in developing a comprehensive consumer credit
code is evidenced by their participation from 1969-1972 on the legislative advisory commit-
tee appointed to study the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (hereinafter referred to as
"'UCCC"). The linal version of the UCCC reported out by the committee contained sub-
stantially more "consumer protection" provisions than the official version of the UCCC.
Although the UCCC was abandoned in favor of the WCA, the cooperativeness of creditors
toward adopting workable consumer credit legislation was established and carried over to
negotiations concerning the WCA.
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provisions, since there was substantial disagreements and intense
negotiations, but on the whole, the goal of both groups was to
provide a workable consumer credit package for Wisconsin.3
II. SCOPE
Although the WCA covers all consumer credit transactions, it
does not erase all other consumer credit legislation in effect in
Wisconsin prior to its effective date. For example, section 218.01
WIS. STATS. et. seq., concerning the financing of automobiles,
mobile homes, etc.,4 section 138.09 relating to licensed lenders,
section 138.12 relating to insurance premium financing, and var-
ious other sections concerning the regulation of credit transactions,
continued in effect after March 1, 1973, although with some modi-
fication. However, any "consumer" credit transactions entered
into by a creditor pursuant to said separate statutes, is also subject
to the WCA. Therefore, consumer credit transactions may be sub-
ject to coverage under one of the above-mentioned sections as well
as the WCA, although presumably conflicts will be resolved in
favor of the specific statute.5 Thus, it may be necessary to consult
not only the provisions of the Act, but also specific legislation
which may exist in other parts of the Wisconsin Statutes.6
The provisions of the WCA apply to all "consumer transac-
tions," essentially defined as encompassing transactions entered
into by a natural person seeking property, services, money or credit
for personal, family, household or agricultural purposes.7 Al-
though the major thrust of the Act is certainly directed toward
regulation of consumer "credit," it should be noted that the Act
also extends to some non-credit consumer transactions. 8
3. For an interesting commentary on the negotiations concerning the WCA, see Davis.
Legislative Restriction of Creditor Powers and Remedies: A Case StudY' of the Negotiation
and Drafting of the Wisconsin Consuner Act, 72 MiCH. L. REv. 3 (1973).
4. All references to statutory sections are to the 1971 Wisconsin Statutes. Reference to
"WiS. STAT.'" is hereinafter omitted in this article.
5. Section 138.09 (relating to licensed lenders) and § 138.12 (relating to insurance prem-
ium financing) specilically state that those sections will prevail in the event of any inconsis-
tency with the provisions of the WCA.
6. In addition to the sections mentioned in the text, it is important to note that the usury
provisions contained in §§ 138.05 and 138.06 were not eliminated by the WCA and still
remain in effect for non-consumer credit transactions concerning individuals not regulated
by other statutes, including those transactions specifically exempt from the WCA under
§ 421.202.
7. Section 421.301(13) and (17). See further discussion concerning applicability of the
WCA to consumer transactions, including consumer credit transactions, infra text at 393.
8. In particular, the provisions governing consumer approval transactions under ch. 423
1974]
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A number of transactions are specifically excluded from the
WCA in section 421.202, including extensions of credit to organi-
zations or any transaction in which all parties are organizations
(except for certain cooperatives specified in section 421.301(17)
and (28)), certain transactions involving late payment or discount
for early payment with public utilities or common carriers, pawn-
broker rates, financing of insurance by insurers (except for credit
insurance subject to chapter 424),' consumer credit transactions
where the amount financed or cash price exceeds $25,000, real
estate transactions falling under chapter 428 and security transac-
tions by broker dealers.ID
In attempting to determine the scope of the Act, a legitimate
criticism would appear to be the confusing definitions contained in
section 421.301. For example, section 421.301(10) defines a "con-
surner credit transaction," which is the type of transaction most
often subject to the provisions of the WCA, as a transaction be-
tween a "merchant" and a "customer" in which "real or personal
property, services or money is acquired on credit and the cus-
tomer's obligation is payable in installments or for which credit a
finance charge is or may be imposed. . . ." However, to deter-
mine who is a "merchant" and who is a "customer," other provi-
sions of section 421.301 must be consulted. The definition of"mer-
chant," in section 421.301(25) states that he is a person who regu-
and debt collection practices under ch. 427 apply to consumer transactions as well as
consumer credit transactions.
9. Although § 421.202(5) refers to "the sale of insurance by the insurer" (emphasis
added), the exclusion obviously is intended to apply to the financing of insurance by an
insurer which would otherwise be a "consumer credit transaction" no matter what financing
arrangement is employed. If the exclusion were intended to be limited only to non-credit
sales of insurance, the reference to the applicability ofch. 424 would not be necessary, since
that chapter only applies to insurance provided in relation to credit transactions. See
§ 424.102. Of course, most insurance premium installment payment arrangements do not
constitute "consumer credit" anyhow since the payment schedule usually is sufficient to
keep the insurance paid in advance and no "debt" is created. FRB Information Letter (Mar.
18, 1970), 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 30,406 (1974) (hereinafter cited as GUIDE).
10. Subsections (7) (which excludes transactions subject to ch. 428) and (8) (which
excludes certain securities transactions) to § 421.202 where added by the April 22, 1973
Amendments. The passage of ch. 428 was in response to the heavy criticism leveled at the
application of the Act to smaller home loans, especially those sponsored by government
agencies such as the FHA or VA loan programs. Several sections of the WCA as originally
enacted contained special provisions for consumer credit transactions secured by a first lien
or equivalent security interest, and to the extent that such transactions are covered by ch.
428 (i.e.. loans not exceeding S25,000 secured by a first lien real estate mortgage or equiva-
lent security interest with an annual percentage rate of 12% or less), the WCA is no longer
applicable.
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larly "advertises, distributes, offers, supplies or deals in real or
personal property, services, money or credit in a manner which
directly or indirectly results in or is intended or designed to result
in, lead to or induce a consumer transaction." (emphasis added)
A "consumer transaction" in turn is defined as a transaction in
which one or more of the parties is a customer in section 421.301
(13). A "customer" is defined in section 421.301(17) essentially as
an individual who "seeks or acquires real or personal property,
services, money or credit for personal, family, household or agri-
cultural purposes."
The key term in the definition of "customer" is the word credit
which is defined in section 421.301(14) as the right "granted by a
creditor to a customer to defer payment of debts. . . ." (emphasis
added) A "creditor" is defined in section 421.301(16) to mean "a
merchant who regularly engages in consumer credit transactions or
in arranging for the extension of consumer credit . . . ." (empha-
sis added) Looking for the explanation of the key words in the
term creditor, it is seen that the definition is circular referring back
to the definition of a "merchant" (which includes a "creditor") and
a "consumer credit transaction" which is a consumer transaction
between a merchant and a customer. These circular definitions
probably will cause far more confusion than assistance in deter-
mining precisely who falls under the coverage of the WCA and
what transactions will be covered. Arguably the provisions of the
Act would have been easier to understand if some of these terms
had not been defined at all, or at least defined without circular
references.
Nevertheless, an analysis of the interrelated definitions would
appear to indicate generally that a "consumer credit transaction"
is one between a person regularly in the business of extending
credit (a "merchant") and a natural person ("customer") which
constitutes either a loan of money, or a sale of real or personal
property or services, or a lease of personal property," primarily for
personal, family, household or agricultural purposes, 2 and (a) in
which any part of the loan is repayable or any part of the price of
II. A consumer lease subject to the WCA does not include a leasehold interest in real
property. Wis. Axim. CODE Bkg. § 80.05 (hereinafter regulations promulgated under the
WCA will be cited as "Bkg.").
12. Bkg. § 80.06 states that the primary' purpose, that is 50% or more, of the transaction
must be for personal, family, household or agricultural purposes before the WCA will apply
(emphasis added).
19741
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the real or personal property or rental of personal property is
payable on a deferred basis for which a finance charge is imposed,
or (b) in which such loan, purchase price, or rental is payable in
more than four installments whether or not there is any finance
charge, or payable in two or more installments (other than a down
payment) if any installment is more than twice the amount of any
other installment.":
Some of the possible confusion in determining whether a par-
ticular transaction is one which would be subject to the WCA is
removed by the provision in the definition of "customer" which
allows any person by agreement to become a "customer" and be
governed by the Act. Therefore, for example, the fact that certain
credit card users might actually be purchasing items for business
or other non-consumer purposes which would not be subject to the
WCA (but would still be subject to the usury limits contained in
section i 38.05) certainly could result in problems for retailers hon-
oring cerdit cards unless the individual could agree to become a
"customer" under the WCA and subject to the Act. 4
One other concept contained in the definitional section of the
WCA deserves particular attention since it may dramatically
change the fundamental concept of the validity of written agree-
ments in consumer transactions. Section 421.301(3) defines an
"agreement" to mean the "bargain of the parties in fact as found
in their language or by implication from other circumstances in-
cluding course of dealing or usage of trade or course of perform-
ance." The section also states that provisions prohibiting introduc-
tion of parol or extrinsic evidence, such as section 402.202 of Wis-
consin's Uniform Commercial Code, shall be inoperative to ex-
clude or limit the admissibility of evidence relating to agreements
subject to the WCA.
Apparently the purpose of this section is to allow customers to
explain in court what they were told by the creditor or seller in
those circumstances where they were misled as to the content of
the written contract. However, the language of section 421.301(3)
goes much further and not only permits customers to introduce
evidence claiming that the written contract does not express their
understanding of the agreement, even where the language in the
13. Bugge and Holbrook, Creditor's Responsibilities and Duties Under the WCA, 46
Wis. BAR Bui i. 38-39 (Feb., 1973).
14. Id. A more detailed discussion of the problems with regard to transactions which
may include both consumer and business aspects is also discussed more fully in that article.
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contract is unambiguous, but also permits challenge to such writ-
ten contracts based on "implication" to the contrary from the
merchant's "course of dealing" or "performance".
Elimination of the parol evidence rule and permitting challenge
to written documents by implication from the merchant's course
of dealing could certainly be costly for merchants since it could
have the effect of encouraging specious challenges on the part of
customers and subjecting merchants to the possibility of continu-
ous harassment and delay in collection proceedings. On the other
hand, the value of this section as an additional benefit to customers
is certainly questionable, especially in light of the broad definition
of what constitutes "unconscionable" conduct by a merchant
under other provisions of the WCA, which would appear to be
sufficient to protect those customers unfairly taken advantage of
by merchants. 15 Presumably courts will interpret this section nar-
rowly and will set aside written provisions only when the customer
has clear and convincing evidence that the "agreement" between
the parties was contrary to the written contract.
Undoubtedly the most noticeable impact of the WCA will be
felt in the area of consumer credit sales. Such transactions, except
for automobile and mobile home financing under sections 218.01
and 218.04 respectively, for the first time will be subject to a limita-
tion on the amount of time price differential which may be charged
as well as subject to the other provisions of the WCA and regula-
tions issued thereunder. Prior to the effective date of the Act, such
consumer "time sales" were not subject to any statutory regulation
and were not limited by the restrictions on interest contained in the
usury statutes because of the long established court created rule
that the "time price differential" in a credit sale (the difference
between the cash price and the time sale price) is not "interest". 16
It is interesting to note that the general approach of the WCA
is to treat all credit grantors, both lenders and sellers, as "mer-
15. See § 425.107 and 426.108 and discussion, infra text at 475 for provisions concern-
ing "unconscionable" conduct.
16. The "time-price differential" concept was first announced by the United States
Supreme Court in the early case of Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (I Black) 115 (1861). In that
case, the Court held that a seller could charge one price if payment was to be made at the
time of sale and another higher price if payment was to be made at a later time. The
difference between the time price and the cash price was not "interest" which would be
subject to usury limitations, but rather a contract which was outside the scope of usury
statutes. The concept, although still valid, has been increasingly narrowed in its application.
E.g., State v. J.C. Penny Co., 48 Wis. 2d 125, 179 N.W.2d 641 (1970) and State ex rel.
Turner v. Younker Brothers, Inc., - Ia. _, 210 N.W.2d 550 (1973).
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chants" under the Act, thereby attempting to eliminate the tradi-
tional distinction between interest on loans and the "time price
differential" in credit sales.' 7 By combining most of the provisions
concerning loans and consumer sales, the WCA differs substan-
tially from the Uniform Consumer Credit Code wlhich has been
adopted in seven states to date. 8 In the UCCC, a separate chapter
is provided for credit sales and for loans, apparently on the theory
that each type of creditor would be able to look to those sections
which applied particularly to him. However, there is considerable
redundancy in the UCCC's provisions on sales and loans, and,
perhaps taking a cue from the WCA, the latest UCCC working
draft has adopted the approach of consolidating the provisions
concerning credit sales and loans. 9
It should be noted that the WCA, in addition to applying to
what is typically thought of as a consumer credit transaction, (that
is, credit for personal, family or household purposes), also includes
extensions of credit for "agricultural" purposes as does the Truth-
In-Lending Act on the federal level."0 The Truth-In-Lending Act,
as initially proposed, did not include agricultural credit since it was
considered that such extensions of credit were more in the nature
of a "business" credit extension rather than a consumer credit
extension, but it was amended prior to final passage to include
agricultural credit. The reasoning, although not clear from the
Truth-In-Lending Act itself, apparently was a feeling that small
farmers needed protection as much as individual consumers. How-
17. Despite the fact that sellers and lenders are identified as "merchants" and treated
the same in most provisions of the WCA, sellers are treated differently in several significant
provisions, including: § 422.303(2) (the terms evidencing the consumer credit sale must be
set forth in at least 8 point standard type); § 422.406 (most negotiable instruments are
prohibited in consumer credit sales): § 422.4 17 (restrictions on security interests differ with
regard to sales and loans); §§ 425.209 and 425.210 (limitation on deficiency judgments only
apply to consumer credit sales).
18. The UCCC has been adopted in one form or another in the following states: Colo-
rado, Idaho, Indiana. Kansas, Oklahoma, Utah and Wyoming. For the official UCCC text
and state variations see I GUIDE 4770-5703.
19. UCCC Working Redraft No. 5 (Nov., 1973), National Conference of Commission-
er% on Uniform State Laws. CCH INSTALLMENT CREDIT GUIDE, CONSUMER CREDIT, Issue
No. 264. Part 5 of art. 2 of the Working Redraft combines many aspects of sale and loan
transactions including delinquencies, deferrals, refinancing and consolidations and other
items which previously were contained in separate articles of the UCCC as adopted in the
states mentioned in supra note 16. Working Redraft No. 5 also includes many other provi-
sions based on the WCA.
20. Title I ofThe Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321,82 Stat.
146, 15 U.S.C. § 1600 (1968) el. seq. is more popularly known as the "Truth-in-Lending
Act," and will be referred to as such in this article.
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ever, the many basic differences between the typical credit for
consumers and credit for agricultural purposes has resulted in sub-
stantial special provisions for agricultural credit under Regulation
Z, the regulation implementing the federal law.2'
Apparently, as a result of the extension of the Truth-In-
Lending Act to agricultural transactions, subsequent consumer
credit codes have usually included agricultural credit as consumer
credit, as is the case with the WCA. However, the problems which
have become apparent in attempting to treat the two types of credit
identically under the Truth-In-Lending Act, which only concerns
disclosure of credit terms, are magnified under comprehensive
credit codes, such as the WCA, which regulate the terms of credit
arrangements in addition to disclosures. In recognition of the pecu-
liar nature of agricultural credit when compared with the more
traditional types of consumer credit, the WCA treats agricultural
credit differently from credit for personal, family or household
purposes throughout its provisions.2
III. TERRITORIAL APPLICATION
The territorial application of the WCA set forth in section
421.201 is extremely broad and purports to extend the WCA to any
consumer transaction "made" within the state (which definition
includes many types of transactions normally thought to be outside
the state), to all refinancings, consolidations, or deferrals "made"
in Wisconsin of any consumer credit transaction no matter where
originally consummated, as well as to a variety of transactions
consummated outside the borders of the state.
Section 421.201(2) states that a consumer transaction is
"made" within the state if the merchant either (i) receives the
customer's offer to enter into the obligation or the executed docu-
ment representing the obligation within the state or (ii) "induces"
a customer to enter into a transaction by "face-to-face" solicita-
21. See. e.g.. § 226.8(0) of Regulation Z to the Truth-in-Lending Act (providing special
disclosures for prompt payment "discounts," a typical agricultural credit arrangement). 12
C.F.R. § 226.8(0); I GUIDE 3579.
22. Thus, for example, certain aspects of agricultural credit are treated differently in
the following sections: § 422.201(4) (separate rate for sellers of farm implements);
§ 422.203(4) (different delinquency rate for agricultural credit); § 422A02 (agricultural
credit excluded from prohibition against balloon payments); § 422.412 (agricultural credit
excluded from limitation on size of last rental payment in consumer leases):
[§ 422.417(l)(e)] (security interest in after acquired property allowed in agricultural sales):
§ 423.201 (agricultural sales excluded from right to cancel a "consumer approval transac-
tion") and § 425.103(2)(a) (separate definition for "default" in agricultural credit
transactions).
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tion or by "mail or telephone solicitation" directed to the particu-
lar resident within the state.2Y
Under this sweeping definition, it would appear, for example,
that an Indiana mail order retailer which has no contact within the
state of Wisconsin other than by sending its catalogs and order
solicitations to particular persons within the state and which only
accepts credit orders upon receipt in Indiana, would nevertheless
be subject to the WCA since such merchant could be claimed to
have "induced" the Wisconsin resident to enter into the transaction
by "mail . . . solicitation directed to the particular customer in
this state.-'" Paradoxically, if the transaction were reversed and a
Wisconsin mail order retailer mailed such solicitations to particu-
lar individuals in Indiana, and accepted credit orders upon receipt
in Wisconsin, the WCA still would purport to apply since the
"offer of the customer" would be "received by the merchant in this
state."
The attempt to extend the WCA to transactions which only
have a casual contact with Wisconsin under section 421.301(2)(b)
could result in irreconciliable conflicts with the laws of other states.
Section 1.201(a) of the UCCC, for example, provides that agree-
ments or offers to purchase "received" in the state are subject to
the UCCC, and conceivably an out of state merchant in a UCCC
state, such as Indiana, could find itself not only subject to Indiana
law because it "receives" the executed contract or offer in Indiana,
but also subject to the WCA because it "induced" a Wisconsin
resident to enter into the transaction. The dilemma for such credi-
tors undoubtedly will have to await court solution.
Section 421.201 not only applies the WCA to transactions
"made" in Wisconsin (under the expanded definition of that term),
but also purports to extend certain provisions of the WCA to
consumer transactions made by a Wisconsin resident while outside
the state boundaries. Thus, section 421.201(6) provides that an out
of state merchant cannot enforce provisions of any consumer
transaction entered into with a Wisconsin resident if such provi-
sions violate subchapter IV of chapter 422 or chapter 423, even if
such provisions would not violate the laws of the state in which the
23. Presumably the phrase "directed to the particular customer" would only extend to
mail solicitations hearing the name of the particular customer, and would not extend to
general solicitations addressed to the "occupant" of the premises (emphasis added).
24. This possible extension of the WCA to such out-of-state merchants has been chal-
lenged by an out-of-state mail order creditor. See Aldens v. Warren, Atty. Gen. and Milden-
berg. Com'r. of Banking, Case No. 72-C405, filed Oct., 1972 (W.D. Wis.).
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transaction was consummated. Subsection (6) also provides that if
such merchant attempts to enforce his out of state transaction in
Wisconsin, he may collect charges only to the extent permitted by
chapter 422. Thus, for example, if a Wisconsin resident went to
Indiana and purchased an automobile, the Indiana seller would
have to adhere to Wisconsin law, at least with regard to subchapter
IV of the chapter 422 and chapter 423, and if he were forced to
enforce the contract through legal proceedings in Wisconsin, he
could only collect the charges to the extent permitted by chapter
422.
Although section 421.301(6) attempts to have certain protec-
tions of the WCA follow Wisconsin residents wherever they may
travel, it is easy to visualize the confusion which would result if
other states adopted similar provisions. For example, if each state
adopted an identical provision, each seller throughout the country
would have to determine the residence of every one of its buyers
and have appropriate contract forms available to make sure he
would be in compliance with the pertinent provisions of the con-
sumer laws of the buyer's state. The burden on interstate com-
merce of such laws would be staggering.
In fact, subsection (6) of section 421.201 could be constitution-
ally deficient as a deprivation of property of the out of state credi-
tor without due process of law, a denial of full faith and credit to
the other state's statutes, or an unconstitutional impairment of the
contract consummated in the foreign state.5 Although it is beyond
25. The language of § 421.201(6) does not limit its application to enforcement in Wis-
consin courts, but purports to apply the specified WCA provisions to contracts entered into
by Wisconsin residents in other states even if the contract is valid under the laws of that
state and apparently even if enforcement is sought in the courts of the other state. This
application certainly could be attacked as a denial of due process. See. e.g., Hartford
Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Delta and Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934) where the
Court stated that a state could not "in an action based upon such a [foreign] contract
enlarge the obligations of the parties to accord with every local statutory policy solely upon
the ground that one of the parties is its own citizen." Cf. John Hancock Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936). Even if enforcement were sought in Wisconsin
courts, the due process and full-faith-and-credit clauses of the U.S. Constitution generally
appear to prohibit a state from declining to apply the law of the situs of a contract merely
because enforcement is contrary to that state's public policy. Annot., 92 A.L.R. 932 (1934).
In fact, strict application of§ 421.201(6) would virtually abolish numerous statutory provi-
sions of other states, such as those contained in small loan or retail installment sale statutes
which specifically permit the practices prohibited in the WCA sections referred to in
§ 421.201(6). For example, unfettered application of§ 421.201(6) could prohibit an out-of-
state creditor who enters into a consumer credit transaction with a Wisconsin resident in
the creditor's home state from collecting rates valid in his state if they exceed the rates in
ch. 422, even if such rates were permitted under a small loan statute requiring licensing.
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the scope of this article to discuss such constitutional issues, consti-
tutional challenges to this provision would not seem unlikely.
Aside from the constitutional difficulties of section 421.201(6),
the difference between the restrictions contained in subsection
(6)(a) and subsection (6)(b) are noteworthy. Subsection (6)(a) does
not state that an out-of-state transaction with a Wisconsin resident
is limited to the charges contained in chapter 422, but only that a
merchant cannot collect charges in excess of those permitted rates
if he attempts collection through "actions or other proceedings"
in the State of Wisconsin. Thus, if the Wisconsin resident pays the
charges originally contracted for without legal proceedings, there
would be no violation of the WCA even if such charges exceeded
those permitted in chapter 422.
By contrast, subsection (6)(b) states that a merchant may not
"en force" any rights against a Wisconsin resident to the extent that
the provisions of the contract violates subchapter IV of chapter 422
or any of the provisions of chapter 423. Thus, it would appear that
contractual provisions not conforming with those requirements of
the WCA could not be enforced against a Wisconsin customer
whether through legal proceedings or otherwise. In fact, since there
is no limitation on the purported applicability of subsection (6)(b),
its provisions would appear to apply to a transaction with a Wis-
consin resident even if the merchant enforces the contract through
legal proceedings in his own state, although it probably is unlikely
that an out-of-state court would invalidate a provision of a contract
legal in that state but prohibited by the WCA simply because the
buyer was a Wisconsin resident.
Section 421.201(5) extends the application of the WCA even
further by stating that subchapters I and II of chapter 425 apply
to actions brought in Wisconsin to enforce rights arising from
consumer transactions (or extortionate extensions of credit)
whether originally subject to the WCA or not. If subchapters I and
I I of chapter 425 merely contained procedural remedies, the appli-
cation of the WCA pursuant to this section would appear to be
little more than a restatement of the usual conflicts of law rule
Similarly, a Wisconsin resident could claim that a valid negotiable instrument taken by an
out-ol-state creditor in a consumer credit sale consummated in the foreign state is void
under § 422.406 or that otherwise valid security interests are nullified by the provisions of
§S 422.4 17 and 422.418. Such provisions and others might be prohibited in contracts with
Wisconsin residents even though the contract was consummated in a foreign state which
%pecifically permitted them and upon which the foreign creditor relied in entering into the
transaction.
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which states basically that the procedural requirements of the
forum state control legal proceedings. However, subchapters I and
I I go far beyond simply stating procedural rules, and include such
substantive provisions as defining when a "default" occurs which
will permit commencement of legal proceedings, a requirement
that merchants give customers a "right to cure" such defaults, a
restriction on the deficiency which will be allowed if collateral is
seized and sold, and a requirement that the merchant is to give the
customer a right to "redeem" collateral once possession is ob-
tained by the creditor.2 1 Imposing these limitations on contractual
provisions which are contrary to the WCA but were valid when
made would appear tantamount to rewriting the agreement, and
consequently the validity of this section to the WCA may also be
constitutionally suspect.
Apparently, except for application of chapter 427 concerning
debt collection procedures and subchapters I and II of chapter 425,
a consumer credit transaction consummated outside the state of
Wisconsin by a non-Wisconsin resident is enforceable in accord-
ance with its terms in Wisconsin under Section 421.201(7).
Section 421.201(3) provides that open-end credit plans are sub-
ject to the WCA where the customer is a resident of Wisconsin and
the merchant honoring the credit card is also a resident or fur-
nishes, mails, or delivers the goods, services or credit to the cus-
tomer while he is in Wisconsin. Although it would appear that this
subsection is intended to limit the application of the WCA to the
circumstances described therein, it should be noted that open-end
26. To illustrate the possible applicability of § 421.201(5), assume that an Illinois mer-
chant sells an automobile for $1,000 (including the finance charge) in a credit sale to an
Illinois resident and takes a security interest in the automobile to secure the obligation. The
contract provides that upon missing one installment, the seller has the right to repossess
the car and commence legal proceedings for collection. If the Illinois resident then moves
to Wisconsin (whether or not he rormally becomes a Wisconsin resident) and ceases to make
payment, the applicability of the WCA under § 421.201(5) would not only prohibit the
Illinois seller from peacefully repossessing the automobile without court order (§ 425.206),
but to commence legal proceedings in Wisconsin for collection, he would have to wait until
"two" installments were in "default" (§ 425.103), give a notice of right to "cure" the default
(§ 425.104), and grant a fifteen day redemption right if he repossesses the automobile after
the appropriate court hearing (4 425.208). Moreover, since the amount of the obligation
would be less than $1,000, after electing to repossess the automobile, the seller would not
he permitted to sue for any deliciency if the value of the automobile would not be sufficient
to repay the entire unpaid balance of the indebtedness (§ 425.209). These restrictions con-
tained in ch. 425 purport to apply under § 421.201(5) even though they were not applicable
when the contract was consummated and even though the Illinois seller had no opportunity
to consider the extra expenses he would be faced with in the event of default when deciding
the linance charge to charge the customer.
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credit transactions are not excluded from the other portions of
section 421.301. Since a consumer credit transaction includes
open-end credit, it could be argued that all of the provisions of
section 421.301 could apply to such transactions in addition to the
special provisions of subsection (3).
Finally, subsection (4) of section 421.201 provides that chapter
427 regulating debt collection activity applies to collection of debts
within the state no matter where the original transaction arose.
IV. RATES
The WCA generally provides that all persons, unless regulated
under separate statutes, who extend consumer credit (whether in
the form of a loan or a credit sale) may impose a finance charge
not exceeding the simple annual interest rate of 18% per year on
the first $500 of credit extended plus 12% per year on any amount
over $500.21
With regard to loans, the Act essentially creates an exception
to the 12% per annum usury limit contained in section 138.05,8 and
allows lenders, such as banks, savings and loan associations, credit
unions and other lenders not otherwise specifically regulated under
separate statutes, to impose an increased finance charge rate of
18% per annum in consumer credit transactions on the first $500
of the loan.
Although the 18% rate on the first $500 may represent an in-
crease in interest for a loan or forebearance or other debts subject
to Wisconsin usury limits, it may well represent a decrease in the
finance charge rate imposed by consumer credit sellers since most
consumer credit sales were completely unregulated prior to the
effective date of the WCA, and it was permissible to charge a time
price differential equal to any annual percentage rate which the
market would bear.
The Act also provides that finance companies who make loans
under section 138.09 and automobile sales finance companies ex-
tending credit under section 218.01 will continue to be regulated
by the rates provided in those sections. 9 Although the legislative
27. Section 422.201.
28. Section 138.05 sets a general usury limit of 12% per year computed on the declining
unpaid balance of the loan or forebearance except for precomputed loans repayable in
substantially weekly or monthly installments in which case the maximum rate is an "add-
on" rate of $6.00 per S100 per annum which is an annual percentage rate of approximately
10.90% for a one year obligation.
29. The Administrator of the WCA (hereinafter referred to as "Administrator") has
ruled that the rates permitted under § 422.201(3) for licensed lenders under .§ 138.09 or
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bill containing the WCA also modified the rates allowed under
those respective sections, the rates generally remain the same.'0
In addition, dealers who sell new or used farm equipment,
implements, tractors, and the like, are now limited to the same rate
which licensees under section 218.01 may charge for class 2 motor
vehicles.:
Notwithstanding the rates in subsections (2), (3) and (4), sec-
tion 422.201(8) allows a merchant to contract for a minimum fi-
nance charge of $5.00 where the amount financed does not exceed
$75, or $7.50 when the amount financed exceeds $75 in transactions
not pursuant to an open-end credit plan.32 Presumably the "mini-
218.01 "pre-empt" the general rate permitted in subsection (2). Bkg. § 80.231. Therefore,
if a rate under subsection (3) is lower than the general rate permitted under subsection (2).
the creditors specified in subsection (3) are limited to the lower rates. See infra note 31.
30. For a comparison between the rates permitted under the WCA and rates allowed
under prior law, see Stute, An Overview of the Wisconsin Consumer Act, 46 Wis. BAR
Bui,. 9. 14-15 (Feb., 1973). Generally, § 218.01 rates for motor vehicle financing were
unchanged after the effective date of the WCA except that the maximum allowable time-
price differential on Class 4 motor vehicle sales defined in § 218.01(6) was lowered from
$15 per $100 to $13 per $100 per year, although Class 4 was expanded to include five-year-
old motor vehicles whereas before a vehicle had to be six years or older. With regard to
licensed lenders under § 138.09, previously such lenders operated under § 138.07 (secured
loans) and § 138.09 (unsecured loans up to $3,000). These two statutory sections essentially
were consolidated on the effective date of the Act in § 138.09, and licensees thereunder may
now charge a discount rate of $9.50 per $100 per year on the first $1,000 plus a discount
rate of $8.00 per $100 per year on any remainder over $1,000 up to $3,000. On loans over
$3,000 of any si/e (or if desired, for loans under $3,000 as well) licensed lenders are permitted
to charge interest up to 18% per year.
31. § 422.201(4). The finance charge rate for the credit sale of Class 2 motor vehicles
under § 218.01(6) is limited to a maximum add-on rate of $9.00 per $100 per year. On a
one year preconputed installment sale, this rate is equal to an annual percentage rate of
approximately 161 %. This rate, of course, is a lower rate than the 18% allowed generally
under § 422.201(2) for other credit sales where the amount financed is less than $500.
Although it would appear that the main purpose of subsection (4) was to give farm imple-
ment sellers an alternative higher rate to subsection (2) when financing sales over $500, the
Administrator has issued Bkg. § 80.24 stating that the rate for farm implement dealers
under subsection (4) is an exclusive rate, and not an alternative rate. Under this regulation,
farm implement dealers are limited to the $9.00 add-on rate under subsection (4) for all
sales, whether under or over $500.
32. It would appear that subsection (8) of § 422.201 intends to provide an alternative
to the rates permitted in subsections (2), (3), and (4) in the event that rates computed under
those sections are less than the minimums specified in subsection (8). Thus the language
states that a merchant "may" charge the minimum rate specified therein. Nevertheless, the
Administrator, in Bkg. § 80.241 has ruled that the "election" provided in subsection (8) is
not merely an alternative, but rather is a limitation on the rates permitted in subsections
(2), (3), and (4) in the event a higher minimum would be permitted thereunder. Conse-
quently, despite the fact that § 218.0](6)(b)(6) provides for a minimum time-price differen-
tial of$15 in motor vehicles sales contracts, the Administrator has ruled that the minimum
finance charge under § 422.201(8) is exclusive and the higher minimum provided under
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mum" charge is earned when the transaction is consummated, and
does not have to be rebated in the event of prepayment.:"
Interestingly, section 422.201(8) does not place any limitation
on the application of the minimum interest charges, and theoreti-
cally the $5.00 and $7.50 minimums can be applied regardless of
the repayment schedule. Thus a thirty day loan of $50 can have a
minimum charge of $5.00 even though the actual annual percentage
rate would be 120%.3
With regard to open-end credit transactions (credit card and
other similar open-end credit) the rates are similar to the rates
allowed on closed-end transactions in that a periodic rate of 11/2 %
per month may be charged on outstanding balances up to $500 plus
1% per month on any amount over $500.31 However, the Act
prohibits the so-called "previous" or "opening balance" method of
computing finance charges and requires that such finance charge
be computed upon either the "average daily balance" of the ac-
count during the billing cycle or the "closing balance" of the ac-
count (the amount outstanding on the last day of the billing cycle
after deducting all payments, credits and refunds during the billing
cycle). :"' Other provisions regulating open-end credit rates are also
§ 218.01(6)(b)(6) is no longer permitted in consumer credit transactions. The validity of this
regulation appears questionable in the light of the direct statutory language in § 422.201(3)
specilically making the § 218.01 rates applicable to licensees thereunder (the exclusivity of
which is emphasi/ed by the Administrator himself in Bkg. § 80.23 1) and the equally unam-
biguous language of § 422.201(8) permitting a merchant to elect the minimum finance
charge specilied therein. (Bkg. § 80.241 mistakenly refers to § 218.01(6)(a)(6) instead of
§ 218.01(6)(b)(6)).
33. Thus, upon prepayment of an obligation (whether the finance charge is precomputed
or not), the merchant is entitled to charge an amount equal to the minimum charges in
§ 422.201(8) in the event the earned finance charge upon prepayment would otherwise be
less than such minimums. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the language of
§ 422.201(8) permits the merchant to "contract for and receive" the minimum finance
charge and such language is not found in the general rate language of subsections (2), (3).
and (4). Furthermore, subsection (8) permits a minimum charge in both precomputed and
non-precomputed transactions while the rebate provisions of § 422.209 only relate to pre-
computed transactions. Since the minimum charge could be contracted for and received in
a non-precomputed transaction and would not have to be rebated upon prepayment, it is
only logical that the minimum finance charge could also be retained in a precomputed
transaction upon prepayment.
34. This subsection permits minimum charges equal to those for which § 129(a)(5) of
the Truth-In-Lending Act requires no annual percentage rate disclosure. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1639(a)(5) (1968). Since the WCA incorporates the disclosures required under the Truth-
In-Lending Act in § 422.301, the annual percentage rate of such a minimum finance charge
does not have to be disclosed.
35. § 422.201(9). Compounding interest in open-end credit plans is permitted by Bkg.
§ 80.221.
36. § 422.201(9)(a).
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contained in section 422.201(9).
In addition to the finance charge permitted by section 422.201,
a credit grantor may impose certain "additional charges" outlined
in section 422.202, including official fees and taxes,37 charges for
premiums for credit life or credit accident and sickness insurance
(written in connection with the consumer credit transaction if such
insurance is not required by the merchant as a condition of the loan
and the customer gives affirmative written indication of his desire
for such insurance), charges for property insurance (written in
connection with the transaction if a specific statement is furnished
to the customer stating the cost of the insurance if obtained
through the merchant and stating that the customer may obtain
such insurance from any person other than the merchant if he
desires), and certain charges incurred in connection with extensions
of consumer credit secured by a first lien or equivalent security
interest in real property.
One confusing aspect of the authorization to collect additional
charges under section 422.202 is that the language states that the
merchant may receive such additional charges only if he "bargains
for" them. Although the concept that certain provisions must be
"bargained for" is contained in several sections of the WCA, it
appears to make little sense in section 422.202 since all the charges
permitted therein are established by statute or third parties and not
by the merchant. For example, the cost of filing a financing state-
ment to perfect a security interest in Wisconsin is set by section
409.403 and the amount cannot be negotiated or bargained for
between the merchant and the customer. Similarly, since the prem-
iums for credit life, accident and sickness or property insurance are
usually set by an insurer which has filed its rates with the Insurance
Commissioner, the merchant has no power or authority to bargain
with the customer on the rate. The merchant must offer the insur-
ance to the customer at the rate specified, or not offer it at all.
It might be argued that the concept of "bargaining" between
merchant and customer was not intended to apply to the amount
of the additional charge, but rather to whether the charge should
37. "Ollicial Fees" are defined in § 421.301(26) to include fees actually paid to officials
for determining or perfecting a security interest as well as premiums payable for insurance
in lieu of perfecting. In addition, Bkg. § 80.08 makes it clear that official fees can include
a termination fee for terminating an outstanding financing statement or mortgage when
termination of such prior security interest or mortgage is agreed to by the customer and is
necessary for the merchant to obtain the security interest or mortgage priority agreed upon
by the parties.
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be included in the transaction at all. However, a careful reading
of the section does not support such an interpretation since the
merchant is not prohibited from requiring the customer to pay the
additional charges as a condition to extending the credit, except
with regard to credit life and accident and sickness insurance . 1
Thus it would appear that a merchant may require the customer
to pay for insurance and other additional charges (except for credit
life and accident and sickness insurance) as a condition of the
extension of credit, and the only "bargaining" which would be
available to the customer concerns whether he wants the credit,
with the additional charges, or does not want the credit at all.
Ironically, similar language is not found in section 422.201
which sets forth the maximum rates allowed in consumer credit
transactions. Thus, a merchant is not required to "bargain for" the
amount of the finance charge he may receive on an extension of
credit, yet he is required to bargain for "additional" charges set
by third parties which are usually beyond his power to alter. The
precise meaning of the "bargain for" phrase in section 422.202 is
most confusing, and appears to have no purpose. Hopefully it will
be ignored by the courts or eliminated by the legislature.
V. DELINQUENCY CHARGES
Section 422.203(1) provides that a delinquency charge in an
amount not exceeding $3.00 or 3% of the unpaid amount of the
installment, whichever is less, may be assessed on any installment
which is not paid in full on or before the tenth day after its sched-
38. Thus § 422.202(I )(b) states that credit life or credit accident and sickness insurance
cannot be -required" by the merchant. Since this subsection specifically states that this type
of credit insurance cannot be "required," it follows logically that all other charges enumer-
ated therein may be so required. Similarly § 422.202(l)(c) states that the cost of property
insurance, to be considered a permitted "additional charge," must be disclosed in writing
us must the fact that the customer may obtain such insurance through another insurer of
his choice. It is obvious that this subsection does not prohibit the merchant from requiring
the customer to purchase such property insurance as a condition of extending the credit as
long as the customer is not required to purchase the insurance from the merchant himself.
Provisions similar to this language contained in the Truth-In-Lending Act have been consis-
tently interpreted to permit the creditor to require property insurance to insure collateral
and excluded the premium from the finance charge provided that the customer is given
conspicuous notice of his right to purchase such insurance from any person of his choice
and is not required to purchase it from the creditor. See, e.g., Interpretation § 226.403 to
§ 226.4, Regulation Z. I GUIDE 1 3518.05. The fact that § 421.302(20) defines "finance
charge" as any charge payable by the customer "as a condition of the extension of credit"
does not prevent the merchant from requiring the "additional" charges in § 422.202 as a
condition of the extension of credit since § 421.301(20) specifically excludes "additional
charges under § 422.202" from the definition of finance charges.
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uled or deferred due date. This subsection also provides that only
one such delinquency charge may be imposed with regard to any
one installment, no matter how long that installment is delinquent.
The concept of a "one-time" delinquency charge substantially
changes the law prior to March 1, 1973 with regard to consumer
loans, since section 138.05(3) allowed lenders to obtain a delin-
quency charge equal to the maximum usury rate in all consumer
loan situations." Thus, a lender could impose a charge of up to
12% per annum (or 1% per month) until the delinquent installment
was paid.
Creditors have traditionally resisted the concept of a one-time
delinquency charge on the grounds that such a limitation substan-
tially weakens the underlying premises of delinquency charges.
First of all, dreditors claim that delinquency charges should serve
as a type "penalty" to encourage repayment on schedule in addi-
tion to compensating the creditor for the outstanding money which
was not paid when due. Where only a one-time default charge will
be assessed, they argue, it is obvious to the customer that once the
delinquency charge is imposed, the longer he stays in default the
"cheaper" his delinquency will become since he will have to pay
only a one-time charge whether he pays one month or one year
after the scheduled due date. Secondly, delinquency charges, at
least to some extent, offset the creditors additional bookkeeping
and collection costs which result from delinquent accounts and
assess such additional costs to the party in default.
On the other hand, the consumer groups advocating the one-
time default charge feature in the WCA claimed that the recurring
delinquency charge under the usury statutes often resulted in an
undue burden on customers. It was charged that many creditors
allowed the delinquency to continue without attempting collection
in order to build up additional delinquency charges, especially
where the indebtedness was secured and the creditor knew that the
value of the collateral would be enough to cover the remaining
obligation plus all of the accrued delinquency charges.
In limiting delinquency charges to a one-time charge to 3% of
the delinquent installment up to $3.00, it would appear that the
39. Section 138.05(3) states:
A contract to make loans or an evidence of indebtedness may provide for a rate of
interest or penalty payable upon the principal amount of an extension of a loan or
forebenrance or upon any amount in default under a loan or forebearance which shall
not exceed the rate allowed in subsection (])(a).
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legislature responded mainly to consumer arguments, although it
might be argued that the 3% charge is still a large enough amount
to be a "penalty" that will encourage prompt payment." On the
other hand, it could be that the limitation will also have unintended
repercussions for consumers. One by-product of the one-time de-
fault charge limitation undoubtedly will be that merchants will be
forced to act more quickly to attempt collection in delinquency
situations since they literally will not be able to "afford" to wait
and see if the delinquent customer can make his payment. Conse-
quently the consumer may be subject to swifter repossessions and
formal collection proceedings.
It is submitted that a more satisfactory compromise between
consumer and creditor interests would result if a continuous de-
fault charge would have been permitted up to a maximum. For
example, a delinquency charge of 2% per month up to a maximum
of 6% would appear to resolve consumer complaints, but would
also take into consideration the basic interests of creditors, namely
to encourage repayment on schedule as well as partially offset
collection and bookkeeping costs. Also, merchants would not be
forced to immediately initiate repossession or formal collection
procedures since they could wait at least three months without
giving the customer a "free" ride.
In addition to limiting delinquency charges to a one-time
charge equal to the lesser or 3% of the unpaid amount of the
installment or $3.00, section 422.203(2) specifies that, for the pur-
poses of determining delinquency charges, payments will be ap-
plied first to current installments and then to delinquent install-
ments. To illustrate the application of payments, assume that a
customer did not make a payment in a monthly installment exten-
sion of credit, (for ease of illustration, assume that the customer
does not pay his January installment) and then makes sporadic
payments from time to time. In such a situation, absent our statu-
40. UCCC § 2.203 and 3.203 grant a creditor the option of imposing a one-time
delinquency charge equal to 5% of the unpaid amount of the installment or $5, whichever is
les. in consumer credit sales or loans, or in the alternative, to impose a delinquency charge
equal to the permitted deferral charge. The deferral charge allowed under UCCC .§ 2.204
and 3.204 is essentially the same as the original annual percentage rate disclosed to the
cutomer. Therefore. although a delinquency charge based on the deferral charge rate would
usually result in a monthly charge which would be less than the one time 5% or $5 delin-
quency charge if the delinquent installment were paid shortly after default, it could result
in a greater total delinquency charge if there were an extended delinquency since the deferral
charge rate could be imposed continuously on the delinquent installment until paid in full.
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tory restrictions, most creditors would apply the payments received
to the installments due in the order in which they were due. That
is, any amounts paid by the customer would be applied.to the
January installment until it (and the permitted delinquency charge)
was paid in full. Further payments would be applied to the Febru-
ary installment until it (and the permitted delinquency charge) was
paid in full, and so on until the obligation was satisfied.
Although consumer groups apparently do not oppose such an
application of payments in general most consumer advocates nev-
ertheless felt that the application of payments to the order in which
the installment was due would be unfair for the purposes of deter-
mining delinquency charges under the WCA because of the possi-
ble misunderstanding of the concept of a "one-time" delinquency
charge. The claimed that a customer who "skipped" only one
installment, but then made subsequent payments equal to a full
installment on each of the remaining scheduled installment due
dates, might be lulled into think that he would be liable for only
one delinquency charge. Absent the restriction in section
422.203(2), of course, such would not be the case.
If, for example, the customer missed his January installment,
but brought in an amount equal to a full installment on his Febru-
ary installment due date, the merchant could apply that payment
toward the delinquent January installment (since payments would
be applied to installments in the order in which they were due) and
the February installment would then be delinquent. Since the Feb-
ruary installment would be past due, the merchant would impose
another one-time delinquency charge on that installment. If the
January installment were the seventh installment in a twelve month
contract, the customer would pay six one-time delinquency charges
(one delinquency charge each for the seventh through twelfth in-
stallments) even though he brought in an amount equal to each of
the remaining installments on their respective due dates after his
missed January payment and believed that he was delinquent on
only that one payment." Therefore, unless a customer brought in
an amount large enough to pay both the delinquent installment and
the current installment, he would be one month delinquent on the
remainder of his loan or credit sale and a delinquency charge would
be imposed each month.
41. Thus, the one-time delinquency charge limitation in § 422.203(1) itself does not
prohibit the application of payments and imposition of delinquency charges described in the
example in the text.
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To prevent unwary customers from incurring such unintended
delinquency charges, consumer groups demanded that a customer
should be protected when he misses a payment but makes subse-
quent payments on time. The result was subsection (2) to section
422.203 which requires a merchant to apply payments first to cur-
rent installments for the purposes of determining delinquency
charges. Thus, in the above example, the payment brought in on
the February installment due date (or within the ten day grace
period) would be applied first to the February installment period.
If the amount brought in is equal to the full current installment,
there is no delinquency charge under section 422.203(2) for that
month even though prior installments remained unpaid and were
delinquent.
Note, however, that the legislature apparently intended subsec-
tion (2) to apply only to the very narrow problem area specified
above, that is, where the customer brings in a full payment on a
scheduled payment due date and believes that the payment will be
applied to the installment then due. The subsection does not pre-
vent merchants from applying payments to installments in the
order they are due for all purposes other than determining a delin-
quency charge under subsection (2).11 Allowing merchants to con-
tinue the practice of applying payments to installments in the order
they are due is extremely important for accounting purposes as
well as for determining the rebates upon prepayment, and for de-
termining deferral periods and deferral charges. 3
Also, note that subsection (2) states that a delinquency charge
cannot be assessed against the current installment while earlier
installments are delinquent only if the current installment is "paid
42. Section 422.203(2) states:
No delinquency charge may be collected on an installment which is paid in full on
or before the 10th day after its scheduled or deferred due date even though an earlier
maturing installment or a delinquency charge on an earlier installment may not have
been paid in full. For purposes of this subsection, payments are applied first to
current installments and then to delinquent installments. (emphasis added)
Bkg. § 80.221 specifically permits the application of payments to "the most delinquent"
installment except for the "calculation of delinquency charges" under subsection (2) of
§ 422.203.
43. Thus, in the example used in the text, for all purposes other than the purpose of
determining the delinquency charge under subsection (2), the payment brought in on the
February installment due date (or within the ten-day grace period) would be applied to the
delinquent January installment (and accrued delinquency charges) first. February's install-
ment would still be due and owing (and hence technically delinquent) with the only differ-
ence from the practice prior to the effective date of the WCA being that no delinquency
charge could be imposed on the delinquent February installment.
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in full." If an amount less than the full installment were received,
the merchant apparently would not have to apply it to the current
installment. Therefore, in the above example, if the customer is
delinquent on his January installment, and on the February install-
ment due date brings in an amount which is half of the normal
required installment amount, the merchant would only have to
determine whether the payment received is enough to pay the Feb-
ruary installment in full. Since it would not be, the merchant pre-
sumably can ignore subsection (2) and could apply the amount
received to the delinquent January installment for purposes of de-
termining delinquency charges. The merchant then would be enti-
tled to collect a delinquency charge equal to 3% of the entire Febru-
ary installment under subsection (I).11
44. The following is submitted as an illustration of the application of the current install-
ment rule containdd in subsection (2) of § 422.203:
(a) If the first installment of $50 of a monthly payment loan (12 equal install-
ments of $50 each) is due on January 1, but only $10 is paid on that date and no
further payment is made on or before January 11, a delinquency charge of $1.20 (3%
of $40, the unpaid amount of the January installment) accrues for that installment
payment as of January 12. Since no prior installment is delinquent, the payment must
be applied to the January installment and a delinquency charge of 3% of the unpaid
amount of that installment is assessed.
(b) If on January 15, the borrower makes a second payment of $10, the amount
may be applied to the delinquency charge and unpaid balance of the January install-
ment. (See Bkg. § 80.221.) Thus $1.20 may be applied to pay the January delinquency
charge and $8.80 to the unpaid balance of the January installment. The remaining
unpaid overdue balance of the loan on January 15 would be $31.20.
(c) If another $10 payment is made on January 31, the amount in arrears would
be reduced to $21.20.
(d) If no further payment was made in January and on February 5, the borrower
makes a fourth payment of $10, the $10 payment may be applied toward the unpaid
amount of the January installment. The amount owing after application of this $10
payment would be $11.20 unpaid on the January installment plus $50 unpaid on the
February installment. However, the February installment would not be delinquent
until February 12 and no delinquency charge may accrue until then. (Since a delin-
quency charge is permissible only if the installment is not paid on or before the tenth
day "after" the installment due date, the borrower has until the end of February I I
to pay an amount equal to the full February installment to avoid a delinquency
charge for February).
(e) If the borrower, after making the $10 payment on February 5, pays another
$40 on or before February II, there can be no delinquency charge for the February
I installment since an amount equal to the "full" February installment would be
made within the applicable grace period. For bookkeeping purposes, however, all
payments can be applied first to the delinquent January installment and the remain-
der to the February installment. Thus, as of February 12, the total amount in arrears
on the loan would be $21.20. (This amount is arrived at as follows: The total due in
January and February is $100 plus the $1.20 default charge for January. The cus-
tomer paid $80 leaving an amount unpaid of $21.20. There is no delinquency charge
for February).
1974]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Although the concept of "delinquency" charges is usually ap-
plied only to precomputed credit transactions,45 the WCA does not
contain such a limitation, and section 422.203 permits such charges
in non-precomputed consumer credit transactions as well. Thus, it
appears that the Wisconsin legislation allows merchants to impose
a delinquency charge in addition to a simple interest rate in non-
precomputed credit transactions." For example, if a customer bor-
rowed $500 on a simple interest bearing basis (not precomputed),
and the loan was repayable in 12 equal monthly installments of
principal plus accrued interest, and if the customer missed his
January installment, then the lender could not only continue to
receive an interest charge at the annual percentage rate of the loan
on the missed installment until it is paid, but in addition, he could
impose the one-time delinquency charge allowed in section
422.203(l). Therefore, in a delinquency situation, a merchant with
a non-precomputed loan or credit sale will have a much greater
total charge upon delinquency than is permitted to ththe merchant
under a precomputed transaction.
The fact that section 422.203 applies to non-precomputed
credit transactions as well as precomputed credit transactions pres-
ents another peculiar dilemma. Subsection (4) states that "inter-
est" after maturity shall be at the rate specified in section
138.05(I)(a) (12% simple interest per annum), provided that no
delinquency charge is taken on the final scheduled installment.
Does this mean that "interest" after maturity is in lieu of the
finance charge rate of the original transaction or is such interest
in addition to the finance charge rate?
If the "interest" after maturity is meant to be the exclusive
(f) On the other hand, if the customer made no other payment after his $10
remittance on February 5, on February 12 the creditor would be entitled to an
additional delinquency charge of $1.50 (3% of $50). The 3% can be applied against
the full $50 February installment becausethe$10 payment made on February 5 could
be applied to the delinquent January installment, and would not have to be applied
to the February installment under § 422.203(2). The language of that subsection only
requires application to the current installment if an amount equal to the "full"
installment is remitted during the February grace period.
45. See. e.g.. UCCC ; 2.203 and 3.203. However, NCA § 2.204 does not limit the
delinquency charge to a precomputed transaction but allows such charges to be imposed
on an% transaction whether precomputed or non-precomputed.
46. Section 422.201(2) states that the finance charges permitted therein may be imposed
on the "unpaid balance" of the amount financed. Thus, the finance charge in a non-
precomputed transaction may be applied on the amount financed as long as it remains
"unpaid" even though the amount financed may remain unpaid beyond its originally sched-
uled due date.
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charge after maturity, it may result in a charge after maturity
which is substantially less than the original annual percentage rate,
even while the merchant is prohibited from collecting the indebted-
ness. To illustrate, if a customer borrows $500 at 18% on a thirty
day note, and then refuses to pay the note when due on its maturity
date, under the theory that the 12% is the exclusive charge, the
lender could not continue to charge the agreed 18% rate after
maturity, but would be forced to lower its rate to 12%. This would
appear to encourage customers not to pay non-precomputed in-
debtedness as scheduled where the rate exceeds 12% since the inter-
est rate after maturity (and after default) would actually be lower
than the original interest rate agreed upon.
The possible unfairness to merchants extending credit on a non-
precomputed basis under this theory would be magnified under the
amendment to section 425.301 passed on February 22, 1973 which
provides that no single payment loan is in "default" until forty
days after maturity." In the above example, the lender and debtor
could agree to a thirty day loan of $500.00 at 18%, but if the debtor
refused to pay at the end of thirty days, the lender could then
charge only 12% for the next forty days and could not proceed to
collect the obligation through legal proceedings until the end of
that forty days.',
Furthermore, the theory that the interest after maturity is ex-
clusive would have a paradoxical effect; during the term of a non-
precomputed transaction a merchant could collect both the finance
charge and delinquency charge on any installment past due, but
after the maturity date, he no longer would be permitted to collect
a finance charge, and the permitted "interest" after maturity could
well be lower than the original annual percentage rate of the
obligation.
On the other hand, if the interest is permitted as an additional
charge after maturity, on a $500.00 extension of credit, the total
rate after maturity could be as high as 30% (the maximum annual
percentage rate of 18% plus "interest" after maturity of 12%).
Although this total rate of 30% after maturity apparently would
not be in violation of the maximum finance charge rates permitted
in section 422.201 because the definition of what constitutes a
"finance charge" in section 421.301(20) specifically excludes delin-
quency charges under section 422.203, it certainly does not appear
47. See § 425.103, as amended, by February 22, 1973 Amendments.
48. For a discussion on the concept of "default" under the WCA, see text, infra at 455.
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to be in conformity with the intent of the rest of section 422.203.
The thrust of that section is to limit the charges imposed upon the
delinquent customer.
The precise intention of the legislature here is impossible to
determine, although logic seemingly would support the second
theory permitting interest after maturity as a charge in addition to
the finance charge rate. These inconsistencies appear to arise be-
cause the delinquency charge section has been extended to non-
precomputed transactions.49 A suggested solution would be to limit
section 422.203 to precomputed transactions, and in non-
precomputed transactions simply allow the merchant to apply the
annual percentage rate to the unpaid balance of the obligation until
paid in full, including when the obligation is delinquent.
Finally, with regard to delinquency charges on the extension of
agricultural credit, whether on a precomputed or non-precomputed
basis, the WCA grants the merchant the option of imposing the
3% delinquency charge permitted under section 422.203(1) or the
12% interest rate permitted under section 422.203(4)(b) although
the same questions concerning the exclusivity of such charges vis-
a-vis the finance charges are still present.
VI. DEFERRAL CHARGE
Turning to section 422.204 concerning deferral charges, the
WCA specifically allows the customer and merchant to defer one
or more installments in any precomputed consumer credit transac-
tion. Deferral charges, of course, are not necessary with regard to
non-precomputed transactions since the finance charge under sec-
tion 422.201(2) may be assessed against the outstanding balance of
the obligation until paid, at least until the maturity date of the
transaction.
In order to understand the allowable deferral charges contem-
plated under section 422.204 and the effect of prepaying an obliga-
tion after it has been deferred, it should first be pointed out that
there are two concepts which may be employed in "deferring" a
credit transaction. One method contemplates deferring a specific
installment from its due date until the end of the term of the
49. During negotiations over various provisions of the WCA between consumer groups
and representative creditors, consumer advocates demanded that the delinquency charge
section apply to both precomputed and non-precomputed transactions, basically because the
NCA's section on delinquency charges was applicable to non-precomputed transactions as
well as precomputed transactions.
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contract or some other specific date. The other contemplates defer-
ring the entire obligation, not just one installment.
To illustrate the first theory, assume that the customer wishes
to defer his seventh installment to the end of his twelfth month
obligation. The parties would agree to defer the seventh installment
to become due one month after the last installment, and thus the
seventh installment is placed at the end of the transaction. A simple
interest rate would be charged from the due date of the seventh
installment until it is paid one month after the last installment due
date. Deferral by this method is permitted by section 422.204(l)(b),
which permits a deferral rate equal to the original annual percen-
tage rate of the transaction."
Under the second theory, using the same example, the seventh
installment would not be deferred to one month after the end of
the contract, but rather each installment remaining in the transac-
tion would be deferred for a one month period. Thus, the seventh
installment would be due on the due date originally scheduled for
the eighth installment, and the eighth installment would be due on
the due date of the ninth installment, and so on to the end of the
contract. The twelfth installment would then be due one month
after its original scheduled due date. In essence, the whole obliga-
tion (all remaining installments) is deferred one month. This
method is also sanctioned by the WCA under the circumstances
specified in section 422.204(l)(a).5 '
In calculating the deferral charge at the time of the deferral,
theoretically it makes no difference which method is employed
since the total deferral charge will be identical. For example, the
deferral charge will be the same whether the seventh installment is
deferred for six months at the original annual percentage rate or
whether the seventh and all subsequent installments (a total of six
installments) are each deferred one month at the same rate.5 2
50. The theory or deferral described in this paragraph of the text appears to have been
the only one permitted under § 138.05(3) which controlled deferrals of consumer loans or
forehearances prior to the effective date of the WCA. The maximum deferral rate under
§ 138.05(3). which still applies to all non-consumer loans or forebearances subject to the
usury statutes, is a rate equal to 12% per annum.
51. Although the UCCC does not spell out both of the procedures cited above in the
statutory text, the Ollicial Comments to UCCC §§ 2.204 and 3.204 also contemplate that
on deferral the installment can be treated as deferred until the end of the contract or all
installments may be considered deferred for the deferral period. Section 422.204(l) simply
makes the alternatives statutory.
52. The statutory language of § 422.204(l)(a) and (b) contemplates that the deferral
charges would be identical under either method if the merchant allocated his finance charge
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However, the method of deferral does make a difference with
regard to calculation of rebates of finance charges in the event of
under the so-called "flat actuarial method" based on the annual percentage rate. [See
Official Comment to UCCC § 2.201 for discussion of finance charge allocation methods.
When the "Flat actuarial method" is employed, basically 1/12 of the annual percentage
rate of the transaction is used to determine the rate applicable to each monthly period, and
the ract that the finance charge was actually calculated using graduated rates (under the
WCA. 18% up to $500 and 12% thereafter) is ignored. However, since subparagraph (a)
requires use of the finance charge "attributable to the final installment" of the original
transaction to be used as the multiplier to determine the deferral charge, if some method
other than the "flat actuarial method" is used to allocate the finance charge, the deferral
charges under the two provisions will be different.
To illustrate, assume that the customer borrows $600 at an annual percentage rate of
10,90% (which is an add-on rate of $6 per $100) repayable in twelve equal monthly install-
ments oF $53 each. (Finance charge equals $36 and the total of payments is $636). If the
seventh installment were deferred to one month after the original maturity date of the loan,
the deferral charge under § 422.204(l)(b) would be $2.89 ($53 deferred for six months at
the annual percentage rate of 10.90%). This charge would be identical to the deferral charge
resulting under subsection (I)(a) if the finance charge is allocated according to the "flat
actuarial method." The finance charge attributable to the last installment would be $.481
(1/12th of 10.90% x $53), and the deferral charge for deferring the seventh and all subse-
quent installments one month each would be $2.89 (6 installments multiplied by $.48 I).
However, if the finance charge is allocated on some method other than the "flat ac-
tuarial method", such as the direct ratio method (more popularly referred to as the "sum
of the digits" or "Rule of 78" allocation method), then the deferral charge under subpara-
graph (a) would be lower than the charge resulting under subparagraph (b). (See infra note
61 for discussion of"Rule of 78.") Under the "sum of the digits method", the finance charge
",attributable" to the last installment would be $.461 (1/78th of the total finance charge of
$36). Using the formula in subparagraph (a), thedeferral charge in the example above would
only be $2.77 for the same period. ($.461 x 6 = $2.77.) It should be noted that one of the
main reasons merchants would prefer to make deferrals under subsection (1)(a) even though
subsection (1)(b) could yield a higher deferral charge is because of the ease in computing
refunds upon prepayment under the method allowed under subparagraph (a). See discussion
in text.
Despite the fact that § 422.204(I)(a) does not limit the method of finance charge alloca-
tion to determine the finance charge "attributable" to the last installment, Bkg. § 80.29
promulgated by the Administrator requires the merchant to use the "sum of the digits
method" of allocation to determine the portion of the finance charge "attributable" to the
last installment. Although most merchants allocate the finance charge according to the
"sum of the digits" method in precomputed transactions so that the Administrator's regula-
tion will probably have little impact, nevertheless, given the statutory language of the
section, it is doubtful that the regulation would be valid if challenged by some merchant
who desired to allocate the finance charge according to some other method. At a minimum,
the deferral charge computation under subsection (1)(a) should permit the finance charge
to be allocated to the last installment under the "flat actuarial method" since, as discussed
herein, such method would result in no greater deferral charge than would be permitted
under subparagraph (b). Furthermore, since the Administrator agrees that the two concepts
contained in § 422.204(l) are optional alternatives, (Bkg. § 80.281), a merchant employing
some finance charge allocation method other than the "sum of the digits" method could
always claim that he is making a deferral under subparagraph (b) if the deferral rate does
not exceed the annual percentage rate. It is difficult to see how the Administrator's limita-
tion on the application of subsection (1)(a) can be upheld.
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early prepayment of the entire indebtedness.
If the first concept described above were employed (section
422.204(l)(b)), upon prepayment before the maturity date, a mer-
chant in a precomputed equal monthly extension of credit would
probably compute the rebate of the finance charge for the install-
ments after the date of prepayment according to the "Rule of
78,- :" while the unpaid amount of the deferral charge attributable
to the one installment deferred from the seventh installment due
date to the end of the contract would have to be recalculated on a
simple interest pro rata basis from the seventh installment due date
until the date of prepayment. The necessity of two separate meth-
ods for calculating the rebate of the original finance charge and the
rebate of the deferred charge proved so confusing and so likely to
result in error under pre-WCA law that very few creditors deferred
precomputed loans under the usury statutes prior to the effective
date of the Act."
If the second theory is employed, the deferral charge is attrib-
uted only to the deferral period. Since the whole loan is considered
deferred one month (that is, the customer has the entire use of the
remaining unpaid balance for one extra month), the deferral
charge is earned after that month expires. Thus, when the seventh
installment becomes due one month later on its deferred due date,
the entire deferral charge is earned and no portion of it would have
to be rebated. If there were a prepayment later during the term of
the obligation, the merchant would only have to compute the re-
bate based on the "Rule of 78" for the installments remaining
unpaid. Section 422.209(4)(a) specifically contemplates this second
theory of rebating deferral charges, while subsection (4)(b) contem-
plates the first theory.
It should be noted that the second theory set forth above under
section 422.209(4)(a) does not "penalize" the consumer upon pre-
payment since the rebate would be calculated on the basis that
there is one additional month in the loan period. To illustrate,
using the above example, after being deferred one month when the
seventh installment was due, assume that the loan was prepaid in
full two months after the deferral, which would be on the date on
which the ninth installment was originally due. Under the first
theory, the calculation of rebate of the original finance charge
53. See discussion of rebate under § 422.209 in text, infra at 421.
54. Deferments were permitted under § 138.05(3) in consumer loans prior to enactment
of WCA. See supra note 50.
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would be calculated on the basis that there would be three install-
ments remaining after prepayment (the tenth, eleventh and twelfth
installments) plus a separate calculation of pro rata rebate for the
deferral charge on the seventh installment which was "deferred"
until the end of the contract. Under the second concept, each un-
paid installment at the time of the seventh installment would be
deferred one month, and on the date of prepayment, instead of
three installments remaining, the refund calculation would be
based on the four installments remaining. 5
Section 422.204(1) also provides that a deferral under one of
the two theories can be made "at any time" between a merchant
and his customer and subsection (7) spells out what disclosures
must be made at the time of the deferral. Unfortunately these
disclosures presume that all deferrals will be made according to the
first method described above (i.e. one installment deferred until
end of' contract), and the language fails to adequately take into
consideration the second theory of deferral, which is the theory
most often used by creditors. Thus, subsection (7)(c) required dis-
closure of the amount of each installment deferred, the original due
dates, and the new deferred due dates. In the above illustration, if
each installment remaining in the loan were deferred one month,
the merchant apparently would have to disclose that the seventh
installment is deferred to the due date of the eighth installment, the
eighth installment is deferred to the due date of the ninth install-
ment and so on to the end of the contract. Undoubtedly this will
confuse customers rather than inform them, since the customer
usually is concerned only with the total deferment charge necessary
to make his loan current. It appears that the disclosures required
under the Truth-In-Lending Act for deferrals or extensions are far
more clear to a customer than the additional disclosures required
under section 422.204(7) of the WCA.56
55. Using the illustration in note 52, supra, the applied to the example in note 52, supra,
the rebate permitted by § 422.09(4)(a) would be $4.62 (rebate based on the "Rule of 78"
method with four months remaining applied to a finance charge of $36.00) while the rebate
under § 422.209(4)(b) would be $4.70 ("Rule of 78"' rebate based on three months = $2.77
plu% pro rata rebate of the deferral charge = $2.89 minus earned deferral charge for two
month, equals deferral rebate of$ 1.93)). Remember that the deferral charge collected under
§ 422.204(1 )(a) was less than under § 422.204(I)(b) so that the rebate under § 422.209(4)(a)
will naturally be less than under § 422.209(4)(b). See supra note 52.
56. The disclosures required by § 422.204(7) of the WCA are in addition to the disclo-
tre, required by § 226.8(l), Regulation Z, Truth-In-Lending Act. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(l).
Section 226.8(l), Regulation Z, basically requires disclosure of (i) the amount deferred or
e\tended: (ii) the date to which or the time period for which payment is deferred or extended:
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In addition to allowing bilateral deferral' agreements, a mer-
chant may unilaterally defer a transaction when any installment is
more than thirty days over due if such arrangement is provided for
in the original contract and the merchant sends the customer the
ten day notice required in subsection (8) before granting the unilat-
eral deferral. Under section 422.204(8), only one such deferral may
take place every twelve months, although the language does not
limit the amount of time in the deferral period. Therefore, if a
customer was delinquent on his installments due on the first of
January, February, and March, but the merchant was willing to
grant a unilateral deferral of these installments to make the loan
current in April, the merchant could unilaterally defer the January
installment to become due on April 1, and similarly defer each of
the other installments remaining unpaid on the obligation to be-
come due three months later. The whole loan would be deferred
only once, although it would be a deferral for a three month period.
Presumably another unilateral deferral could be made twelve
months after January 1, the date of the first installment deferred.
VII. REFINANCING AND CONSOLIDATION
The refinancing of any consumer credit transaction or the con-
solidation of one or more consumer credit transactions are permit-
ted by section 422.205 and section 422.206 respectively at the max-
imum rates allowable under section 422.201 whether or not the
original contracts or notes being refinanced or consolidated were
at such maximum rates.
The original version of the WCA proposed to limit the annual
percentage rate on refinancing to the rate of the original transac-
tion, 5 7 although there was no attempt to limit the rate on a consoli-
dation of two consumer credit transactions. The reasoning behind
the proposed limitation on refinancing, according to consumer
groups, was to make sure that if an individual could not make his
payments and was forced to refinance an extension of credit, the
new refinanced agreement would be at no higher rate than the
original agreement.
Although attractive in the abstract, the limitation on refinanc-
ing would be unrealistic in practice since its provisions could easily
be circumvented simply by advancing new money to the customer
and (iii) the amount of the charge or fee for the deferral or extension.
57. See § 2.206 of original version of Wisconsin Consumer Act contained in Assembly
Bill 1057, 1971 Legislative Session. A similar provision is contained NCA § 2.206.
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at a higher rate than the obligation to be refinanced and then
"consolidating" the original obligation with the new obligation.
Since consolidations would have been permitted at the maximum
rates available even under the original version of the WCA, the
merchant in essence would be able to increase the rate of the
original indebtedness up to the maximum allowed rates, thereby
effectively avoiding the refinancing restrictions. In recognition that
a limitation on refinancing rates would be meaningless, the final
version of section 422.205 was changed to permit refinancing at the
maximum allowable rates without the formality of extending new
money.
In the consolidation situation, of course, there could be no
realistic attempt to limit the new consolidated rate to a rate lower
than to the allowable maximum. Since there might be a number
of different rates on the various obligations being consolidated, it
would simply be impossible to designate one of those rates as the
maximum rate for the consolidated transaction. If the "highest"
rate of the obligations being consolidated were considered the max-
imum, again the limitation could be circumvented simply be ad-
vancing new money at the maximum WCA rates and consolidating
it with the other obligations. In addition, if a creditor were limited
to a certain rate on consolidation other than the maximum rate,
he might refuse to consolidate which would often times be to the
detriment of the consumer. '
With regard to consumer credit sale transactions, the consoli-
dation provisions of section 422.206 provide new flexibility for
sellers since the WCA will allow an existing consumer credit sale
to be refinanced at the time of a second sale at the maximum rates
permitted under section 422.201 so that both obligations can be
contained in a consolidated payment schedule. Prior to the effec-
tive date of the WCA, an existing time price sale having a finance
charge greater than the usury limit could not be "consolidated"
with a second time price sale at a rate higher than 12% per annum.
The reason was that once the first sale was refinanced, it became
a "loan or forebearance," and as such, would be subject to the
usury limitations of section 138.05. Thus, where the time price
58. In a consolidation, the merchant usually consolidates previous obligations with a
current obligation so that the resulting single schedule of payments of the consolidated
transaction is less each month than the total of the monthly payments would be if the
obligations were paid separately. The resulting lower monthly or periodic payment is usually
,ought by the customer.
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differential exceeded the usury limits, time sale credit grantors had
to sell each item under a separate time price contract with its own
repayment schedule, or finance all sales pursuant to a loan agree-
ment at a rate not exceeding the usury rates. This inconvenience
for creditors and consumers has been eliminated by the refinancing
and consolidation provisions of the Act.
VIII. PREPAYMENT AND REBATE
Section 422.208 provides that a customer has the right to repay
any consumer credit transaction without penalty, except in the
circumstances of a transaction secured by first lien mortgage or
equivalent security interest where the original term is ten years or
more and the annual percentage rate is 10% or less. 9
Presumably the exception for certain real estate transactions
originally was included to permit the typical prepayment penalty
imposed by many financial institutions upon prepayment of home
mortgages. In this regard, it may be questioned why the legislature
decided to allow prepayment penalties for certain real estate trans-
actions and prohibit them in all other circumstances, especially
since statistics indicate that most home mortgages are prepaid in
full on the average of between 61 and 8 years (usually through
purchase of another home and obtaining another mortgage) so that
the prepayment penalty is actually income to the mortgagee."
There would certainly seem to be little reason for distinction be-
tween such a real property creditor and any other creditor employ-
ing the same finance charge rate.
With regard to precomputed consumer credit transactions, sec-
tion 422.209(1) provides that upon prepayment in full by the cus-
tomer, either by cash, refinancing or consolidation, the creditor
must grant a rebate of unearned interest to the customer as pro-
vided in that section. Subsection (2) provides that for transactions
repayable in substantially equal successive installments at approxi-
mately equal intervals of time, the rebate of the finance charge
must be at least as great as a rebate calculated according to the
"'sum of the digits" or "Rule of 78" method of calculating earned
interest and rebates. "
59. Since the April 22, 1973 Amendments exempted first mortgage loans of $25,000 or
less having an annual percentage rate of 12% or less, the exclusion in § 422.208 only applies
to indebtedness other than loans secured by first liens, such as land contracts.
60. This is the average life of a typical residential mortgage according to the executive
director of the Wisconsin Banker's Association. Telephone conference December 14, 1973.
61. The "sum of digits" or "Rule of 78" finance charge allocation procedure for deter-
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With respect to other precomputed credit transactions (ones
not involving equal installments at equal intervals), subsection (3)
allows the Administrator to prescribe a refund formula "consis-
tent" with the "Rule of 78" method described in subsection (2).
Pursuant to this statutory direction, the Administrator has pro-
mulgated a regulation which requires a merchant to recalculate
irregular installment precomputed transactions so that only a sim-
ple rate, not exceeding the maximums allowed under the WCA, is
permitted on the outstanding balances of the transaction for the
period that such balances were outstanding.62 In other words, the
merchant, in essence, must refund the entire precomputed finance
charge and recalculate the obligation as if it were a non-
precomputed simple interest bearing loan.
It is debatable whether the Administrator has complied with
the direction contained in subsection (3) since the requirement that
irregular payment loans be recalculated would not seem to be a
formula "consistent" with the "Rule of 78," formula contained in
subparagraph (2) in many circumstances, especially where the only
mining rebates of precomputed finance charges upon prepayment in full is widely used and
accepted in the United States as a shorthand method of approximating the rebate which
would be granted if the "actuarial" method were used. Essentially the procedure allocates
the finance charge to each month of a monthly payment obligation in the "direct ratio"
that the number of monthly installments scheduled to be outstanding on any installment
due date bears to the sum of all monthly installments scheduled to be outstanding during
the term of the transaction. Thus, during the first installment period of a twelve month
obligation, all twelve installments would be scheduled to be outstanding; while during the
second month, eleven installments would be scheduled to be outstanding and so on for each
monthly period of the obigation. The sum of all such unpaid monthly installments scheduled
to he outstanding during the term of the obligation is 78 (12 + I1 + 10 + . . .3 + 2 + I =
78). Thus, for example, the portion of the precomputed finance charge earned during the
first month of the transaction would be 12/78 since all twelve monthly installments would
have been outstanding (and used by the customer) during that monthly period. During the
second month of the transaction, only eleven monthly installments would be scheduled to
be outstanding and 11/78's of the total finance charge would be attributable to that monthly
period. Concomittantly, if the obligation were prepaid in full on the due date of the second
installment, a total of 23/78's of the finance charge would be earned and the customer would
receive a rebate equal to 55/78's of the finance charge.
Although the denominator is '78" only in a twelve-month obligation, the term "Rule
of 78" is commonly used interchangeably with the term "sum of the digits" no matter what
the length of the obligation. The method has long been used in Wisconsin (see § 138.05(2))
and has been recommended as the procedure to be used upon prepayment of precomputed
transaction in the Report to the President by the National Commission on Consumer
Finance (hereinafter referred to as "'Report"). See ch. 3, "Rebates for Prepayment" of
Report. CCH INSTALLMENT CREDIT GuIDE-Consumer Credit, Issue No. 215, (Jan. 15,
1973) at 40-41. The "Rule of 78" rebate method is described more fully in ch. 3. of the
Report as well as the Ollicial Comment to UCCC § 2.210.
62. Bkg. § 80.301.
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irregularity concerns an extended first or last installment period.
It is submitted that the Administrator would at least have to accept
the method of determining rebates on irregular transactions per-
mitted under the UCCC.13
By requiring that unearned precomputed interest be rebated
upon prepayment, the WCA basically has expanded the concept of
rebate upon prepayment in effect prior to the Act for loans under
section 138.05(2). That section, which only applies to loans, pro-
vides that a partial rebate of precomputed interest is required, but
only if such precomputed interest exceeds $10 per $100 per annum.
Under the WCA, rebates of precomputed finance charges must be
made in all consumer credit transactions no matter what the an-
nual percentage rate.
IX. DISCLOSURES TO THE CUSTOMER
Subchapter I II of chapter 422 is designed to make customers
more aware of the terms of their consumer credit obligations
through required disclosures of certain credit terms and required
notices, as well as to establish certain minimum standards which
must be followed in consumer credit transactions.
With regard to disclosures of the terms of an extension of
credit, the WCA basically builds upon the Truth-In-Lending dis-
closures, incorporating the federal disclosures by reference. It is
important to note, however, that the disclosure requirements of
subchapter I ll, including disclosures made pursuant to the Truth-
In-Lending Act, are applicable to a broader range of transactions
than are subject to the Truth-In-Lending Act itself. Thus, section
422.301 provides that disclosures under the WCA must be made
for all consumer credit sales "payable in installments" as defined
in section 421.301(30), even though no finance charge may be im-
posed. Under section 421.301(30), credit sales are considered to be
"payable in installments" when there are two installments if one
installment is more than twice the size of the other installment.
Thus, disclosure under the WCA may be required in sales where
there are only two installments even though Regulation Z only
requires disclosures to be made where there are more than four
63. See UCCC § 2.210(5) (sales) and § 3.210(5) (loans) for a description of the "Rule
of 78"" method of rebate applied to irregular payment precomputed extensions of credit.
Basicall., these sections codify the established practice of using the "Rule of 78" rebate
method where the first or last installment interval is longer or shorter than the other
intervals, if all other intervals are equal.
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installments."
In addition to the disclosures required under the Truth-In-
Lending Act, the WCA requires every document evidencing the
customer's "obligation to pay" (other than in open-end credit
transactions) to contain the following "Notice to Customer" set
forth in section 422.303(3):
(a) Do not sign this before you read the writing on the
reverse side, even if otherwise advised.
(b) Do not sign this if it contains any blank spaces.
(c) You are entitled to an exact copy of any agreement you
sign.
(d) You have the right at any time to pay in advance the
unpaid balance due under this agreement and you may be entitled
to a partial refund of the finance charge.
The intent of the notice obviously is to make customers aware
of what consumer groups consider the more important aspects of
a consumer credit transaction. The concept is laudable, and on its
face, the Notice seems quite reasonable. Unfortunately, however,
the Notice in many respects may be misleading to the customer,
and can be criticized for adding unnecessary language to consumer
credit transaction forms already overburdened with required
language.
For example, the Notice informs the customer in clause (a) that
he should not sign the agreement before reading the writing on the
reverse side even if otherwise advised. The objection to this clause
is not so much its content, but the fact that such language probably
duplicates language already contained in the contract. Virtually all
contracts state on the front that terms and conditions contained on
the reverse side are incorporated in the agreement. Rather than
having a notice to the customer telling him to read the reverse side,
in addition to the incorporation language, which still will be in-
cluded to make sure that such terms and conditions are part of the
agreement, it would seem more reasonable simply to require the
merchant to disclose "conspicuously" the fact that the terms and
conditions on the reverse side are incorporated as part of the con-
tract contained on the front side.
Also, the language of clause (a) of the Notice unnecessarily
appears to reflect the consumer groups' district of merchants by
implying that merchants would generally advise consumers not to
64. See § 226.2(k), Regulation Z. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(k).
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read the reverse portion of a contract. Interestingly, this part of
the Notice actually might result in a greater benefit to merchants
than to consumers since a customer would have difficulty claiming
that he did not read the reverse side or was unaware of its provi-
sions or-that the merchants told him not to read the reverse side
when the notice is conspicuously to the contrary.
Clause (b) of the Notice could be extremely confusing. It di-
rects the customer not to sign if there are any blank spaces in the
contract, yet it fails to inform him that, with certain exceptions,
section 422.304 only prohibits blank spaces which are to be "filled
in after it is signed." Moreover, section 422.304 permits blank
spaces for identification numbers of goods to be filled in subse-
quent to consummation of the transaction where such information
is not available at the time the transaction was consummated.615
Similarly, clause (c) may be misleading to customers since the
customer is not entitled to an exact copy of every document he
signs, but only to documents which evidence his "obligations.""6
Finally, clause (d) of the Notice is repetitious and misleading
to customers. It is redundant because the Truth-In-Lending Act
already requires creditors to disclose the method of rebate upon
prepayment. 7 In addition, it misleadingly states that the customer
may be entitled to a partial refund of the finance charge any time
he pays in advance. In fact, such rebate will only be refunded when
a precomputed consumer credit transaction is prepaid, and then
only if such transaction is prepaid in full. 8
65. Section 422.304 also requires merchants to fill in blank spaces "relating to price,
charges or terms of payment which ar inapplicable to a transaction . . . in a manner which
reveals their inapplicability unless their inapplicability is clearly and conspicuously indi-
cated.- The Administrator, in Bkg. § 80.34, has stated that a general statement to theeffect
that blank spaces are inapplicable to the transaction cannot be relied upon by merchants.
although the regulation does not prohibit the use of such general statements. The Adminis-
trator advances no reason for his regulation, and such a general statement, if clear and
conspicuous, would seem to be in comlliance with the statutory language.
66. See § 422.302(3). It should be noted that theWCA draws a distinction in this regard
between documents which evidence a customer's "obligation" and documents which evi-
dence a customer's "obligation to pay." The Notice to Customer required by § 422.303 is
only required to be inserted on the customer's "obligation to pay," while the customer is
entitled to receive a copy of ever document which "evidences the customer's obligation"
under § 422.302(3). See also Bkg. § 80.32 which acknowledges the distinction between
documents evidencing the customers "obligation" and those evidencing his "obligation to
pa).
67. § 226.8(b)(7), Regulation Z. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(7).
68. Section 422.209 specifying rebates only applies to precomputed transactions. Ob-
viously, if the finance charge is not precomputed, there is nothing to "rebate." In addition,
§ 422.209 specilically states that no refund is required unless a precomputed transaction is
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Another disclosure requirement is found in section 422.303(2)
which stipulates that the "terms" of sale contracts shall be in not
less than 8 point standard type, apparently because of the feeling
that more abuses result from the fine print in consumer credit sales
than in loans. Presumably this section does not require the whole
contract to be in 8 point type, but only the actual terms of the sale
agreement (e.g. some state and federal required disclosures might
not be considered "terms" of the sale). 9
Subchapter Il also places additional requirements on creditors
with regard to supplying customers and co-signers information to
make sure that those persons are aware of the exact nature of their
obligations. Thus, section 422.302(3) requires that the creditor fur-
nish every customer with a copy of each agreement or document
evidencing the customer's obligation. In a typical secured loan
transaction, the creditor would have to give the customer copies of
the loan document, any security instruments, and the required
federal and state disclosures.7" This is certainly a reasonable re-
quest since the customer has a right to know the extent of the
obligations. The requirement should impose little additional hard-
ship on most creditors, since creditors usually supply copies of such
documents already.
The notice to co-signers entitled "Explanation of Co-signer
Obligation" required by section 422.305 must be in at least 10
point bold face type, and delivered to and signed by each co-signer
of any consumer credit transaction. The notice is intended to put
the co-signer on notice of his obligations and especially of the fact
that he may be liable for the consumer credit obligation even
though the principal debtor may not be first pursued for collection.
Several possible pitfalls should be mentioned with regard to
this co-signer notice. First of all, it is possible to interpret section
422.305 as requiring that the notice and a copy of each instrument
prepaid "in full.' Fortunately, the Administrator has permitted some flexibility in the terms
of the Notice to Customer in forms submitted for his approval pursuant to § 426.104(4).
Thus most forms make it clear that there will only be a rebate of precomputed finance
charge% when there is prepayment "in full." In this regard, the Federal Reserve Board has
adopted a recent amendment to § 226.8(b)(7) of Regulation Z requiring disclosure when
no rebatc of finance charge will be given upon prepayment in full. I CCH GUIDF 1 3566.
Prior to the effective date of the amendment on January I, 1974, disclosures were required
onl3 %%hcre the prepayment resulted in a rebate of some portion of the finance charge.
69. In addition to the disclosures and notices set forth in the text, the WCA also requires
disclosures upon deferment. See § 422.204(7) and (8). See text at 418, supra for discussion.
70. Ifa document is signed by the customer but does not evidence any of his obligations,
uch as a loan or credit sale application, he is not entitled to a copy of the document. See
aIwo tupra note 65.
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evidencing the consumer credit transaction be supplied to each
person signing a note or time sale contract (other than the cus-
tomer and his spouse) even though all signatories are liable directly
to the creditor on a joint and several basis." In other words, since
each party executing the agreement may be considered a "co-
signer" for every other party, all parties must receive co-signer
notices and a copy of the instrument evidencing the transaction.
This requirement goes far beyong Regulation Z to the Truth-In-
Lending Act which requires only one copy of a disclosure state-
ment to be furnished to the principal debtor (a debtor other than
an endorser, co-maker, guarantor or similar party).7 2
In this regard, it is suggested that such an interpretation goes
too far. A careful reading of the language of the notice indicates
that it is primarily intended to alert parties who are secondarily
liable on the transaction, such as a guarantor or surety. Often such
parties sign separate guaranty agreements without being fully
aware of the terms of the specific credit transactions they are
guaranteeing or the full import of the guaranty agreement. The
notice correctly warns such guarantors concerning possible future
liability. However, a person who signs the loan or credit sale instru-
ment as one of the parties certainly is aware of his obligation, and
the co-signer notice becomes an additional burden on creditors
without any corresponding benefit to the customer. The co-signer
notice should be limited to parties who are secondarily liable.
In addition, the requirement in section 422.305(3) that each co-
signer also must be furnished a copy of the instrument underlying
the consumer credit transaction in addition to the co-signer notice
seems overly burdensome to creditors. One or the other would
seem sufficient.
Ironically, although section 422.305(3) requires the merchant
to furnish the co-signer with a copy of the instrument evidencing
the consumer credit transaction, there is no requirement in the
statute that the merchant supply the guarantor or endorser who
signs a separate guaranty or endorsement with a copy of that
separate agreement. However, the Administrator has issued regu-
lations requiring that the creditor deliver to the co-signer a copy
71. Although § 422.305(2) states that the explanation of co-signer obligation "shall
contain no other matter than above set forth [in subsection (1)1", the Administrator has
issued regulations permitting form numbers, execution dates, instructions, union printing
labels and acknowledgements of receipt to be included on the notice. Bkg. § 80.341. Also,
Bkg. § 80.35 permits modilication of the statutory notice for open-end transactions.
72. § 226.6(e), Regulation Z. 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(e).
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of any instrument he signs.73
Secondly, with regard to this section, it is possible that a cerdi-
tor will not be able to obtain a valid continuing or "blanket"
guaranty from an individual guaranteeing more than one
indebtedness of a customer unless the co-signer signs a new co-
signer notice and is furnished with a copy of the instrument evi-
dencing the transaction each time a new obligation is undertaken
by the customer.
This interpretation could arise by virtue of the introductory
clause to section 422.305(1) which states that no co-signer shall be
"obligated" on a consumer credit transaction unless given the re-
quired notice. Thus, without the notice, it can be argued that a
guarantor would not be obligated with regard to that transaction.
If such an interpretation is upheld, the concept of a continuing
guaranty in consumer credit transactions would probably disap-
pear; if the guarantor must execute a new notice for each transac-
tion, it would be just as easy to require him to sign the document
evidencing the transaction as one of the parties."
Finally, although originally there was no limitation on the lia-
bility of a guarantor of a consumer credit transaction in subschap-
ter I II and presumably the guarantor could have been obligated to
a greater extent than the principal debtor himself could have been
obligated, section 422.420 added by the February 22, 1973 Amend-
ments, essentially limits the co-signor's liability for fees and
charges so that it can be no greater than that of the primary debtor.
The section also provides that the co-signer is afforded the same
protections under the WCA as the original debtor himself.75
X. LIMITATIONS ON AGREEMENTS AND PRACTICES
Sections 422.401 through 422.420 further regulate and limit the
terms which may be included in the agreement between a creditor
grantor and a customer in a consumer credit transaction. Because
73. Bkg. § 80.351.
74. It appears that the Administrator has accepted the concept of continuing guaranties
in open-end transactions without requiring the co-signer to execute a new explanation each
time a new transaction is entered into as long as the co-signer's liability does not exceed
the amount originally specified on the co-signer explanation. Bkg. § 80.35. It would seem
that the same concept could also be applied to a continuing guaranty for a series of closed-
end transactions, although no regulation has been issued on the subject.
75. For a discussion on the possibility that a guarantor could guarantee attorneys' fees
in a consumer credit transaction even though the principal written agreement between the
merchant and the customer cannot contain a provision for attorneys' fees, see supra note
103.
[Vol. 57
W.C.A.-A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
of the numerous restrictions and limitations contained in these
sections, it is impossible to discuss each one in detail, and the
following will discuss only the more important provisions which
are likely to affect creditors and consumers most frequently.
A. Balloon Payments
Consumer groups have long considered the typical balloon pay-
ment transaction abusive because the arrangement allegedly en-
tices unsuspecting customers into low monthly payments on a
transaction which then has a prohibitively large last installment
often referred to as a "balloon" payment. Although the customer
can make the monthly installments, it would usually be impossible
for him to pay the balloon payment when it came due. Merchants
might agree to refinance the balloon payment, but consumer
groups claimed that such refinancings were often at a much higher
annual percentage rate than the original transactions. Also, if the
merchant refused to refinance the balloon payment, the customer
would be forced to obtain new financing (which often times would
be impossible) or to return the collateral which secured the obliga-
tion often leaving the customer with no merchandise and a possible
deficiency.
The Truth-In-Lending Act attempted to negate the abuses con-
nected with balloon payments by requiring such payments to be
clearly identified." However, apparently feeling that the abusive
practices concerning balloon payments were still present, con-
sumer Groups in Wisconsin insisted that legislation restricting
balloon payments be contained in the WCA.
Creditors, on the other hand, pointed out that typical balloon
payment transactions gave the consumer more borrowing power
enabling him to make large purchases or to meet emergencies with
low monthly payments which fit his budget and a balloon payment
at the end. Most creditors claim that they rarely refused to refi-
nance the balloon, and tha. the refinance rates did not differ
greatly from the original rate.
The WCA basically agreed with consumers by prohibiting most
76. § 226.8(b)(3), Regulation Z. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(3). In fact, Regulation Z ex-
tended the concept of "balloon payment" to include any payment which is twice the size of
any other payment stating that:
If any payment is more than twice the amount of an otherwise regularly scheduled
equal payment, the creditor shall identify the amount of such payment by the term
'balloon payment' and shall state the conditions, if any, under which that payment
may be relinanced if not paid when due.
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balloon payments in section 422.402 although there was some com-
promise since the section excepts open-end credit plans, non-
precomputed transactions on which the annual percentage rate
disclosed is less than 12% and transactions involving an extension
of agricultural credit.
In consumer credit transactions not specifically exempt from
section 422.402, however, the restrictions extend far beyond merely
limiting the typical balloon payment arrangement involving a large
last installment after a number of lower equal installments. The
section prohibits any consumer credit transaction which does not
have substantially equal installments or is not payable in substan-
tially equal intervals unless specifically permitted under one of the
narrow exceptions contained in subsection. (2).11
Subsection (2)(a) permits irregular payments or irregular inter-
vals (including traditional balloon payment type arrangements)
where the income of the customer is "seasonal" and the credit
arrangement is "in accordance with the needs of the customer,"
but only if a proper "warning" concerning the irregular payment
arrangement be set forth in the contract.' 8 Moreover, section
422.401(3) provides that the customer shall have the right at any
time to refinance any unequal or irregular (balloon) installment at
an annual percentage rate which does not exceed the rate disclosed
in the original transaction, although in this regard it is not alto-
gether clear whether subsection (3) is referring to the finance
charge rate of the original transaction, or whether it simply is
requiring the creditor to disclose the rate at which the balloon
payment will be refinanced at the time of the original transaction.
Arguably, because limitations on rates at the time of refinancing
are easily circumvented and because section 422.402(3) specifically
permits the method of refinancing contemplated in section 422.205
(which permits refinancing at maximum rates),79 subsection (3)
77. The language of§ 422.402(l) would not appear to prohibit an interval between the
date of the agreement and the first installment due date which is longer or shorter than the
other payment intervals since the section only requires that intervals "between" payments
he %uhstantially the same. Since there is no payment due before the first payment, the first
payment interval is not subject to the limitation.
78. Section 422.402(2)(a) requires the following warning to be stated in 12 bold type
on any permitted balloon payment transaction:
WARNING
The amounts of payments or the dates on which they are payable under this agree-
nient arc not equal. Do not sign this paper unless you are certain that this payment
schedule meets your needs.
79. See text at 419 supra, for discussion of § 422.205.
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only requires the disclosure of the rate which will apply if the
balloon payment is refinanced, and does not limit the refinance
rate to the rate of the original transaction."0
Subsection (2) also provides that a downpayment of any
amount will not be considered a prohibited balloon payment if it
is paid prior to or contemporaneously with the consummation of
the transaction or if the downpayment is no more than 20% of the
cash price of an item if it is paid on or before the due date of the
second installment. In addition, last installments may exceed the
average of all other installments by as much as 10%.1
B. Maximum Periods of Payment
Another alleged abusive practice claimed by consumer groups
concerned extensions of credit with low payments stretched over a
prolonged number of months or even years so that the total
amount of finance charge paid became extremely large. To prevent
such practices, section 422.403 limits the number of months over
which consumer credit transactions can be scheduled, depending
on the amount of the original transaction. Surprisingly, the limita-
tion on the periods of repayment does not apply simply to precom-
puted transactions (which is the case with the statutes of most
states which limit the periods of repayments) but applies to all
credit transactions whether precomputed or non-precomputed.82
80. Thus, if the original contract containing the balloon payment (as permitted by
subsection (2)(a)) states that the balloon installment can be refinanced at the maximum
rates under the WCA, the disclosure would appear to comply with§ 422.402(3) even though
the annual percentage rate of the original transaction is lower than the maximum rate.
81. Section 422.412 provides limitations on consumer leases similar to the balloon
payment limitation contained in § 422.402 stating that in consumer leases other than ones
for agricultural purposes, the obligation of the customer upon expiration of the lease cannot
exceed the average payment allocable to a monthly period under the lease, except for
damages caused to the leased property. See also Bkg. § 80.38 (charge for excess mileage in
motor vehicle lease is considered damages and is not prohibited by § 422.412).
82. There is good reason for limiting the maximum period of payment in many precom-
puted transactions since the simple interest rate per year (the annual percentage rate) often
increases with each year that the transaction is scheduled to be outstanding. For example.
the annual percentage rate computed on a "discount" basis of 10% per annum per year
would be 19.91% for a one year extension of credit repayable in equal monthly installments,
while the same discounted rate over a live year obligation would result in an annual percen-
tage rate of 31.58%. (Where the linance charge is calculated using a discount rate, it is
deducted froni the total amount of the obligation. For example, if the total of payments in
a consumer credit transaction was $1,000, a 10% discount rate for a one year monthly
repayment loan would result in a linance charge of $100 and an amount financed of $900, if
the $1,000 were repayable in two years at the same discount rate the finance charge would
he $200 and the amount financed $800; etc.). Thus, a limitation on the maximum period of
payments is necessary to limit the effective annual percentage rate which may be charged
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An unexpected result caused by the limitations on periods of
repayment contained in the original version of section 422.403 was
the prohibition of the typical government college student loan,
since such transactions would often extend beyond the designated
maximum period. For example, most government student loans do
not require repayment until after graduation, and the period from
the commencement of the loan until repayment would often be
longer than the maximum periods stated in section 422.403. To
correct this unintended result, subsection (4) was added to section
422.403 by the February 22, 1973 Amendments, specifically to
exempt college student loans from the limitations of section
422.403. New subsection (2) was added at the same time to permit
longer periods of repayment for credit used to improve the cus-
tomer's real estate, provided that the annual percentage rate does
not exceed 15%.
It is worth noting that with regard to non-precomputed credit
transactions with an annual percentage rate of less than 12%, sec-
tion 422.403 does not prevent a merchant and a customer from
agreeing to a repayment schedule which substantially exceeds the
stated maximum periods, since the last payment can be a large
balloon payment which the parties can agree to refinance. 3 For
example, if the total of payments if $700 in a transaction with an
annual percentage rate of less than 12%, the obligation can be
repaid in twenty-four equal installments of $10 each and a final
balloon payment of $460."'. The balloon payment can then be refi-
nanced and repaid in any number of installments since section
422.403 only provides a maximum period of repayment for the
"initial" transaction. This technique undoubtedly will be employed
by merchants who traditionally permit the cash price of an item
to be repaid over an extended period of time without a finance
charge, such as in jewelry sales, water softener sales, cemetery lot
sales and the like.
on a transaction. However, the same rationale does not apply to non-precomputed transac-
tions since the annual percentage rate remains the same no matter how long the period of
repayment is scheduled. Thus, the WCA not only controls the maximum finance charge
rates in a consumer credit transaction, but also, for the first time, limits the length of a
consumer credit transaction to the extent set forth in § 422.403 even though such repayment
period has no effect on the annual percentage rate.
83. Section 422.402 restricting balloon payments does not apply to non-precomputed
transactions where the annual percentage rate is less than 12%.
84. The "'balloon payment" must still be disclosed pursuant to § 226.8(b)(3), Regula-
tion Z. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(3).
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C. Limitation On Holder In Due Course
And Waiver of Defense Doctrines
One of the major changes, long advocated by consumer groups,
which has been incorporated in the WCA, concerns the limitations
on the rights of holders of time sales contracts or negotiable docu-
ments evidencing a time sale where the holder is not the original
seller."
Prior to the WCA, the common practice of many sellers was
to take a "negotiable" promissory note or a contract containing a
clause waiving all defenses against the assignee to evidence the
obligation incurred in a time sales transaction. The seller would
then negotiate the note to a third party who became a "holder in
due course" or sell the contract containing the "waiver of defense"
clause to a third party who would be able to pursue collection of
the obligation without regard to most claims or defenses that the
buyer might have against the original seller, including claims for
defective merchandise or failure to perform."' Consumer groups
have long claimed that such doctrines fostered fraudulent practices
by allowing sellers to obtain a negotiable promissory note evidenc-
ing the sale obligation or sales contracts containing a waiver of
defense clause before the customer has a chance to discover if the
merchandise sold or work performed is satisfactory. If the cus-
tomer later discovered that the work or service was not as prom-
ised, the seller often had vanished or become insolvent so that no
remedy was available against the party actually at fault. Since no
claim would be available against the "holder in due course" or the
third party to whom the contract was assigned, the customer would
not only be saddled with the inferior work or merchandise, but
would still be required to pay the third party holder. Even when
the seller was available, if he refused to correct the customer's
complaint, the customer was faced with the prospect of commenc-
ing a lawsuit for satisfaction, which probably would be more costly
than the amount being claimed, while still being required to make
payments to the holder of the note or contract.
Creditors defended the holder in due course and waiver of de-
fense concepts as necessary to allow the unobstructed and easy
movement of consumer paper. The argument was that third party
purchasers of such paper, such as financial institutions, should be
85. k§ 422.406-422.408.
86. Under § 403.305 of Wisconsin's Uniform Commercial Code, a holder in due course
takes the note free from all claims and defenses except those set forth in § 403.305(2).
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able to look at the face of the note or contract and determine
whether it would be subject to any claims or defenses arising out
of the underlying transaction. If the assignee ascertained that the
note or contract would not be subject to claims that the customer
may have against the seller, he would be able to purchase-the
instrument without the delay which would have otherwise been
necessary to check the validity of each underlying transaction.
Also, creditors pointed out that the customer was the one who
dealt with the seller, and therefore was in a much better position
to determine the seller's trustworthiness with regard to defective
merchandise or performance of services. If the merchandise or
services were inferior, the customer could proceed against the
seller, but he should not have the right to stop payment to the third
party assignee who had nothing to do with the underlying transac-
tion. If the seller was insolvent or could not be found, the customer
should bear the loss.
In rebuttal, the consumer groups argued that the institutional
assignee in today's society is in a much better position than the
customer to determine the trustworthiness of the seller and the
merchantability of the service or products sold by a particular
merchant. They not only claim that purchasers of notes or sales
contracts, such as financial institutions, can easily check on the
trustworthiness of a merchant, but that all too often such purchas-
ers know or should know that the merchant is not acting properly
with regard to his sales or services. Despite this, such institutions
purchase a seller's negotiable notes or sales contracts knowing that
they will be protected from liability under the holder in due course
doctrine or waiver of defense clause. Consumer groups argue that
the elimination of the holder in due course doctrine and regulation
of waiver of defense provisions would force the large financial
institutions to purchase such instruments only from sellers who
perform properly, thereby "policing" such merchants. Such re-
sponsibility on third party holders would cause sellers to upgrade
the merchandise and service sold to customers. In addition, limita-
tion of the protective doctrines would guarantee the customer some
remedy in the event he is "tricked" into purchasing inferior mer-
chandise or services.
The result of the conflicting arguments is that the WCA pro-
hibits sellers from taking a negotiable instrument, other than a
check, in a consumer credit sale and substantially limits the valid-
ity of waiver of defense provisions in sales contracts.
With regard to elimination of a "negotiable" note, section
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422.406 prevents a subsequent holder of such a note from becom-
ing a "holder in due course," and instead limits his capacity to that
of an assignee. As an assignee, of course, the holder is subject to
the same claims and defenses as the seller.
Section 422.406(4) does limit the liability of such holder to the
amount owing on the instrument at the time the holder receives
notice of a claim or defense against the original seller if the cus-
tomer's claim is eventually proven to be valid. However, if the
customer cannot obtain satisfaction against the original seller for
his valid claim, the holder may be additionally liable for any
amounts he has previously received from the customer. In order
for the customer to obtain this additional amount, he must obtain
a judgment against the seller which is uncollectible and must act
against the holder within the time limits outlined in section
422.406(4.87
It is important to note that the buyer may sue the holder of the
instrument directly for any claim or defense he may have against
the seller, since the holder of any note, who is not a holder in due
course, takes subject to all claims and defenses which the maker
of the note has against the original payee. The seller may, of
course, be joined in the action.8
Although the language contained in subsection (4) of section
422.406 purports to limit a holder's liability to the unpaid balance
of the instrument at the time the holder receives notice that the
customer has a claim or defense against the original payee of the
note, unfortunately there appears to be confusion arising from the
juxtaposition of subsection (3) with subsection (4). Subsection (3)
provides that "a holder to whom an instrument [is] issued in viola-
tion of this section . . . is subject to all claims and defenses of the
customer against the payee subject to the extent provided in
subsection (4)". Subsection (4) then states that "such holder's lia-
bility . . . is limited. . ." as described therein. Therefore, it could
be claimed that subsection (4) merely limits the liability of a holder
who actually takes a negotiable instrument in violation of section
87. Section 422.406(4)(b) provides that the customer must proceed against the holder
within two years after an execution with bond is returned unsatisfied against the original
seller. The section also requires the customer to levy execution against the original seller
within one year after judgment.
88. The right to directly sue a holder of a note taken in a consumer credit sale permitted
under § 422.406 should be compared with the prohibition against such direct action where
the consumer credit sale is evidenced by a retail sale contract rather than a promissory note.
See text infra, at 438, for discussion of § 422A07(5).
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422.406, but does not limit the liability of a holder of a non-
negotiable instrument who attempts to comply with the WCA.
Such a result does not appear to be the legislature's intent since
creditors would be encouraged to take instruments purporting to
be negotiable in order to limit their liability. This certainly would
be in direct contravention to the purpose of section 422.406 which
is to prohibit the use of such negotiable instruments. The legisla-
ture should have been more precise and specified that the holder
of any promissory instrument, whether negotiable or not, would be
held liable only to the limits contained in subsection (4).
Since negotiable instruments are prohibited only in a consumer
credit sale transaction under section 422.406, absent some restric-
tions, it would be possible for a seller to circumvent the limitation
of section 422.406 simply by sending the customer to a lender who
would loan the money to the customer using a negotiable note, but
by prior arrangement with the seller, have the proceeds made paya-
ble directly to the seller. To prevent this type of circumvention,
section 422.408 provides that loans which are so closely related to
a credit sale that they are really "interlocking" transactions, will
be treated essentially as if the seller himself took the note.
Subsection (3) of section 422.408 defines when a loan is "inter-
locking" with a consumer credit sale and essentially includes loans
where the lender and seller are "related" or have an arrangement
which indicates that the basic purpose for the loan is to circumvent
the prohibition against negotiable instruments in consumer credit
sales."9 Paragraph (e) and (f) of subsection (3) are the only two
extensions of the definition of "interlocking" beyond the situation
of a pre-arranged relationship between the lender and seller.
Subsection (3)(e) states that if a lender has knowledge of "sub-
stantial complaints" that a seller or lessor fails or refuses to per-
form his contracts and fails to remedy complaints within a reason-
able time then the loan will be considered an "interlocking" loan,
provided, of course, that the lender knows that all or a "meaningful
part" of the proceeds will be paid to such a seller as required under
the introductory clause of subsection (3). However, section
422.408(3)(e) undoubtedly will be applied only to clear cut and
blatant failures to perform on the part of sellers, since the cus-
tomer's burden of proving that the lender had "knowledge . . . or
written notice of substantial complaints" (emphasis added) against
the seller for failure to perform, and knowledge of the merchant's
89. See § 421.301(32) and (33) for definition of "related" persons.
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failure to remedy such complaints, would appear extremely
difficult. 'J°
Subsection (3)(1) provides that an interlocking loan will result
under lender credit card systems where a purchase is financed by
a loan in excess of $100 disbursed directly to a seller who has a
direct or indirect contractual relationship with the credit card is-
suer permitting him to honor that credit card. Where subsection
(3)(0 applies, § 422.408(5) requires the customer to notify the card
issuer of his claim within twelve months after entry of the transac-
tion on his account. Lender credit card transactions under $100 are
not considered interlocking loans unless one of the other elements
of subsection (3) are applicable. The $100 exemption also applies
to seller credit card transactions which are used in the same man-
ner as a lender credit card with parties unrelated to the issuer."
Since section 422.408 is intended merely to avoid the circum-
vention of the prohibition against taking negotiable instruments in
the typical consumer credit sale transaction for merchandise or
services, the section as originally enacted did not extend to the
financing of residential real property secured by a first lien on the
property when the annual percentage rate was less than 12%.12 Of
90. Some consumer advocates have opined that "grapevine" information of complaints
against a seller would be sufficient to give a lender knowledge under § 422.408(3)(e), or that
a newspaper account of a seller's failure to perform would constitute sufficient "notice"
under that section. See Davis, supra note 3, at 24. However, subsection (3)(e) clearly
requires something more. The section was intended to require actual knowledge on the part
of the lender of such complaints since the objective standard that the lender "should have
known" of such complaints is not found in this subsection. Compare § 425.310 (which
provides that corporate officers may be liable for damages in certain circumstances where
he knew of, or "should have known of" violations of the WCA). The phrase stating that
such "knowledge" may be obtained by a lender "from his course of dealing with other
customers of the seller" simply is to make it clear that the information would not have to
come from the customer who is asserting that the loan is interlocking, but can come from
other customers. However, such knowledge must be actual knowledge and not third-party
hearsay or "grapevine" accusations. Similarly, the "written notice" of substantial com-
plaints "by such other customers" can only include notices directed to the lender by custom-
ers of the seller, and certainly cannot logically be expanded to include any written word
concerning the seller, such as a story printed in a newspaper. Finally, as emphasized in the
text, the lender must not only have knowledge of the "substantial complaints," but also
knowledge that the merchant "fails to remedy such complaints within a reasonable time."
91. See § 422.408(2). Ordinarily, all seller credit transactions (such as oil company
credit cards) would be considered transactions subject to the restrictions concerning waiver
of defense clauses contained in § 422.407 since such transactions are not "consumer loans"
as defined in § 421.301(12). However, § 422.408(2) redefines consumer loans for the pur-
poses of § 422.408 to include seller credit card transactions except when the transaction is
with the seller credit card issuer or a person related to the issuer or operating pursuant to a
license or franchise under the trade name of the issuer. In those transactions not included
in § 422.408, of course, the customer may assert any claim against the issuer whether under
or over $100 within the limitations of § 422.407.
92. § 422.408(6).
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course, this exception becomes somewhat less important after en-
actment of chapter 428, which regulates all first lien mortgage
loans."
The WCA also limits the effectiveness of the so-called "waiver
of defense" clause in time sale contracts, although the validity of
such provisions are not eliminated as are the protections granted
a "holder in due course" of a negotiable instrument. Thus, section
422.407(2) states that waiver of defense clauses are not effective
until twelve months after the buyer receives notice of the assign-
ment of the sale contract from the seller to a third party.94 In other
words, the buyer has one year after notice of assignment in which
to notify the assignee of possible claims or defenses.95 Such assign-
ment must be in good faith to an assignee not related to the seller."
The time period obviously represents a compromise between
consumer and creditor interests. The first twelve months after the
assignment of the contract was felt to be the time period during
which most warranty defects or other non-performance on the part
of the seller would occur and when the consumer is most in need
of a defense against collection attempts by third party assignees.
The effectiveness of the waiver of defense clause after twelve
months meets the needs of creditors by granting them an assurance
that at some definite time the sale contract paper which they have
purchased will be enforceable on its face and will not be defaulted
because of the underlying transaction. Most creditors feel that if
claims were allowed after twelve months, false and spurious claims
would be fostered simply to avoid or hinder collection by the third
party assignee.
It is important to note that the twelve month period does not
commence until a notice of the assignment is sent to the buyer by
93. See note 59 supra for discussion of ch. 428.
94. The language of§ 422.407 appears to have left open a technical loop hole concern-
ing waiver of defense clauses since subsection (1) states that the section only applies to
consumer credit transactions "other than a consumer loan which is not an interlocking
consumer loan." This leaves open the possibility that a seller could take a non-negotiable
promissory note in a consumer credit sale containing a waiver of defense clause. Since
§ 422.406 only prohibits "negotiable" instruments in consumer credit sales, and since
§ 422.407 only applies to credit transactions other than consumer loans, arguably there is
no limitation against waiver of defense clauses in non-negotiable promissory notes.
95. It is interesting to note that §§ 422.406-422.408 provides the purchaser of goods on
credit with substantially greater rights than a purchaser who pays cash. Thus, these sections
grant a customer who purchases on credit the right to proceed against the third-party
assignee in certain circumstances as well as against the original seller for defective merchan-
dise or services. A cash customer, of course, can only proceed against the seller.
96. § 422.407(2).
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the assignee. Pursuant to section 422A09, such notice must make
conspicuous reference to the customer's right to notify the assignee
of any claims or defenses he may have against the seller within
twelve months after receiving the notice of assignment, and warn
that if no notification is given by the customer, the assignee may
enforce the contract fee of such claims or defenses.
As in the case of a holder of an instrument under section
422.406, the liability of a third party assignee of a time sale con-
tract containing a waiver of defense clause generally is limited to
the unpaid balance at the time he receives notification from the
buyer of a claim against the seller.17 Similarly, if the buyer obtains
a judgment against the seller which is returned unsatisfied and later
proves to be uncollectible, the buyer can obtain additional recovery
of all amoun'ts aid to the holder or assignee prior to the notice of
claim or defense. 8
Contrary to the rights of a customer to sue the holder of a
negotiable instrument directly, section 422.407(5) states that "any
claims or defenses of the customer" against the seller "can only
be asserted as a matter of counterclaim, defense to, or set-off
against a claim by the assignee" of a time sale contract. This
means that a customer may neither sue a third party assignee
directly on a claim against the seller, nor join the assignee in any
lawsuit commenced against the seller. Rather, the customer only
has the right to assert his claim as a "counterclaim defense to or
set-of' in a lawsuit for collection by the assignee.
This provision is extremely important to creditors since it
should prevent disgruntled customers who have a claim against
sellers from routinely joining third party assignees in lawsuits
against the seller."5 Absent this limitation against direct action,
97. § 422.407(2)(a).
98. § 422.407(2)(b).
99. Section 422.407(5) has another important effect. Although the section permits the
customer to preserve his claim or defense against the assignee, it does not give him the legal
right to stop payment on the obligation. Consequently, if the customer does stop payment.
which lie usually will do if he has a legitimate claim against the seller, it will constitute a
"delault" under § 425.103 permitting the assignee to seek legal collection of the indebted-
ness and test the validity of the customer's claim or defense in court. If a customer were
given the statutory right to cease payment if he had a valid claim against the seller, arguably
the assignee would never have the opportunity to force the customer to prove the validity
of his claim or defense in a legal proceeding because a default occurs under § 425.103(2)
only if the customer refuses to pay the obligation "without justification under any law."
100. It should be noted that if the buyer obtains judgment against the seller for defective
merchandise or other legitimate claim, and the judgment proves uncollectible. or if the seller
is bankrupt or cannot be found within the state, the limitation of§ 422.407(5) does not
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third party assignees would probably be joined in every action
commenced by a customer against a seller and thereby forced to
incur litigation costs even though the customer is eventually suc-
cessful in collecting his claim against the seller.' Of course, as-
signees of contracts or notes without waiver of defense clauses
could be sued directly.i'l
D. Attorneys' Fees
Section 422.411 provides that writings evidencing a consumer
credit transaction may not include a provision for the payment of
attorneys' fees by the customer. The prohibition apparently is
aimed at prohibiting clauses, often inserted by merchants in con-
sumer agreements, stating that the customer will be responsible for
attorneys' fees up to 15% or 25% of the unpaid balance of the
obligation in the event of default. Before the WCA, some mer-
chants would assess such fees immediately after default even if the
contract were never turned over to an attorney for collection.
An exception is provided for consumer transactions in which
(i) the credit is extended for the purpose of acquiring residential
property, (ii) the extension of credit is secured by a first lien mort-
gage or equivalent security interest, and (iii) the annual percentage
rate is 12% or less, although again this exception became relatively
unimportant when chapter 428 was added to the WCA by the April
22, 1973 Amendments covering all first mortgage loans with an
annual percentage rate not exceeding 12%. In transactions where
the above elements are met, the merchant may contract for the
payment of attorneys' fees with the customer not to exceed 5% of
any judgment entered against the customer or $100, whichever is
less. Also, the fees must be payable only to licensed attorneys not
employed by the merchant.
With regard to mortgage loans covered by chapter 428, section
428.103(1)(e) permits a lender to contract for attorneys' fees for
opinions of title as well as an amount equal to 5% of the amount
adjudged due a creditor on the unpaid indebtedness in the event of
foreclosure. If a foreclosure action is settled prior to judgment, the
creditor may recover reasonable attorney fees up to 2 % of the
unpaid principal balance if the contract so provides.
apply and the customer can proceed against the third-party directly for the entire amount
of the indebtedness under § 422.407(2).
101. See text supra at 438, for discussion. The possibility of waiver of defense clauses
in non-negotiable notes is discussed supra note 94.
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The reasoning of the legislature in allowing limited attorneys'
fees under sections 422.411(2) and 428.103(l)(e) apparently is that
an annual interest rate of 12% or less does not sufficiently compen-
sate a first mortgagee for the substantial legal cost of foreclosing
a mortgage and therefore, such creditors should not have to bear
the entire legal expense of foreclosure as a cost of doing business.
However, there appears to be little reason for the distinction be-
tween first lien mortgagees and all other merchants, other than an
arbitrary determination on the part of the legislature. It certainly
can be argued that whatever justification there is for allowing cer-
tain first mortgagees to collect attorneys' fees, although limited,
also applies to all other merchants charging the same rates. Pro-
hibiting a large group of merchants from collecting the actual
attorneys' fe~s from defaulting customers means that the cost of
collecting such delinquent accounts will be spread among all con-
sumers in the form of higher finance charge rates.
The problem of protecting the defaulting customer from exces-
sive extra charges while not forcing all customers to subsidize him
appears to be more fairly approached by the recommendation of
the National Commission on Consumer Finance, which reflects the
status of the law in many states. The Commission proposed that
the defaulting customer should bear his own attorneys' fees if in
fact the contract were referred to an attorney for collection and the
attorneys' expense is actually incurred, and in no event could such
fees exceed 15% of the outstanding indebtedness at the time of
default. r'11
Finally, it should be noted that although section 422.411 pro-
hibits any writing from containing a provision providing for the
payment of attorneys' fees by customers, the section does not pur-
port to limit the right of creditors to collect statutory fees such as
those provided in section 271.04.13
102. See Report supra at 25-26. The states which have adopted the UCCC have all
chosen alternative B of uccc § 2.413 which permits attorneys' fees up to 15% of the
unpaid net after default as recommended by the National Commission on Consumer
Finance.
103. Also it is interesting to note the curious language contained in the prohibition
against the attorneys' fees in § 422.411. The section does not prohibit such attorneys' fees
in a consumer credit transaction, but only prohibits a provisions for such attorneys' fees
from being included in the written contract between the customer and the merchant. Theo-
retically, therefore, it is possible for the customer to agree to the imposition of such attor-
neys' fees orally as long as the provision is not included in writing. Since § 421.301(3)
defines an "agreement" under the WCA as the bargain of the parties in fact and specifically
states that § 402.202 concerning the prohibition against parol evidence is inoperative to
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E. Multiple Transactions
Section 422. 414 prohibits a merchant from dividing one trans-
action into two or more loans or sales in order to obtain a higher
finance charge rate than would be permitted if the transaction were
set up as a single sale or loan. This prohibition is necessitated by
the fact that the WCA allows an 18% charge on the first $500
financed, and only a 12% charge on amounts above $500. Without
section 422.414, a merchant could divide what is essentially a single
sale or loan into two or more obligations of less than $500 each and
obtain 18% on each obligation instead of obtaining 18% on only
the first $500 and 12% on any excess.
Some critics have claimed that section 422.414 is automatically
violated any time a customer owes more than one obligation to the
same creditor at the same point in time. Such a narrow interpreta-
tion, however, certainly is not supported by the language of subsec-
tion (I), especially when read in conjunction with subsection (2).
Subsection (2) provides that more than one loan or financed sale
arising out of "substantially" the same transaction shall be
presumed a violation of the section. There is no such presumption,
however, where the multiple agreements arise out of separate
transactions, indicating that multiple indebtednesses arising out of
separate transactions were definitely contemplated.
A narrow interpretation prohibiting a customer from having
more than one outstanding obligation from each creditor at any
point in time would force a creditor to refinance all prior obliga-
tions whenever the customer desires a new extension of credit.
Such refinancing might be impossible for multiple office creditors
like finance companies or large retail operations, neither of which
would have any way of readily ascertaining if the customer were
exclude admissable evidence of the actual bargain in fact between the parties, it is conceiv-
able that the oral agreement to such attorneys' fees could be enforced. See text supra at
394. This argument is supported by the language contained in § 428.103(I)(a) concerning
certain first mortgage real estate loans where a creditor cannot "contact for or charge"
attorneys' fees except as set forth in that section, indicating that the legislature could have
prohibited all attorneys' fees in § 422.411 if it desired (emphasis added). Perhaps more
intriguing is the possibility that a guaranty agreement could provide that the guarantor is
responsible for any attorneys' fees incurred in attempting to collect the transaction upon
default by the customer if the customer agreed to such attorney fees orally. Such a provision
would not be prohibited by § 422.420 (added by the February 22, 1973 Amendments) since
that section only prohibits a co-signer from being obligated for the payment of fees which
could not be imposed upon the customer, and § 422.411 does not prohibit the customer
from orally agreeing to attorneys' fees. A similar analysis could be applied to the agreement
to pay default charges orally. See § 422.413.
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already obligated on another consumer credit transaction. Indeed,
even if it could be discovered whether the customer had other
obligations with the creditor, a rebate of the finance charge would
have to be calculated on such previous transactions causing irritat-
ing delays for customers and merchants alike. Certainly the legisla-
ture intended no such result. Also, in precomputed transactions,
requiring a refinancing and consolidation every time a subsequent
extension of credit is sought by the customer could result in a
greater total finance charge than if the transactions were kept
separate104
Rather, section 422.414 only regulates the merchant's conduct;
he may not "divide" an obligation to obtain a higher finance
charge than would otherwise be permitted. If the customer himself
obtains a $560 loan today, and, on his own volition, comes in the
following week and obtains another $500 loan, the creditor may
charge the maximum rate on both loans apparently without violat-
ing the section.
However, the section makes it clear that such multiple indebt-
edness can only be initiated by the customer. Thus, section 422.414
not only forbids a merchant from splitting transactions, but also
104. For example, assume that a customer purchases a washer and dryer for $800 and
'finances it at the maximum annual percentage rates permitted by § 422.201 repayable
monthly over a twenty-four month period. The total finance charge would be $148.96 (the
amount financed would be $800 and the total of payments would be $948.96 with monthly
payments of $39.54 each. The annual percentage rate would be 16.96%). If at the end of
twelve months, the customer purchases another small electrical appliance for $50 from the
same merchant, the narrow interpretation of§ 422.414 would require the first indebtedness
to be refinanced and consolidated with the second transaction. The rebate on the indebted-
ness under § 422.209(2) would be $38.73. The unpaid balance of the first purchase of $436.05
($948.96 minus twelve payments of $39.54 each equals $474A8 minus rebate of $38.73 equals
unpaid balance of $436.05) plus the new purchase of $50 would be financed over the remain-
ing period of twelve months at the maximum permissible rates, an annual percentage rate
of 18%. The total finance charge on this new obligation of $486.05 ($436.05 plus $50) would
be $96.00. Thus, if the two purchases were consolidated at the time of the second purchase,
the customer would pay a total finance charge of $206.23 ($148.96 minus rebate of $38.73
plus new finance charge of $96.00). If, on the other hand, the customer had merely financed
his new purchase of $50 separately at the same 18% annual percentage rate over a twelve
month period, the additional finance charge would have been only $4.96 and the total finance
charge of the two separate purchases would only have been $153.92. Part of the reason for
the increased total finance charge when the two transactions are consolidated is because the
new amount financed on the consolidated transaction is less than $500, permitting the
merchant to charge an annual percentage rate of 18% on the consolidated transaction while
the maximum annual percentage rate on the initial transaction was only 16.96%. It should
be noted that a similar result would occur if the rebate of precomputed finance charge were
calculated according to the flat actuarial method, instead of the "Rule of 78." See discus-
sion supra note 61.
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from "encouraging" a customer to become obligated on more than
one loan or credit sale at the same time with the "purpose" of
obtaining a higher finance charge than would be permitted if there
were only one extension of credit.
Consequently, it seems clear that a customer who is multiply
indebted to the same merchant may show a violation of section
422.414 only if he is able to carry either of the following eviden-
tiary burdens: (a) prove that the separate transactions are "sub-
stantially" the same, thereby triggering the presumption that sec-
tion 422.414 is violated, (although he then must be prepred to meet
the creditor's rebutting evidence); or (b) prove that the creditor's
"purpose" was to obtain a higher finance charge, and that his
conduct "encouraged" the customer to enter separate agreements,
thereby vi olationg section 422.414(1) directly.
F. Restrictions On Security Interests
Sections 422.417 and 422.418 contain strict limitations on secu-
rity interests which may be taken in the collateral for a consumer
credit sale or loan transaction. With regard to consumer credit
sales, section 422.417 provides that a seller may take a security
interest only in (a) the property sold, (b) goods sole previously but
only where the transaction is a consolidation of several credit sales
or if such goods were purchased pursuant to an open end credit
plan, (c) goods upon which the purchased property is installed or
annexed or upon which services are performed, if the obligation is
more than $500 and (d) real property to which the property sold is
affixed or which is improved by the property or services sold, if the
obligation is $1,000 or more. No security interest is permitted in
after acquired property to secure a consumer credit sale, except in
the financing of agricultural products or agricultural equipment.1'0
The release of security interests after two or more credit sales
are consolidated is governed by section 422.418(2). The seller must
apply payments received after consolidation to the oldest transac-
tion first. When an amount received is sufficient to pay for the
oldest transaction, the security interest with regard to that transac-
tion must be released.
The provision in section 422.418 restricting the security interest
in consolidated transactions, along with the section 422.417(l) lim-
105. § 422.417(i)(e). Bkg. § 80.391 provides that a security interest may include repair
or replacement parts in the property sold as well as "proceeds" of such property.
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itation on security interests in consumer credit sales, regulate the
use of the traditional "cross collateral" agreement. Under such
cross collateral provisions, the seller could retain a security interest
in all items purchased by an individual until the price of the last
item purchased was paid in full.'"' Thus, if there were a default in
the payment of the last item, a seller could seize all items of collat-
eral even though the customer had paid the seller suffficient
amounts for items previously purchased.'
The WCA remedies cross collateral abuses by prohibiting a
seller from taking a security interest in future property,' and by
requiring allocation of payments received first to the oldest obliga-
tion of a consolidated transaction. 109 A seller in a consumer credit
sale transaction will now be forced to look only to the merchandise
most recently sold and still unpaid to secure the consumer credit
sale.
The result of the restriction on cross collateral security interests
undoubtedly will cause many sellers to demand larger downpay-
ments (resulting in less credit extended) in consumer credit sales,
especially where the items sold depreciate rapidly after sale (such
as automobiles or furniture)."' Since the seller usually will only be
able to secure the indebtedness with the merchandise he sells, he
will attempt to make sure that the amount of the outstanding
obligation never exceeds the value of the collateral upon
repossession.
Subsection (2) of section 422.417 states that with respect to a
consumer lease, a lessor cannot take a security interest in any
property of the customer other than the leased goods to secure the
106. This procedure is permitted under § 409.204 of Wisconsin's Uniform Commercial
Code which permits a secured party to retain a security interest in any item of collateral to
secure all "future advances" or obligations between the parties.
107. See. e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 350 F. 2d. 445 (D.C.
Cir. 1965). In that case, plaintiff purchased a number of household items during the period
from 1957 to 1962 but then defaulted payment on the last item purchased. The creditor
repossessed all items purchased during the five year period even though the amount in
default was less than the cash price of the last item. The court ruled against the defendant
creditor claiming that such repossession was unconscionable. Although this case was de-
cided prior to enactment of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, similar cross collateral
provisions are specifically permitted under the Code and many courts have refused to set
aside such cross collateral agreements in view of the specific statutory authorization. See
supra note 106.
108. § 422.417(I).
109. § 422.418(2).
110. Larger down payments (and lower amounts financed) are further encouraged under
the WCA by the limitation on deficiency judgments in consumer credit sales contained in
§ 425.209 when the unpaid balance is under $1,000. See discussion text, infra at 462.
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obligations under the lease. This section is extremely confusing
since in a true lease, the lessor is the owner of leased property and
therefore it is meaningless to allow him to take a security interest
in his own property. Some consumer advocates claim that this
section prohibits the taking of a security deposit in connection with
a consumer lease, but it appears extremely doubtful that the legis-
lature intended to prohibit the well established practice of taking
security deposits from customers to protect against damages with-
out specific language to that effect. Also, although such deposits
are often labeled "security" deposits, generally no security interest
is taken in money. The logical interpretation of subsection (2) is
that it only prohibits a creditor from taking a security interest in
other personal property to secure the payment of obligations due
under the consumer lease, but does not prohibit the usual security
deposit arrangement to protect against possible damage to the
property."'
With regard to consumer loans, subsection (3) of section
422.417 allows a lender to take a security interest in any personal
property except the necessities listed in the statute, if such items
were not purchased with the proceeds of the loan. Thus, only a
purchase money security interest may be taken in the "clothing (of
the customer's family), dining table and chairs, refrigerator, heat-
ing stove, cooking stove, radio, beds and bedding, couch and
chairs, cooking utensils and kitchenware." Also, no security inter-
est is allowed in real property if the obligation is less than $1,000.
The reason advanced by consumer groups for exempting house-
hold furnishings from security interests other than purchase money
security interests is that the value of the customer's basic necessi-
ties is not usually relied upon by creditors in determining whether
they will make the loan in the first place. Therefore, creditors
I 11. Since the WCA specifically permits changes for damages to leased property to be
assessed against the lessee under § 422.412, it would seem reasonable to assume that an
advance deposit could be agreed to between the parties to protect against such damage.
However, care should be taken to make sure a security interest is not taken in the money.
In addition, it appears that the WCA does not prohibit a lessor from requiring advance
payment of rent in a consumer lease transaction. Thus, for example, in lieu of a security
deposit, a lessor could require the lessee to pay the last two months of rent in advance at
the beginning of the lease term. Such advance payment would not be prohibited by
§ 422.412 since that section only limits the obligation of the customer upon termination of
a lease (in effect, prohibiting a "balloon" type payment), and does not purport to limit the
customer's obligation during the lease term. This advance payment of rent could serve the
same function as a security deposit to guarantee payment of damages as long as no security
interest was taken in the deposit.
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should not be able to threaten seizure of such collateral, which
serves only as a psychological club over the customer. Even if the
collateral is actually seized, it is claimed that the creditor does not
count on the collateral to liquidate the loan, but rather only to
force the customer to obtain the money for repayment so that the
collateral will be returned. Creditors, on the other hand, claim that
a customer's collateral is a determinative factor in making loans,
and that often the only collateral a customer has is his household
goods.
Section 422.417(3) represents a compromise between consumer
advocates and creditors by exempting certain items considered ne-
cessities, but allowing a creditor to take security interests in "lux-
ury" items such as color television sets, boats, snowmobiles, paint-
ings, appliances and the like.'"2
G. Miscellaneous Limitations
The remaining sections of subchapter IV of chapter 422 impose
a number of other limitations and requirements on the relationship
between creditors and their customers. Thus, section 422.404 pro-
hibits wage assignments as security for payment of an obligation
unless it is revocable at will;"t3 section 422.405 prohibits confes-
sion of judgment clauses;" 4 and section 422.413 limits default
charges contained in the written contract to those provided in the
WCA plus reasonable expenses incurred in the disposition of col-
lateral." ' Changes in open-end credit plans are not allowed in most
situations without proper advance notice under section 422.415.
112. An intriguing question is whether an AM-FM stereo radio, television, and record
player combination console would be considered exempt as a "radio" under the language
of the statute. I rsuch a unit were considered a "radio", query whether the merchant could
substitute a $3.50 transistor radio so that thecustomer would have in his possession one
'radio" which would be the exempt radio under the statute. In this regard, it should be
noted that only one of each of the items enumerated in § 422.417(3) is exempt.
113. Wage assignments are governed by § 241.09. Although the statutory language of
§ 422.404. as amended by the February 22, 1973 Amendments, does not prohibit a penalty
for revoking an assignment, and only requires a notice to the right to revoke if the merchant
desires to renew the assignment. Bkg. § 80.361 requires substantially the following notice
on art|" wage assignment: "The customer may terminate this assignment at any time without
penalty."
114. This prohibition against confession of judgment clauses essentially repeats the
prohibition already contained in § 270.69. Section 422A05, however, provides that any
merchant who accepts an instrument containing a confession of judgment clause is subject
to the penalties provided in § 425.305 (transaction is void and customer may retain goods,
services, or money received).
115. See text, infra at 460 for discussion of the expenses permitted upon disposition
of repossessed collateral. See also supra note 103 for discussion of "oral" default charges.
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Also, granting or offering rebates to customers for referring other
prospective customers, or upon occurrence of certain events such
as a subsequent sale, are prohibited by section 422.416. Section
422.419 prohibits a contract which contains the waiver of certain
rights of customers." 6 Finally, section 422.420, added by the Feb-
ruary 22, 1973 Amendments, grants a co-signer the same protec-
tions granted to the customer."7
XI. CONSUMER APPROVAL TRANSACTION
Another problem area often raised by consumer groups con-
cerns the alleged "high pressure" tactics of door-to-door salesmen
and direct solicitation sellers or lenders, especially against house-
wives. The theory is that the salesmen exploit the sense of security
that consumers feel in the privacy of their own home. Conse-
quently, consumer groups have consistently demanded protection
for the customer against certain types of high pressured salesman-
ship. The UCCC and the NCA have taken opposite routes in the
attempt to alleviate some of the problems, and the approach taken
in subchapter II of chapter 423 might be considered as a compro-
mise between the two Codes.
The UCCC provides a three day "cooling off" period within
which the customer has a right to cancel any home solicitation
consumer credit sale by sending notice of such cancellation" 8 to the
creditor. However, the UCCC applies only to consumer "credit"
transactions where the buyer's agreement or offer to purchase is
obtained by the seller, creditor or persons acting on their behalf
while personally soliciting the sale at the buyer's "residence."
The NCA goes much further and extends protection beyond
just home credit transactions."' First of all, the NCA provides that
any sales agreement (credit or non-credit) initiated or consum-
mated away from the merchant's regular place of business,
116. Section 422.419(l)(a) prohibits a consumer credit contract from containing a pro-
vision by which the customer authorizes the merchant to enter the customer's "dwelling"
to repossess collateral. Bkg. § 80.392 defines the term "dwelling" to include "any garage,
shed, barn, or other building on the premises whether attached or unattached." This expan-
sion of the definition of "dwelling" certainly goes far beyond the normal meaning of the
word, and does not appear to be supported by any statutory language of the WCA.
117. See supra note 103 for discussion of possibility that guarantor could agree to
guarantee certain charges agreed to orally by the customer.
118. UCCC § 2.501-2.505.
119. NCA §§ 2.501-2.505. At least one state, Vermont, has already adopted a right of
rescission statute which applies to all retail sales. See VT. STAT. ANN., Title 9, § 2454 (supp.
1967).
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whether or not at the buyer's residence, would not be complete
until the customer "affirmed" the sale by notifying the creditor
within three days that he does indeed intend to consummate the
purchase. Secondly, with regard to all other retail sales, the NCA
grants a- customer a three day right of rescission no matter where
the sale is consummated. The drafters of the NCA rationalized as
follows: since pressured door-to-door sales often lack volition, the
consumer should be given a second chance to enter affirmatively
into the transaction. With regard to store sales, the drafters rea-
soned that most retailers accept merchandise returns anyhow, in
effect giving the customer the same second chance, and therefore,
a consumer's chance to change his mind should be codified into a
right of cancellation.12 0
The WCA incorporates concepts from both the UCCC and
NCA. The basic provision of subchapter II is a three day right to
cancel any "Consumer Approval Transaction." A Consumer Ap-
proval Transaction is any consumer credit transaction or a cash
transaction over $25 not specifically exempted by section 423.201:
(i) which is initially solicited by face-to-face contact away from the
merchant's regular place of business, or by mail or telephone com-
munication directed toward a particular customer, and (ii) which
is consummated away from the merchant's regular place of busi-
ness or in which the customer's offer to contract or other writing
evidencing the transaction is received by the merchant away from
his regular place of business."'
By extending coverage beyond just credit sales consummated
in the home, the WCA is somewhat broader than the UCCC. Yet,
by limiting coverage to transactions initiated and consummated (or
where the offer to contract is received) away from the merchant's
regular place of business, and not extending the right to cancel to
transactions consummated on the creditor's premises, the WCA
does not go as far as the NCA. Also, unlike the NCA, the WCA
does not automatically cancel a Consumer Approval Transaction
not reaffirmed; it only permits the customer to cancel if he acts
within three days.
Where both elements of the Consumer Approval Transaction
definition are met, the customer has until midnight of the third
business day after he receives a notice of his right to cancel (speci-
fied in section 423.203) to rescind the transaction. The notice to
120. See Official Comment, NCA § 2.501.
121. § 423.201.
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the customer may be included on other documents and need not
be a separately typed document.122
Upon any cancellation by the customer, he is not liable for any
finance or other charge, and the merchant must return any down-
payment within ten days of cancellation as well as take any appro-
priate action to terminate the transaction including termination of
any security interests . 2  After cancellation by the customer, sec-
tion 423.205 provides that he must tender the return of the prop-
erty after the merchant performs his obligations under section
423.204. The customer has the duty to take reasonable care of the
goods from the time of delivery until the expiration of a reasonable
time after tender, not to exceed twenty days. 24
It should be emphasized that both elements specified in section
423.201 must be present before subchapter II to chapter 423 will
apply: the transaction must be initiated away from the merchant's
regular place of business (by face-to-face solicitation or direct mail
or telephone solicitation) and consummated (or the offer to con-
tract or evidence of transaction received) away from the mer-
chant's regular place of business.
The most obvious example of a Consumer Approval Transac-
tion under chapter 423 would be where a salesman visits John
Smith at his home and sells merchandise to him. In fact, the sale
need not actually be consummated at the Smith's residence;
Smith's offer to purchase received by the seller or his agent is all
122. The notice contained in § 423.203 was substantially amended by the February 22,
1973 Amendments. The section, as amended, makes it clear that the notice need not be
contained in a separate document and can be printed on the document evidencing the
Consumer Approval Transaction. Section 423.203 (3)(m), also added by the February 22,
1973 Amendments, states that if the Federal Trade Commission or other federal agency
adopts a notice of right to cancel different from that specified in the WCA, compliance with
the federal notice will also be considered compliance with the WCA. Although not promul-
gated as a linal regulation at the time of the printing of this article, the Federal Trade
Commission has proposed a rule which would grant customers the right to cancel in substan-
tially more circumstances than granted in ch. 423. See 37 F.R. 22934; 4 GUIDE 1 10,451.
123. § 423.204(l), as amended by the February 22, 1973 Amendments.
124. § 423.205 as amended by the February 22, 1973 Amendments. It should be noted
that the statutory language of § 423.205(l) does not limit the customer's duty to take care
of delivered property in a Consumer Approval Transaction if the merchant fails to perform
his obligations under § 423.204 after the customer's cancellation. This is because
§ 423.205(l) states that the duty to take reasonable care of the property shall not exceed
twenty days after "tender" of the property, but § 423.205(2) does not require the customer
to "tender" the property until the merchant has performed his obligations under § 423.204.
To correct this deticiency, the Administrator has issued Bkg. § 80.44 which states that the
customer's duty to take reasonable care of goods in no event shall exceed forty days after
he gives notice of cancellation.
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that is needed to trigger the customer's rights. Thus, the fact that
some creditors do not "accept" a contract until it is received at the
home office will not affect Smith's right to cancel if the agent
receives the offer at his home.
Moreover, the receipt of the offer to purchase need not take
place in Smith's home, since the Consumer Approval Transaction
concept extends to transactions consummated "away from the
merchant's regular place of business." Thus, if the initial contact
was at Smith's home, but the deal was consummated at a restaur-
ant which was not the seller's regular place of business, the three
day cancellation period would still apply.
On the other hand, if Smith had read a newspaper advertise-
ment concerning the merchandise, called the seller who then came
to Smith's home, and the sale was then consummated, it would not
be a Consumer Approval Transaction. One of the elements above,
namely the requirement that the transaction be initiated by "tele-
phone solicitation directed to the particular customer" (emphasis
added) by the merchant, would not have been met'2s In fact, Smith
would be deemed to have initiated the transaction. Conversely, if
the seller initiated the transaction by telephone solicitation directed
to Smith, but Smith came to the premises of the seller to consum-
mate the transaction, it again would not be a Consumer Approval
Transaction, and Smith would not have a three day right of
rescission.
Unfortunately, application of the three day right of rescission
may be extremely difficult to determine in certain circumstances,
such as where a seller or lender addresses mail to a particular
customer by name inviting him to send in a postcard for
information concerning a loan or the purchase of certain merchan-
dise. If the customer executes the card and "invites" the lender or
seller to his home for a presentation, and the transaction is then
consummated in the individual's home, the determination as to
whether the transaction is a Consumer Approval Transaction re-
volves on whether the first element, which requires the transaction
to be "initiated . . . by mail . . . directed to the particular cus-
tomer," is met. It appears that this type of transaction would not
125. Presumably the requirement that the mail or telephone solicitation be "directed'"
to the customer means that the soliciting merchant must seek out the particular individual
who eventually becomes the customer. An envelope addressed to "occupant" or a telephone
solicitation to anyone who answers the telephone would not be a solicitation "directed'"
toward that person.
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fall within the scope of the chapter because the customer was not
directly solicited to enter into the transaction, but only invited to
make an inquiry if he felt interested. It is only the type of "pres-
sure" exerted in uninvited solicitation that appears to be subject
to the cancellation provisions.
XII. INSURANCE
Although a detailed discussion of the insurance regulation pro-
visions of chapter 424 is beyond the scope of this article, a few
points should be mentioned.
Subchapter II to chapter 424 controls the issuance of credit life
and credit accident and sickness insurance including the method of
determining and filing premium rates for such insurance, 6 limita-
tions on the total amount of such insurance which can be written,' 2
the maximum permitted term of such insurance, 2 ' and the required
disclosures of insurance terms.'29
Chapter 424 also controls the issuance of property insurance
written on collateral securing a consumer credit obligation in sub-
chapter III. Section 424.301 provides that although creditors may
require property insurance on collateral, a creditor may not receive
a separate charge for such insurance unless the insurance covers a
substantial risk of loss or damage to the property allowed as collat-
eral, the amount, terms and conditions of the insurance are reason-
able in relation to the value of the property, the term of coverage
is comparable to the term of the obligation, and the value of the
property and the amount financed of the credit transaction (exclud-
ing the insurance premium) is $800 or more. 30 Section 424.301(2)
provides that the "term" of insurance will be considered reasona-
ble in relation to the term of credit if the coverage does not extend
substantially beyond the scheduled maturity date of the obligation.
It is important to note that although section 424.301(3) does
not permit a creditor to "contract for or receive" a separate charge
for property insurance where the value of the property is $800 or
less, it does not prohibit the creditor from requiring the customer
to obtain such insurance through someone other than the creditor
as a condition for the extension of credit. The prohibition only
126. § 424.209.
127. § 424.208.
128. k§ 424.201(a) and 424.207.
129. § 424.203.
130. See § 424.301 (1) and (3).
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limits the "separate charge" which a creditor may receive, not the
insurance he may require the customer to purchase at his own
expense. The rationale of the section is to prevent a creditor from
selling insurance and collecting the insurance premium (and
thereby receiving a commission) on collateral which would not
ordinarily be insured. However, there is no prohibition against
requiring such insurance when insurance is deemed necessary to
protect the value of the collateral securing the obligation. Presum-
ably a creditor will not require unnecessary property insurance
when he will receive no commission from the sale.'3'
Also, although subsection (3) prohibits the creditor from con-
tracting for or receiving such a separate charge, a corporation
"related to" the creditor is not so prohibited. Apparently recogniz-
ing the commercial reality that insurance companies "related to"
a creditor under the broad scope of that term contained in section
421.301(33) are usually separate profit centers, subsection (3) only
seeks to remove the incentive to the creditor himself from directly
profiting by the sale of such credit insurance.3 2
Section 424.302 makes sure that the benefit of property insur-
ance is extended to the debtor where the creditor contracts for or
receives a seiarate charge for such insurance. The risk of loss of
such collateral, if not willfully caused by the customer, extends
only to the portion of the collateral not covered by insurance. This
section also has the effect of prohibiting contracts where by insur-
ers are subrogated to the rights of creditors to any loss or damage
not willfully caused by the debtor. 133
Section 424.303 prohibits cancellation of property or liability
insurance unless the customer is in default under section 425.103
or unless the customer agrees in writing. In either event, at least
thirty days advance written notice must be given to the customer
before cancellation. Upon cancellation, any prepaid insurance
premium shall be rebated or credited to the customer's account.
Subchapter IV of chapter 424 grants the Commissioner of In-
131. A typical example or the type of collateral on which a merchant would require
insurance even though the merchant himself could not sell the insurance would be snowmo-
bile linancing, especially for used snowmobiles where the purchase price is often less than
$800.
132. The WCA is careful to set forth those instances in which its provisions extend to
persons "related to" a merchant. Therefore, for example, § 422A08(3)(a) states that an
interlocking loan occurs when the lender is "related to" the seller of merchandise and
§ 422.407(2) states that the agreement to waive defenses cannot be asserted by an assignee
"related to" the assignor.
133. See Official Comment to UCCC § 4.302.
1974]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
surance power to issue rules in connection with chapter 424 and
provides for cooperation between the WCA Administrator and the
Commissioner.
In general, many of the provisions in chapter 424 are the same
provisions as contained in Article 4 on insurance of the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code, and reference to that law and the Official
Comments thereto are helpful to understanding the WCA
provisions.
XIII. COLLECTION REMEDIES
The sections of the WCA discussed above concerned the regu-
lation of the formation of the contract, the terms which may be
included, and the disclosures which must be made. Chapters 425
and 427 regulate creditors' formal and informal remedies with
regard to customers who default in the repayment of a consumer
credit obligation or who jeopardize collateral securing the obliga-
tion. The creditors' remedies and limitations thereon and the rights
of customers upon default are discussed in the sequence a merchant
would normally expect to encounter them when an obligation is not
paid when due.
A. Regulation of Informal Collection Remedies
As has been the case under prior Wisconsin law, the WCA
permits a merchant or other "debt collector" as defined in section
427.103(3) to attempt to "collect" an installment of a consumer
credit obligation through means other than legal proceedings in a
court of law as soon as the installment becomes past due. "4 Upon
such nonpayment, a merchant may contact the customer to deter-
mine the reason for nonpayment and urge the customer to pay
immediately.": 5
Chapter 427, however, for the first time imposes some statu-
tory limitations on the activities of merchants who attempt such
informal collection. Section 427.104 basically prohibits a merchant
from attempting to coerce collection by threatening the customer
directly with physical harm or criminal prosecution or threatening
134. Section 425.103(l) limits the commencement of legal proceedings in a court of law,
but does not limit informal collection procedures. Cf. Bkg. § 80.61 (stating that the restric-
tion against "commencing any action" under § 425.105(1) unless a notice of right to cure
is sent only refers "to the commencement of legal proceedings in a court of law").
135. Only oral or written collection attempts are permitted without court action. Sei-
/ure of collateral without court proceedings is prohibited by § 425.206. See discussion in
text, infra at 461.
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to communicate or actually communicating With third parties in
an attempt to force the customer to pay the overdue indebtedness
through embarrassment in front of friends or neighbors, or fear of
reprisal from his employer.
Most of the items contained in section 427.104 concern prac-
tices which are generally considered "unfair", although some of
the rather vague language provides little guidance for merchants
who desire to comply with the Act. For example, subsection (1)(h)
of section 427.104 prohibits a merchant attempting to collect a
debt from engaging "in other conduct which can reasonably be
expected to threaten or harass the customer or a person related to
him." However, the merchant is left with the task of determining
what "reasonably" threatens or harasses a customer. Presumably
court decisions and administrative regulations will develop to in-
form merchants of the extent of permissible collection practices. 3 '
B. Formal Collection Remedies
In addition to regulation of "informal" collection attempts of
overdue payments, the WCA strictly regulates the formal or legal
remedies that a merchant may take against the customer or any
collateral. Thus, chapter 425 not only details the procedures which
must be followed if the customer does not make payment voluntar-
ily, but also prohibits commencement of any legal proceedings
upon breach of contract unless such breach is also a "default" as
defined in section 425.103.
I. What constitutes a Default? With regard to monthly pay-
ment transactions, the typical type of closed-end consumer credit,
a default occurs when a customer has:
. . . outstanding 2 or more scheduled payments which have re-
mained unpaid for more than 10 days after their original or
deferred due dates, or the failure to pay the first payment or the
last payment, or in the case of a transaction for an agricultural
purpose, the failure to pay an installment within 40 days of its
original or deferred due date ... 31
136. It should be noted that ch. 427 does not apply to transactions consummated piror
to March 1, 1973 even though the activity may occur after March 1, 1973. The transitional
provisions of the WCA make it clear that the Act does not apply to any transaction
consummated prior to March I, 1973 except for certain specified sections. See transitional
provisions. Wis. Laws 1971, ch. 239 § 39. See also discussion in text, infra at 479.
137. Section 425.103(2)(a)(I). Where the interval between installments is more than two
months, § 425.103(2)(a)(2) provides that a "default" will occur when one payment remains
unpaid for more than sixty days after its original or deferred due date. Section
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Although there is some inconsistency in the use of the term
"payments" and "installments," generally speaking, the section
means that a merchant cannot proceed with formal collection rem-
edies in a court of law until the customer has two or more sched-
uled payments outstanding and unpaid beyond their respective 10
day grace periods. As discussed subsequently, however, there are
some exceptions to the two missed installments rule when dealing
with the first and last installments, agricultural transactions, im-
pairment of creditor's rights in collateral, or impairment of the
customer's ability to pay.
The provision permitting customers to miss two payments be-
fore a creditor may proceed with formal remedies developed amid
substantial controversy. Consumer groups argued that since credi-
tors usually do not attempt legal collection until an account is 60
or 90 days past due, section 425.103(2) does no more than codify
the practice of most creditors. In addition, these consumer advo-
cates claimed that the extra month allows customers time to work
out financial problems and resume normal payments. On the other
hand, creditors argued for a retention of the right to commence
legal collection immediately after a default to encourage people to
pay promptly and to take possession of collateral as quickly as
possible to prevent damage. Creditors claimed that delinquencies
would be increased by customers' knowledge that creditors could
not proceed against them when they took an additional month to
repay. Despite these arguments by creditors, however, the WCA
generally adopted the two missed installments approach advocated
by consumer groups, although with several important excep-
tions. '
The first exception, concerning a merchant's right to com-
mence legal proceedings against a customer upon non-payment of
425.103(2)(a)(3), added by the February 22, 1973 Amendments, states that a single install-
ment obligation is not in "default" until forty days after its scheduled or deferred due date.
With regard to open-end credit plans, § 425.103(2)(b) provides that a default will occur
when a customer fails to pay any two installments when due within any twelve month period.
138. It should be noted that the version of the WCA originally introduced in the Wis-
consin Assembly stated that a customer would not be in "default" until he missed three
consecutive payments. See § 425.103 of A. B. No. 1057, 1971 Sess. Laws. In addition, that
original proposal granted the customer the right to unilaterally defer any installment which
he could not pay. The language eventually contained in § 425.103 of the WCA was a
compromise between the interests of creditors in retaining their rights to proceed for de-
faults as soon as possible after an installment is unpaid and consumers who supported the
original version of the Act. See Davis, supra note 3 at 29-33 (1973). It should also be noted
that this concept of permitting two missed installments before a creditor can proceed has
been adopted in other states. See. e.g., IOWA CoDE § 536.13(7)().
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the first or last installment, has been seriously undermined by the
Administrator through his rule making powers. The statutory lan-
guage of subsection (2) quoted above appears to have been in-
tended to permit a merchant to proceed for collection immediately
against a customer who refuses to pay his first or last installment
of a monthly consumer credit transaction. Thus, the language
states that a default occurs upon "the failure to pay the first or last
payment, .. ."
The first installment exception from the two missed install-
ments rule presumably was in recognition of the experience of
merchants who generally have found that individuals who do not
pay the first installment of an obligation usually have no intention
of making any payments and merely desire to use any collateral
as long as possible before it is repossessed. Similarly, since the
obligation has matured when the last payment is due, there is no
reason to grant the customer additional time before permitting the
merchant to proceed with legal collection if the last installment is
not paid when due.' Nevertheless, despite the fact that the statu-
tory language seems unambiguous in permitting immediate formal
action upon non-payment of the first or last installment, the Ad-
ministrator has adopted a regulation which states that no cause of
action will accrue against a customer until forty days after the first
or last installment remains unpaid. 140 The effect of the Administra-
139. Of course another reason failure to say the last installment is a "default" is because
no other installment may have been missed, and only one installment would be delinquent.
Consequently, to make sure the merchant can collect the last unpaid installment in such a
situation, § 425.103(2)(a)(1) provides that a default occurs upon non-payment of the last
installment.
140. Bkg. § 80.60 states:
For the purposes of section 425.103(2)(a), Wis. STATs., the term 'default' with re-
spect to the first or last installment of a transaction other than one pursuant to an
open-end plan shall mean to have outstanding such scheduled payment for more than
40 days after its original or deferred due date.
Apparently the Administrator based this regulation on the claim of some consumer groups
that the pertinent language of subsection (2)(a) of § 425.103 meant to state that the forty
day period applied to the first payment or the last payment of any consumer credit transac-
tion as well as the failure to pay any installment in a transaction for an agricultural purpose.
This interpretation, however, would appear to be directly contrary to the plain language of
subsection (2)(a)(1). If the legislature had intended for the forty day period to apply to the
first and last installments, it certainly would have clearly done so instead of putting the forty
day phrase after the provisions concerning agricultural transactions. In fact, the legislature
specifically amended subsection (2) of§ 425.103 in the February 22, 1973 Amendments by
adding a new subparagraph (a)(3) stating that a single installment transaction would not
be in "default" until forty days after its scheduled due date. Obviously if the legislature had
intended to apply this same requirement to the first or last installment of a monthly payment
transaction, it would have done so when it originally passed the Act or surely when it
enacted the amendment to § 425.103.
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tor's regulation is particularly severe with regard to the first install-
ment, especially where the collateral will be subject to heavy use.
Thus, for example, a farmer could purchase and use a large piece
of equipment until forty days after the due date of the first install-
ment before being in "default" for non-payment. Assuming the
typical thirty day period between the date of the purchase and the
first installment, the equipment could be used for seventy days
without any payment before the merchant could even attempt to
reclaim the collateral through legal procedures. Nevertheless, al-
though the validity of this regulation is certainly dubious, until
successfully challenged, it would appear that no legal action for
collection may be commenced upon default in payment of the first
and last installment until the forty day period has elapsed.
Section 425.103(2)(a) also exempts agricultural extensions of
credit from the two missed installment rule by providing that such
obligations are in "default" if the customer fails to pay any
installment within forty days of its original or deferred due date.
This language presumably was in addition to the right of a mer-
chant to proceed immediately for non-payment of the first or last
installment in extensions of credit for agricultural purposes, and
would have permitted merchants to commence legal proceedings
under either exception in an agricultural transaction where collat-
eral is likely to be subject to heavy use and substantial depreciation
in value. The Administrator's regulation mentioned above, how-
ever, would appear to make the exception for first and last install-
ments meaningless in agricultural transactions since the merchant
is given the right to proceed within forty days after any payment
due on the transaction is not paid.
Finally, in addition to defining defaults in terms of missed
installments, a transaction may also be in "default" anytime the
customer breaches a covenant of the transaction which either ma-
terially impairs (a) the condition, value or protection of the collat-
eral, (b) the creditor's security interest, or (c) the customer's ability
to pay the balance of the obligation. Thus, even if a customer has
not missed any installments, but the merchant has proof that the
ability of the customer to pay the remaining installments is materi-
ally impaired (e.g., commencement of insolvency proceedings or
loss of employment), or that the value of the collateral is impaired
or the security interest is in jeopardy (e.g., customer has damaged
the collateral or is preparing to remove it from the state), then the
merchant may commence formal collection procedures immedi-
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ately.'"
2. Customer's Right To Cure Default. After a "default" has
occurred as specified in section 425.103, a merchant may proceed
to realize upon the collateral, or otherwise collect the debt through
legal proceedings, only after he gives the defaulting customer a
notice of his right to "cure" such default pursuant to section
425.104.1"-To cure, a customer must tender all unpaid installments
(prior to acceleration) plus unpaid delinquency or deferral charges,
and take whatever action is necessary to cure the default.13 If the
customer cures the default within fifteen days after the notice is
sent, the obligation is reinstated as current and the merchant may
not proceed further to collect the indebtedness or recover the col-
lateral. A customer has the right to cure only twice during any
twelve month period.' If the customer does not exercise his right
to cure (or if the cure provisions are inapplicable), then the mer-
chant may accelerate maturity of the obligation and either (a)
replevy the collateral securing the debt and, if allowed, obtain a
deficiency, or (b) waive rights to the collateral and sue the cus-
tomer for the entire unpaid balance of the obligation as an unse-
cured creditor. Section 425.203 specifically provides that the mer-
chant must elect his remedies; he may not sue on the entire obliga-
tion and also seize the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation.
3. Replevin-Enforcement of Security Interest. If a merchant
decides to proceed against personal property by enforcing his secu-
rity interest, he must follow the procedure outlined in subchapter
II of chapter 425. To obtain possession of the collateral, if the
customer does not surrender it, the merchant must institute an
action for replevin in small claims court pursuant to section
425.205.' 15 This section requires a hearing to determine whether the
141. In the event that a default occurs under § 425.103(2)(c) it presumably would still
he necessary to send a "notice of right to cure default" pursuant to § 425.104. See
§ 425.103(3). However, if the "default" consisted of proof that the customer was preparing
to remove collateral from the state, the merchant could immediately obtain a restraining
order pursuant to § 425.207. Section 425.207 permits a court to enter a restraining order
to protect collateral if the merchant can show that the customer is acting or about to act in
a manner which substantially impairs the merchant's prospect for realization of his security
interest.
142. § 425.103(3) and 425.105(l).
143. § 425.105(2). Bkg. § 80.62 specifies that the notice is deemed given on the "date
of mailing" and concomitantly the date of "tender" of performance on the part of the
customer is considered the date on which he mails or otherwise delivers the unpaid delin-
quent installments or otherwise performs to cure the default.
144. § 425.105(3).
145. Under § 425.205(l) such replevin action may be commenced in the small claims
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customer is in default and if the merchant has the right to seize
the collateral. If the merchant is successful at the hearing, a judg-
ment will be entered ordering the customer to turn over the collat-
eral to him. The judgment, however, determines only the right of
possession; any claim for deficiency or damages to the collateral
must be sought in a separate action. Unfortunately, this necessity
of double judicial proceedings appears to impose a substantial bur-
den on customers and merchants alike. The burden for merchants
is obvious since now two court actions, one for possession and a
separate action for any deficiency, are necessary. However, the
procedure may also be an additional burden on customers, since
the merchant is not prohibited from collecting the statutory attor-
ney's fees and court costs from the customer for both proceedings
if awarded by the court and the customer often will be obligated
to pay such costs for two actions instead of one. 4' A much more
satisfactory procedure would have been to allow determination of
the entire claim in one court proceeding, but require actual repos-
session and resale of collateral before a merchant could recover
damages and/or a deficiency. Handling all facets of collection in
one action would be less costly for the merchant and would make
the customer liable only once for statutory attorneys' fees and
court costs.
To prevent undue delay in the collection enforcement proce-
dure, the summons for the replevin action may be issued at any
time after the customer is in "default", although the return date
may not be set prior to the expiration of the the fifteen day right
to cure period.' 47 In recognition that the elimination of self help
repossessions and the requirement of a court hearing before seizure
will be more costly, section 425.205(1) attempts to minimize the
court regardless of the value of the collateral. Appropriate forms for the summons and
complaint are set forth in § 425.205(2) and (3) respectively.
146. Although § 422.411 prohibits written provisions which provide for payment of
attorneys' fees by the customer, award of statutory attorneys' fees are not prohibited. See
text supra at 440.
147. § 425.205(6). This provision permits some flexibility to the merchants. Thus, for
example, a merchant may send the fifteen day notice of right to cure pursuant to § 425.104
as soon as the obligation is in "default". If the merchant heard nothing from the customer
for seven days, he could then serve the small claims replevin summons setting the return
date for one day after the expiration of the fifteen day notice of right to cure period. (Section
299.05(3) permits the return date of a small claims action to be set from eight to seventeen
days after service of the summons.) If the customer did not choose to cure the default within
the lifteen day period and had no defense, the merchant could force the customer to turn
over the collateral in the small claims proceedings one day later.
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merchant's costs and attorneys' fees by permitting the replevin
action to be commenced by an officer or agent of the merchant
even though he is not an attorney. 4 8
The requirement of a hearing before replevin would appear to
satisfy the constitutional requirements set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in Fuentes v. Shevin.14 9 In that case the
Supreme Court held replevin procedures in Florida and Pennsyl-
vania unconstitutional because the statutes did not provide for a
hearing before seizure by the sheriff.5 In fact, the WCA appears
to go much further than the constitutional requirement of the
Shevin case since a hearing is required before a merchant (without
action by the sheriff) may seize collateral through peaceful repos-
session. 5'
Once the" merchant has obtained judgment for possession pur-
suant to section 425.205, section 425.206 allows him to take pos-
session of collateral in much the same manner as secured parties
could take possession of collateral without a hearing prior to the
effective date of the WCA. Consequently, any method of peaceful
repossession permitted prior to the effective date of the Act under
148. Although § 425.205(1) permits a non-attorney officer or agent of a merchant to
"commence" the small claims replevin procedure, the section does not appear to permit
such individual to "argue" in the action without an attorney. Thus, subsection (l)(a) states
that "notwitstanding .§ 299.05(2) and 299.06(2)(a), process may be issued to, and such
action may be commenced by, an officer or agent of a merchant on the merchant's behalf
even though such officer or agent is not an attorney authorized to practice law in this state."
The two referenced sections concern only the "commencing" of small claims actions. Sec-
tion 425.205(l)(a) does not make reference to § 299.06(2)(b) which states that a party, who
is not appearing pro se, may "appear and prosecute" an action or proceeding only "by an
attorney regularly authorized to practice in the circuit courts of this state but not other-
wise." Nevertheless, an attorney presumably is not needed to appear in the replevin action
if it is not contested and a judgment granting possession of the collateral to the merchant
is entered by default.
149. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
150. Similarly, the district court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin declared Wiscon-
sin's replevin before judgment statute (ch. 267) unconstitutional in Dorsey v. Community
Stores Corp., 346 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. Wis. 1972). Although the statute was declarei unen-
forceable in the Dorsey case because it did not provide for a hearing before a judgment,
the defect probably can be cured by providing a hearing to the defendant prior to actual
seizure.
151. At the time the WCA was enacted, the Wisconsin legislature apparently decided
to follow the concept expressed in Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972) which
held that collateral could not be repossessed under the Uniform Commercial Code unless
there is a prior court hearing. The Adams case was eventually reversed in Adams v. South-
ern California First National Bank, - F.2d. _ (9th Cir. 1973) 42 U.S.L.W. 2230. The
case is now on appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. For a discussion of the ramifications of
abolition ofself-help repossession, see White, The Abolition of Self-Help Repossession: The
Poor Pa" Even More, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 503.
1974]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
the Uniform Commercial Code is probably permitted after judg-
ment is obtained pursuant to section 425.205. '52
4. Customer's Surrender of the Collateral. It is important to
note that the WCA does not require a judgment in replevin in every
case before a merchant can obtain possession of collateral securing
a consumer credit obligation after default. Section 425.206 states
that a creditor may take possession of collateral after default with-
out the necessity of starting a replevin action if the customer con-
sents to a "surrender" of the collateral.
The WCA has two concepts of "surrender". Section 425.204
states that a customer may "voluntarily surrender" all of his rights
in collateral to a merchant at any time. A surrender is "voluntary"
only if it is not made pursuant to a "request or demand" by the
merchant. ' If the customer "voluntarily" surrenders his collat-
eral, presumably he will be liable for any deficiency after resale of
the collateral notwithstanding the restriction on deficiencies con-
tained in section 425.209. 51 However, the language of section
152. Section 425.206(2) does regulate such peaceful repossession after judgment by
prohibiting a merchant from committing a "breach of the peace" or entering a "dwelling
used by a customer as his residence" except at the voluntary request of the customer,
although such activities would probably be prohibited by existing law without the statutory
language.
153. The fact that § 425.204 gives a customer the right to voluntarily surrender his
collateral "at any time" does not mean that the merchant is compelled to accept unreasona-
ble surrender. The cusomter cannot "surrender," for example simply by abandoning the
collateral on the merchant's premises without a reasonable delivery to the merchant.
154. Subsection (2) to § 425.204 states that "the rights and obligations of the merchant
and customer with respect to collateral voluntarily surrendered as defined in this section
.%hall be governed bY .ff 409.504 to 409.507 and are not subject to his subchapter." (empha-
sis added). Thus by the express language of the statute, the deficiency limitation provisions
of§ 425.209 do not apply when collateral is "voluntarily" surrendered. Unfortunately, last
minute amendments to the WCA on the floor of the Wisconsin Senate has resulted in
unnecessary confusion with regard to the application of the deficiency limitations contained
in § 425.209 to "voluntary" surrenders of collateral. Originally the deficiency limitations
of § 425.209 applied only to repossessions other than "voluntary surrenders." Just before
passage, however, the Senate amended § 425.209(2),(3) and (4) so that the section purports
to prohibit deficiencies under $1,000 where "the merchant repossesses or accepts vohuntar'
surrender ofgoods" (emphasis added) which were the subject of a consumer credit sale and
in which the merchant had a security interest. This amendment created an inherent conflict
with § 425.204(2) which, as quoted above, specifically states that rights and obligations with
respect to collateral voluntarily surrendered are not subject to the provisions of subchapter
II of ch. 425, and instead are governed by .§ 409.504-409.507, which permit deficiencies.
Apparently the Senate confused the concepts of "voluntary" surrenders and "non-
voluntary" surrenders. Interestingly, as § 425.409 is now worded, it does not purport to
apply to "non-voluntary" surrenders at all, and unless such a non-voluntary surrender is a
"repossession," it may be argued that § 425.209 does not apply when collateral is surren-
dered pursuant to a request or demand. Such an interpretation, however, would appear to
defeat the purpose of the section.
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425.204 does not prohibit a merchant from "requesting or demand-
ing" surrender of collateral, but only provides that if he does make
a request or demand, such surrender is no longer "voluntary".1 55
If a merchant does "request or demand" surrender of collateral
when the customer is in default, and the customer complies, the
surrender would be valid under section 425.206(l)(a). When the
customer submits his collateral to the merchant in a "non-
voluntary" surrender, however, the merchant is prevented from
proceeding for any deficiency if prohibited under section
425.209.'11 In this regard, promulgated regulations of theAdminis-
trator state that a non-voluntary surrender of collateral will not be
valid unless the customer is notified of his right to contest the
merchant's claim to the collateral in a replevin hearing.,5 7
5. Customer's Right of Redemption. Upon the issuance of
process under section 425.205 or when the merchant obtains pos-
session of the collateral pursuant to judicial action or surrender,
section 425.208 grants the customer the right to "redeem" the
collateral within fifteen days by (1) paying all installments due and
unpaid on the date of repossession (prior to any acceleration) plus
any unpaid delinquency or deferral charges, (2) taking any neces-
sary action to cure non-monetary defaults, (3) paying the court
costs incurred by the creditor including filing and service fees and
bond costs, and (4) tendering a "performance deposit" equal to
three scheduled installments (or three minimum payments in open-
end plans) or 1/3 of the remaining unpaid obligation, whichever is
less. If a customer exercises his right to redeem, the collateral must
be returned to him and the agreement will be reinstated as though
payments had been made as scheduled.'58
Section 425.208(4) and (5) provides that the performance de-
posit, may, but need not be applied to future delinquent install-
155. § 425.204(3). Notification sent to the customer informing him of his right to
vohntarily surrender collateral is not a "request or demand". See Bkg. § 80.67.
156. Section 425.209, discussed infra, text at 465 only prohibits deficiencies in credit
sale transactions. Therefore, in consumer loan transactions (other than interlocking loans
under § 422.408). whether the collateral is surrendered voluntarily or surrendered pursuant
to request or demand makes no difference since a deficiency can be sought in either case.
157. Bkg. § 80.68. However, no notice is required under the provisions of the statute
for an effective surrender and, arguably, a non-voluntary surrender would be effective under
§ 425.206(l) even without such notice. Bkg. § 80.68 also states that collateral will not be
deemed surrendered if the merchant misrepresents any material fact or the state of the law,
or if the merchant violates the debt collection provisions of ch. 427.
158. § 425.208(2). in addition, subsection (3) provides that any process under which the
collateral had been held shall be vacated, and the pending action dismissed.
1974]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
ments until the unpaid balance of the obligation equals the deposit.
Therefore, until such amount is reached, a merchant may proceed
with his legal remedies against the collateral or the customer im-
mediately upon occurrence of another "default" as defined in sec-
tion 425.103.
At least three points deserve special mention with regard to
section 425.208. First of all, subsection (1) states that the right of
redemption continues for fifteen days after the taking of possession
of the collateral or after "issuance of process" under section
425.205. Literally interpreted, the subsection appears to mean that
the right to redeem commences on the date that the merchant
serves the summons to recover his collateral in a replevin action
even though this could mean that the customer's right of redemp-
tion will expire before a hearing is held in the replevin action and
before the merchant even obtains possession of the collateral. 5"
Furthermore, under this language a merchant who mails a no-
tice of "right to cure" under section 425.105 and simultaneously
commences a small claims action under section 425.205(6), will
cause the customer's "right to redeem" and "right to cure" to run
concurrently. Although the statute is clear in this procedure, it
certainly will result in confusion and probable litigation. Thus,
when a merchant causes the concurrent running of rights, which
one actually applies? Does the customer merely have to "cure"
pursuant to section 425.105, or must he "redeem" according to
section 425.208? Presumably he must "redeem", since section
425.208(1) clearly provides that the right to redeem commences
when process is issued under section 425.205, but the procedure is
certainly confusing and should be clarified by legislation.
The second point to note is that the WCA does not require a
merchant to notify the customer of his right to redeem unless a
small claims action for replevy is commenced.' Thus, although
the customer has a right to redeem, he may never be given any
notice of his right.
Finally, to redeem collateral under section 425.208, a customer
159. The conclusion that the customer's right to redeem commences on the date that
the merchant issues process is buttressed by the fact that § 425.205(3)(d) states that a notice
of the customer's right of redemption must be included in the complaint itself. There is no
other requirement that a notice of the right of redemption be given to the customer, and
apparentlN the legislature required the notice to be put in the complaint to make sure that
the customer was aware that the right of redemption was running even though the customer
had not yet relinquished possession of the collateral.
160. § 425.205(3)(d). See also supra note 159.
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must pay "any court costs, filing and service fees, and bond prem-
ium charges incurred by the creditor," but it appears that the
customer need not pay the expenses incurred by the merchant in
the repossession. In this regard, the WCA is inconsistent in that it
allows a merchant to obtain reimbursement for all costs of disposi-
tion of the collateral (which includes the cost of retaking the collat-
eral) to the extent provided in the contract if the sale is actually
consummated, but does not allow recovery of the cost of taking
possession of the collateral if the customer elects to redeem the
collateral.' Consequently, although the merchant may have in-
curred the same expenses in obtaining the collateral for disposition,
reimbursement for such expenses depends entirely on whether the
customer decides to "redeem."
If the collateral is not redeemed by the customer within the
fifteen day period, the merchant may then proceed under section
425.208(6) to dispose of it pursuant to the provisions of sections
409.504 through 409.506 of Wisconsin's Uniform Commercial
Code subject to the deficiency limitations of sections 425.09 and
425.10.
6. Deficiency Judgments. Once the merchant disposes of the
collateral, different rules apply concerning his rights to a deficiency
depending on whether the original transaction was a sale or loan.
If the original transaction was a consumer loan, other than an
interlocking loan, the creditor may proceed to collect any defi-
ciency in much the same manner as allowed under prior law. Under
the WCA, however, as discussed above, the deficiency will not be
set in the replevy hearing. If the customer refuses to acknowledge
and pay the deficiency, a new court action would have to be
commenced.6 2
If the transaction is a consumer credit sale (or an interlocking
loan), the merchant may proceed only for a deficiency as allowed
by sections 425.209 and 425.210. Subsection (2) of section 425.209
states that the customer is not personally liable for the unpaid
balance of an indebtedness when the amount owing at the time of
161. Section 422.413 permits a contract to provide for reimbursement of reasonable
expenses incurred by a merchant in "disposition of collateral" and § 425.408(6) permits
collection of such expenses upon sale of the collateral pursuant to § 409.504. Section
409.504(l) permits a secured party to apply proceeds of disposition first to "the reasonable
expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for sale, selling and the like." However, no reim-
bursement for any expenses incurred by the merchant in retaking the property is permitted
under § 425.208(I)(c) if the customer exercises his right to redeem the collateral.
162. See § 425.206(l)(e) and discussion in text, supra at 461.
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default is $1,000 or less. If $1,000 or more, section 425.210 states
that the collateral must be valued at its "fair market value" to
determine the amount of the deficiency.
The valuation requirement in section 425.210 apparently is an
attempt to prevent the merchant from selling repossessed collateral
to a related company or friend at a price below its actual value to
establish a large deficiency. For example, a retail furniture outlet
could assign a time sales contract to an affiliated sales finance
company, which, upon default, would repossess the collateral and
resell it back to the retail furniture outlet at a very low price. The
sales finance company could then sue the buyer for the large defi-
ciency thus established, while the retail outlet could resell the furni-
ture at an inflated price. To prevent such practice, the WCA re-
quires that the fair market value of the collateral be deducted from
the unpaid balance of the obligation. 1"3
It is important to note that sections 425.209 and 425.210 are
specifically limited to consumer credit sales and interlocking loans,
and do not apply to non-interlocking loans. Limiting the deficiency
judgment sections only to credit sales and interlocking loans appar-
ently is based on the belief of consumer groups that most alleged
abuses occurred in the repossession of collateral by retail sellers,
especially in the automobile field." 4 As explained above, some
sellers would attempt to establish large deficiencies. Also, con-
surner groups claimed that not infrequently the cost of repossessing
and disposing of collateral would be extremely excessive when
compared to the actual value of the collateral. Thus, they claimed,
customers would not only lose their collateral after repossession,
but also face an artificially high deficiency plus the often exorbitant
expenses of repossession and sale of the collateral.
Although the same argument might be made with regard to
consumer loans, the difference appears to be that consumer lenders
usually do not own retail outlets to resell repossessed collateral,
and consequently are not likely to sell collateral at artificially low
prices because their main purpose is to satisfy as much of the
unpaid obligation as possible. Also, lenders rely on a variety of
collateral, while sellers usually rely only on the item sold to secure
the obligation."I5 Therefore, a limitation on deficiencies for con-
163. AnIer e tensive research, the Report, supra note 61, concluded that very few credi-
tors geared their operations to repossess and resell collateral at a low price in an attempt
to etahlish a large deliciency. See Report, at 28.
104. (. Report, at 30.
165. In fact. u nder§ 422.4 17(l), subject to the narrow exceptions stated therein, a seller
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sumer loans would probably be meaningless since consumer lend-
ers would merely add more property to make sure that the total
value of the collateral always exceeds the outstanding balance of
the obligation.'
One confusing point under section 425.209 is the fact that it
exempts a customer from a claim for deficiency in a credit sale or
interlocking loan if the amount owing at the time of default is
$1,000 or less, but it does not describe the method for computing
the $1,000.
The Administrator has issued a regulation stating that the
$1,000 should be computed by deducting any unearned finance
charges from the unpaid balance on the date of default. 16 7 How-
ever, this position appears to confuse the concept of "acceleration"
of maturity of installments with the right to rebate of unearned
precomputed finance charges. It has long been the practice of cred-
itors, codified in virtually all consumer credit laws, that upon de-
fault the creditor may demand payment of all unpaid installments
(or "accelerate" maturity of the installments) even though the
scheduled due dates (or maturity dates) of each installment would
not yet have become due. Absent any statutory language, a credi-
tor would not have to rebate unearned interest in the event of such
acceleration since each installment is a combination of both princi-
pal and the precomputed finance charge and it is the entire install-
ment which becomes accelerated and immediately due, not merely
the principal portion of each installment. When rebate upon accel-
eration is required, the statute usually states the requirement
clearly.'
in Wisconsin may only take a security interest in the property actually sold. See discussion
in text, supra at 444.
166. Professor Davis, in his article on the Wisconsin Consumer Act, suggests that the
limitation on deliciencies contained in § 425.209 should also extend to purchase money
consumer loans. Davis, supra note 3, at 68. However, such a limitation would simply be
unworkable. All a lender would have to do to avoid the consequences of the deficiency
limitation would be to take other property of the customer as collateral to secure the loan
in addition to that being purchased with the loan proceeds. The fact that the loan proceeds
are going to be used to purchase a particular item in which the lender expects to take a
security interest does not prevent the lender from taking a security interest in other property,
except as set forth in § 422.417(3). A limitation on deficiency judgments only makes sense
in consumer credit sales transactions.
167. Bkg. § 80.69.
168. See. e.g., WIs. STAT. § 138.09(7)(d) (1971) (which was repealed by Wis. Laws
1971. ch. 239 (elective March I. 1973)). That section required a rebate of precomputed
interest after acceleration only if the lender desired to charge a default charge after such
acceleration. By analogy, it should be noted that prior to the WCA, a creditor did not have
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The WCA is no exception. Section 422.209(6) clearly states
that upon acceleration a merchant does not have to rebate any
precomputed interest until the date on which judgment is entered.
Thus, for example, if a customer is in default and has ten payments
of $100 each remaining unpaid, the merchant may "accelerate"
and sue for all ten payments totalling $1,000. The merchant is
required to rebate unearned precomputed finance charges only at
the time judgment is finally entered. This seems logical since the
merchant does not have possession of the money owed nor the
method of forcing the customer to pay such money until the date
of judgment, and therefore, he should be entitled to continue to
earn the finance charge at the original annual percentage rate at
least until that date.169
Consequently, the more logical interpretation of section
425.209(2) appears to be that the total amount of the remaining
installments must be $ 1,000 or less before the merchant is prohib-
ited from obtaining a deficiency. The WCA does not state that the
$1,000 is after the "rebate" of precomputed interest, but only that
the amount "owing" at the time of default is less than $1,000. The
amount "owing," at least until the required rebate on date of
judgment under section 422.209(6), is the total amount of all in-
stallments. Therefore, the Administrator's regulation would ap-
pear to be of questionable validity under the Act.
It should also be noted that although the customer is not liable
for a deficiency upon repossession of collateral where the unpaid
to rebate any portion of the precomputed linance charge even upon early prepayment under
§ 138.05(2) if the annual percentage rate was less than 10%.
169. In tact. many would argue that the merchant should be entitled to receive the
preconlputcd linance charge until the unpaid delinquent balance is actually collected from
the customer. However, this approach was rejected in the WCA because it could permit
merchants to obtain judgment and then delay enforcing such jugment until the maturity or
the obligation so that all precomputed interest would also be collected. By limiting interest
arer judgment to the judgment rate of 7%, merchants are encouraged to move promptly to
collect the judgment.
It is not clear tinder § 422.409(6) whether a merchant would have to give a rebate of
unearned interest to a customer after default and acceleration if the indebtedness is collected
other than by obtaining a judgment. Since that section requires a rebate of unearned interest
onl% on the date of judgment, presumably no such rebate would be required if no judgment
%%ere obtained. It might be argued that once the merchant collects the unpaid balance of
the obligation, lie would be required to give a rebate of unearned interest on that date under
§ 422.209 since the customer in effect has "'prepaid" the obligation in advance of the
originall% scheduled installment due dates. Such a theory, however, would appear to run
counter to the concept of acceleration which makes all installments due immediately and
gi% cs the merchant the right to collect all such installments without waiting for the scheduled
due dates. Since all installents are due upon acceleration, there can be no "prepayment."
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balance of the indebtedness is $1,000 or less, he is responsible for
damages to the collateral under subsection (5) to section 425.209.
7. Suit for Entire Balance of Debt. If the merchant in a con-
sumer credit sale or interlocking loan desires to proceed against the
customer for the full amount of an obligation which is less than
$1,000 at the time ofdefault, he may do so only by waiving his right
to possession of the collateral, and seeking ajudgment for personal
liability against the customer as an unsecured creditor. 170 In such
event, if judgment is obtained, the merchant may not levy execu-
tion on the collateral which secured the obligation in the first
instance. 171
In addition, when a judgment is obtained in either a consumer
credit loan or sale transaction, the WCA prohibits enforcement of
the judgment against any property described in section 425.106 as
well as the usual exempt property stated in section 272.18.172 Sec-
tion 425.106 also raises the homestead exemption from $10,000,
which is the limit under section 271.20, to $15,000 for any judgment
based on a consumer credit transaction. 73
Finally, section 425.106(i)(a) limits the amount of wages which
may be subject to garnishment after judgment in a consumer credit
transaction. That section provides that 75% of disposable earnings
or forty times the federal minimum hourly wage plus $15 per de-
pendent other than the customer (as reported on federal income tax
returns), whichever is larger, is exempt per weekly pay period.
Thus, for example, 75% of the wages of a wage earned in a family
of five (after deducation of all amounts required by law to be
withheld) or $124 whichever is greater, will be exempt from gar-
nishment under this section based on the current federal minimum
hourly wage where the debtor is paid on a weekly basis. 7 1 Section
170. § 425.203.
171. § 425.209(6).
172. The items of personal property exempt from execution under § 425.106(I)(b) are
the same items in which a lender is prohibited from taking a security interest under
§ 422.417(3)(a).
173. § 425.106(l)(c). For all other (non-consumer credit) judgments, § 272.20 continues
to provide only a $10.000 homestead exemption.
174. The $124 minimum is computed as follows: the current federal minimum hourly
wage of $1.60 multiplied by 40 plus $15 for each of the customer's four dependants (other
than the customer himself). Note that the $15 exemption per dependant was per pay period
and not per week under the original version of the WCA, but was made applicable on a
v cekly basis by the February 22, 1973 Amendments. Of course the minimum exemptions
"ill increase when the new federal law becomes effective.
Although it apparently was the intent of consumer groups to provide the same exemp-
tion under § 425.106(I) as provided under the Truth-in-Lending Act except that a higher
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425.106(3) provides that a process or order issued in violation of
section 425.106 is void."'
It is important to note that the scope of subchapter II of chap-
minimum exemption would be provided under subsection (1)(a)(2), the language in
§ 425.106(1) does not accomplish that result. In fact, § 425.106(1) will often result in less
of an exemption from garnishment than the federal law.
Section 303 (15 U.S.C. § 1673) of the federal law provides that the maximum earnings
or an individual subject to garnishment may not exceed the lesser of (i) 25% of his "disposa-
ble earnings" (gross earnings minus required withholdings) per week or (ii) the amount of
his weekl% "disposable earnings" in excess of 30 times the federal minimum hourly wage
(%%hich means that a minimum of $48 is exempt under current minimum hourly wage rates).
Thus. for example, a person earning $200 per week who has $40 withheld for taxes would
have a maximum of $40 subject to garnishment (25% of $160) by application of the first
method specilied above which would result in the least amount of wages subject to garnish-
Ient.
B3 comparison, § 425.106(l) of the WCA exempts the greater of (i) 75% of an individ-
ual's "earnings remaining after all deductions," or (ii) 40 times the federal minimum hourly
%age plus $15 per dependant per week other than the customer. Thus the WCA does not
identif) the portion of wages "subject" to garnishment as the federal law does, but rather
specilies the portion of wages which are "exempt." However, the exempt portion of the
%%ages are not required to be deducted from the net income remaining after required with-
holdings (which the federal law refers to as "disposable income"), and therefore the exempt
portion of the income is subtracted from the gross wages of the customer.
Using the same example set forth above, under § 425.106(l)(a)(l) the portion of an
individual's wages "exempt" from garnishment would be $120 (75% of $160, the customer's
earnings after required withholdings), but this would leave $80 subject to garnishment (the
total %%age of $200 minus the exempt portion of $120), not $40 as under the federal law.
Similarly. assuming a family of live, the exempt earnings under § 425.106(I)(a)(2) would
be $124 (40 x federal minimum hourly wage of $1.60 plus 4 x $15). Again, however, the
anount subject togarnishment would not be merely $36 ($160 minus $124), but rather would
be $76 ($200 minus $124). The only argument that might be made for the contention that
the legislature intended that the difference between "disposable earnings" and the exempt
portion of a customer's wage would be the amount subject to garnishment, is by inference
from subparagraph (1)(a)(1) which deducts required withholdings from gross wages before
calculating the 75% exemption. However, even this argument is not available with regard
to subparagraph (I )(a)(2) since the calculation there makes no mention whatsoever of the
"'customer's earnings remaining after all deductions."
In the above example, of course, the federal law would control since it specifies that 25%
of the disposable income or $40 is the maximum subject to garnishment. However,
§ 425.106(1) often may not provide a greater exemption assumed by its consumer
supporters.
175. Because a process issued in violation of § 425.106 is void, it could be that Bkg.
§ 80.63, purportedly issued to "assist" employers, may in fact result in a trap for employers
not familiar with its provisions. Bkg. § 80.63 states that a garnishee summons "should"
contain the legend "Consumer Credit Transaction Garnishee Summons" when a garnish-
ment is issued in a consumer credit transaction under § 425.106. It is not altogether clear
sshether flailure to comply with this regulation would result in a garnishee summons which
%%ould be considered in violation of§ 425.106 and thus "void" under subsection (3), but if
it uerc. an unwary employer who honored such a garnishee summons could be liable to the
%%age earner customer for conversion. Hopefully, the fact that Bkg. § 80.63 states that the
garnishee summons "should" bear such legend means that summonses without such legend
are nevertheless still proper under the WCA.
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ter 425 set forth in sections 425.201 and 425.202 only applies to
enforcement of a security interest in collateral which are "goods".
Thus, under the language of those sections, it would appear that
the provisions concerning, the customer's right to surrender collat-
eral, the requirement that the merchant sue and replevy for posses-
sion, the customer's right to redeem, the restrictions on deficiency
judgments and the like will not extend to real estate or intangible
property used as collateral. 76 With regard to these items, only
subchapter I would apply, and after a default and notice of right
to cure, the merchant would be able to proceed for repossession
of the item as allowed under the law prior to enactment of the
WCA, subject only to the restrictions of subchapter I.
The rest of chapter 425 sets forth a number of restrictions
concerning specific collection practices. These restrictions include
a prohibition of extortionate extensions of credit; 77 a specification
that a complaint for collection set forth the facts constituting the
default, the amount claimed by the merchant and the figures neces-
sary to compute such amount and contain a copy of the writing
evidencing the transaction (except in open-end credit plans);' and
a prohibition against discharging employees who are garnished. 179
In addition, section 425.111 and 425.207 set forth the circumstan-
ces in which there can be an attachment of property before judg-
ment by a merchant and section 425.112 grants the court authority
to stay enforcement of a judgment by order upon "just and equita-
ble conditions".
Section 425.113 prohibits the issuance of a warrant against the
person of a customer under chapter 273 (Remedies Supplementary
to Execution) in any consumer credit transaction. Note that the
term "warrant" as used in this section only refers to warrants
issued pursuant to section 273.05 and does not limit or effect the
power of a court to issue an order or attachment pursuant to
176. Consequently, collateral such as corporate stock and bonds, real estate or real
estate li\tures (which were lixtures at the time of the transaction and thus are not "goods"
under § 421.301(21)) would not be subject to the procedures contained in subchapter II.
177. § 425.108. Compare the limitation on extortionate extensions of credit contained
in § 201(a) of the Truth-In-Lending Act. 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-96. Section 425.108 provides
substantially greater recoveries than the federal law for extortionate extensions of credit by
permitting triple penalties.
178. § 425.109.
179. § 425.110. This section appears to prohibit dismissal based on a garnishment
regardless of the number of garnishments. Compare § 304 of the Truth-In-Lending Act 15
U.S.C. § 1674 which prohibits dismissal by reason of the fact that an employee's earnings
%%ere subject to garnishment "for any one indebtedness" (emphasis added).
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section 295.04 where a person has failed to appear at a supplemen-
tary examination permitted under chapter 273. "" In other words,
it is only the type of ex parte "body attachment" upon affidavit
under section 273.05 which is prohibited by section 425.113, and
not the order to show cause for contempt or attachment to arrest
allowed under section 295.04 for refusal to obey a court order to
appear at a supplementary examination pursuant to section 273.03.
Section 425.107 introduces the concept of "unconscionability"
to consumer credit transactions on a broad basis. Under this sec-
tion, a court may refuse to allow any agreement to be enforced if
it determines that certain conduct is "unconscionable" as defined
therein.'" General guidelines as to what may be considered uncons-
cionable practices are outlined in subsection (3), but the precise
application of the concept of unconscionability will have to await
development through the administrative process and the courts.
XIV. CUSTOMER'S REMEDIES
The monetary civil penalties allowed against merchants for
violation of the WCA range from a minimum of $25 plus actual
damages to a maximum of $1,000 or actual damages, whichever is
higher."' Certain violations will render the entire transaction void
under section 425.305 and the customer has the right to retain any
goods or services received.' Interestingly, section 425.304 pro-
vides an alternative penalty of twice the finance charge but not less
than $100 or greater than $1,000 or the actual damages. The other
18I. Bkg. § 80.66.
181. The Adminkitrator is granted a similar power to determine unconscionable conduct
under § 426.108. See discussion in text, infra at 474. For a thorough comparison of the
customer's rights after default contained in subchapters I and 11 of ch. 425 with prior
Wikconsin law from a consumer advocate's point of view, see Crandall, The Wisconsin
Comunter ,let: Wisconsin Consumer Credit Laws Before and After, 1973 Wis. L. Rav. 334
(1973).
182. § 425.302-425.304. Section 425.302 providing for a penalty of $25 plus actual
damages; applies to all violations of the WCA for which no other penalty is specified.
Section 425.303 providing for a penalty of SI00 plus actual damages applies to the
follo%%ing sections: §§ 424.203; 424.206 and 425.107.
Section 425.304 providing for a penalty of twice the finance charge with a minimum of
SIO and a maximum of $1000 or actual damages applies to the following sections:
§§ 422.203-422.207: 422.209: 422.303-422.305; 422.402-422.404; 422.406; 422.407; 422.411 ;
422.413: 422.415: 422.417-422.419; 423.203; 424.204; 425.108; 427.105. See Stute, supra
note 30. at 29-30.
183. Section 425.305 voids the transaction and permits the customer to retain all goods,
services or money received without any obligation to pay for violations of the following
sections: § 422.201: 422.405: 422.414: 422.416; 423.302; 425.108; 425.113 and 425.206. See
Stute. tlIra at 30.
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provisions providing for customer remedies allow actual damages
plus the dollar amount of the penalty specified.
In addition to the monetary penalties, if the customer prevails
in an action he may recover costs and expenses incurred in connec-
tion with prosecuting the action plus a reasonable amount of attor-
neys' fees. However section 425.308 specifically limits the award
of attorneys' fees by stating that fees generally shall be determined
by the time and labor required, and not by a percentage of the
recovery. In this regard, it is difficult to understand why the Act
permits consumers to recover reasonable attorneys' fees while no
similar provision is contained for creditors.8 4
Section 425.307 provides a rather complicated statute of limita-
tion periods by providing that, except for open-end transactions, a
customer may sue at any time within one year after the date of the
last violation of the WCA or within two years after consummation
of the agreement or one year after last payment under the agree-
ment, whichever is later. With regard to open-end credit plans, a
customer must commence an action within two years after the date
of last violation.
An overall time limit of six years after the date of last violation
is also provided, presumably as a limitation on the right to com-
mence an action within one year after last payment on those trans-
actions which are longer than six years. Thus, for example, in the
case of real estate mortgages which may require payments over a
twenty-five or thirty year period, the overall limitation states that
no action may be commenced more than six years after the date
of last violation rather than one year after the last payment on the
transaction. The limitation on commencement of actions does not
apply to defenses, set-offs or counterclaims based on a right under
the Act.
A unique attempt to prevent the use of the "corporate shield"
to circumvent liability for violations of the WCA is contained in
section 425.310. This section provides that where a "meaningful"
part of a corporation's activities are in violation of the Act, but
damages or penalties awarded to a customer or the Adminstrator
cannot be collected from such corporation by reason of its insol-
vency or dissolution, then the judgment shall be recoverable
against the principal agents of the corporation including officers
184. Section 422.411 prohibits merchants from including a written provision in a con-
sumer credit contract providing for recovery of attorneys' fees upon default. See discussion
in text, supra at 440.
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and managers who "knew" or "should have known of" the viola-
tion or "willfully participated" in the violation.
The fact that the principals of the corporation must be in a
position to "have known of" or have "willfully participated" in a
violation and the fact that a "meaningful part" of the corporation's
activities must be in violation of the Act hopefully will limit the
application of this section to alleged "fly-by-night" operators who
set up corporations simply to avoid personal liability for their
illegal activities. However, it is conceivable that this provision
could apply to principals of a legitimate merchant where, for ex-
ample, an employee knowingly violates the Act resulting in class
action damages which exceed the assets of the corporation and the
court determines that the principals "should have known" of the
violations. Although such a possibility is greatly reduced by the
fact that a class action for recovery of penalties is not allowed in
most circumstances under the class action provisions,'8 neverthe-
less, principals of a corporation, especially a closely held corpora-
tion, could risk personal as well as corporate assets under this
section.
In addition to the private damages and penalties granted cus-
tomers under the provisions of subchapter III of chapter 425, a
violator of the Act may be subject to civil penalties brought by the
Administrator under section 426.301. Such penalty may be as high
as $10,000 for a willful violation. Also, section 425.401 provides for
criminal penalties in certain circumstances.
XV. ADMINISTRATION OF ACT
The administration of the WCA is to be handled by the Com-
missioner of Banking who is granted broad powers as "Adminis-
trator" by chapter 426. Under section 426.104, the Administrator
has the power to receive and act on complaints, counsel individuals
and groups on their rights and duties under the WCA, make and
publish results of studies under the WCA, hold public and private
hearings to effectuate the purposes of the WCA, plus the power to
promulgate rules to enforce the WCA or prevent circumvention of
its terms.
The WCA also has incorporated protection for merchants who
rely on the Administrator's rules. Section 426.104(4)(a) states that
no penalty can apply under the Act if the merchant has acted in
185. For limitation of penalties in class actions, see discussion in text, infra at 476.
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conformity with any rule, order, interpretation, opinion, or state-
ment of the Administrator notwithstanding the fact the Adminis-
trator is later reversed by a court or other authority. In the event
of such reversal, however, the merchant is still liable for actual
damages. Similarly, a merchant may submit a proposed practice
to the Administrator for approval under section 426.104(4)(b), and
if approved, or not disapproved within thirty days, then the prac-
tice shall not be considered a violation of the Act notwithstanding
later judicial reversal. In addition, under section 426.104(4)(a), the
merchant will not be liable for penalties or damages in the event
of a reversal of a practice approved or not disapproved under
subsection (4)(b).111
Section 426.106 provides for strong investigatory powers in the
Administrator. He can investigate any person who he "has reason
to believe has engaged in or is about to engage in" a violation of
the Act. In any such investigation, the Administrator has broad
powers to compel testimony and subpoena records.'87
Under section 426.108, the Administrator has the power to
promulgate rules which declare specific conduct to be unconsciona-
ble and prohibit the use thereof. The guidelines provided in section
426.108 are essentially the same guidelines which are set forth in
section 425.107, which grants the right to any court of law to find
certain activities unconscionable. However, the rules promulgated
by the Administrator concerning specific "unconscionable" con-
duct will not automatically be upheld as unconscionable in a case
brought before a court under section 425.107, since section 425.107
(2) states that the Aministrator's rules will only be "presumed" to
be unconscionable in such cases.
The power granted to the Administrator to declare certain spe-
cific conduct "unconscionable" increases the authority of the
Administrator substantially over the power of most administrative
agency heads who are usually only given the power to promulgate
rules based on statutory language. Under the WCA, he potention-
186. Section 426.104(4)(a) states that no provision of the WCA "which imposes any
penalt%' shall apply while § 426.104(4)(b) provides that no "violation of this Act" will
result if an act, practice or procedure is submitted and approved or not disapproved.
187. Section 426.106 does not give the Administrator the right to periodically "exam-
ine" merchants as the Commissioner of Banking has the power to do with licensees under
§ 138.09 or ch. 218. The Administrator can investigate only if he has "reason to believe"
the WCA has been or is about to be violated, or upon the filing of a complaint verified by
live persons tinder subsection (2). Presumably the Administrator would have to state the
facts upon which he relies to trigger his investigation rights, and these facts could be
challenged by the merchant at the outset pursuant to ch. 227. See § 426.107.
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ally has the power to prohibit conduct which may not be
specifically prohibited under the statutory language of the Act. In
recognition of this fact, the language of section 426.108 carefully
proscribed the limits of the Administrator's authority. Presumably
the Administrator can only declare certain "specific" conduct un-
conscionable on a case by case basis upon determination that such
conduct violates the guidelines set forth in that section. The ele-
ments of what constitutes "unconscionable" conduct specified in
section 426.108 all contemplate existence of and application to a
specific set of facts or transaction. Consequently, section 426.108
does not grant the Administrator unlimited authority to "legislate"
new substantive consumer protective provisions simply by desig-
nating unfavored conduct as "unconscionable". Unless such limi-
tation of authority is carefully observed, the provisions granting
the Administrator authority to promulgate rules of unconsciona-
bility could well be considered unconstitutional as an improper
delegation of legislative power by the legislature. 8"
To prevent violations of the WCA or the rules promulgated
thereunder, as well as to restrain use of any false, misleading,
deceptive or unconscionable conduct, the Administrator may seek
temporary restraining orders or temporary or permanent injunc-
tions under section 426.109. Ex parte restraining orders may be
issued for up to thirty days. "I
XVI. CLASS ACTIONS
The WCA contains extensive class action provisions which per-
188. The Administrator, after some consideration, apparently acknowledges the limited
posker granted under § 426.108. Thus, the tentative draft of the rules first proposed by the
Administrator presented for public hearing on April 16, 1973 stated that it would be
"unconcionable*' for a merchant "to fail to respond in writing to a specific question or
di~putc raised by the customer within 30 days of such inquiry ...." At such hearing it
was repeatedly pointed out by creditors that the Administrator had no basis for declaring
such conduct "'unconscionable" under § 426.108 since the conduct did not fall within the
prcvie%% of any of the particular elements outlined in that section. (Such elements, according
to the otlicial comments to § 6.109 of the NCA from which § 426.108 was taken, reflect
"the most common factors that society would recognize as constituting probable unfairness
in consumer transactions). Moreover, the subject of responding to billing statement inquir-
ies had been the subject of considerable congressional debate with regard to the Fair Credit
Billing Act then before Congress. In light of these arguments, the Administrator decided
not to promulgate such conduct as being "unconscionable" in the final version of the
reguilations. In a maneuver which may be questionable, however, the Administrator promul-
gated virtually the same regulation as Bkg. § 80.36 as a general regulation, apparently
basing hi% authority to issue the regulation under § 422.306 dealing with record keeping
requirements.
189. § 426.109(2).
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mit use of the class actions procedure, but takes effective steps to
limit the possible abuses which may arise under such procedure.
Section 426.110(1) permits a class action by any customer "af-
fected" (i) by a violation of the WCA or rules promulgated ther-
eunder, (ii) by a violation of the Truth-In-Lending Act, or (iii) by
false, misleading, deceptive or unconscionable conduct of a mer-
chant in making, soliciting or enforcing consumer credit transac-
tions."" It also permits class actions to be brought by the Adminis-
trator on behalf of a customer so affected. 9' Such class action may
only be maintained for "actual damages" and other relief to which
a person may be entitled under the Act, but cannot be brought for
penalties unless the conduct of the merchant is shown by a prepon-
derance of the evidence to be a "willful and knowing" violation of
the Act.9 2 The prayer for relief may also include a request for
"reasonable" attorneys fees which are specifically limited to "the
value of the time reasonably expended by the attorney rather than
by the amount of the recovery on behalf of the class."'' 3
Restricting class actions recoveries to actual damages (except
where there are willful and knowing violations of the Act) is an
effective response to one of the particularly abusive characteristics
of class actions which has become prevalent under the Truth-In-
Lending Act. Under the Truth-in-Lending Act an inadvertent error
by the creditor permits the customer to sue for an amount equal
to double the finance charge (or for an amount not less than $100
nor more than $1,000) even if no actual damages are sustained. If
such error were committed on forms used by the creditor with all
its customers, a class action for the Truth-in-Lending Act penalties
could result in astronomical civil liability if the class is upheld.'94
190. Under § 426.110(2), a class action for "false, misleading, deceptive or unconscion-
able conduct" is permitted only in consumer credit transactions.
191. Section 426.110(l) provides that if a customer files such action, he must give notice
to the Administrator who has the option to join within thirty days of such notice.
192. § 426.110(l) and (14).
193. § 426.110(15).
194. Se. e.g., Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Company, 329 F.Supp. 270
(D.C. N.Y. 1971). In the Ratner case, the court refused to uphold the class. Although cases
brought under the Truth-In-Lending Act have split on whether class actions should be
upheld, generally cases decided since the Ratner decision have refused to permit such
classes. See. e.g.. Rogers v. Coburn Finance Corp., 54 F.R.D. 417 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Hoff-
man v. Charnita Inc.. 58 F.R.D. 86 (N.D. Pa. 1973); Gerlach v. Allstate Insurance Co.,
338 F.Supp. 642 (S.D. Fla. 1972); Shields v. Valley National Bank of Arizona, 56 F.R.D.
442 (D. Ari. 1972); Rodriguez v. Family Service Publications Inc., 57 F.R.D. 189 (C.D.
Cal. 1972). Alsup v. Montgomery Ward and Co., 57 F.R.D. 89 (N.D. Cal. i972); Goldman
v. First National Bank of Chicago, 56 F.R.D. 548 (N.D. III, 1972): Kriger v. European
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Section 426.110 eliminates the spector of this enormous liability
for penalties under the WCA except for willful and knowing viola-
tions. Also, the limitation of attorney's fees to actual time ex-
pended in the event of recovery should cause attorneys to assess
the validity of the class action with somewhat greater care since
the allure of potential recovery of tremendous attorney's fees for
technical violations has been removed.
Furthermore, a class action for unconscionable or false, mis-
leading or deceptive conduct cannot be brought unless the act or
practice has been found to constitute a violation of the Act and is
specified with "particularity" in a rule promulgated by the Admin-
istrator or in a case decided by an appellate court of the state. In
addition, the violation must occur at least thirty days after the
decision or promulgation of the rule.'95
Since one of the fundamental purposes of a class action is to
provide a vehicle to force merchants to correct violations of the
WCA as well as to compensate individuals sustaining damages
because of such violations, subsection (4)(a) requires a customer to
give the merchant an opportunity to correct any mistake by requir-
ing that prior to the commencement of the class action, the cus-
tomer must give at least thirty days notice to the merchant specify-
ing the particular alleged claim or violation and demanding that
such violation be corrected. If the merchant remedies the alleged
error or agrees to remedy such violation in a reasonable time
within thirty days after receipt of such notice, no class action may
be maintained by that customer.
Furthermore, no action for damages may be oaintained if, at
any time during the class action proceeding, the merchant complies
with subsection (4)(d). This subsection states that if a merchant
ceases the alleged violation and notifies or makes a reasonable
eflort to notify all customers in the class that upon their request
they will be given the appropriate remedy, and gives such remedy
Ilealth Spa Inc.. 56 F.R.D. 104 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Kenney v. Landis Financial Group Inc.,
349 F.Supp. 939 (N.D. la. 1972). Eovaldi v. First National Bank of Chicago, 55 F.R.D.
134 (N.D. III. 1972).
195. Section 426.110(3) specifically provides that alleged violations of § 426.110(2)
(fal,,e. misleading, deceptive or unconscionable conduct in the making, soliciting or enforc-
ing of consunier credit transactions), § 423.301 (false, misleading or deceptive advertising
consumer credit), § 425.107 (unconscionable conduct decided by a court), § 426.108 (un-
con,,cionable conduct under rules promulgated by the Administrator) or § 427.104(l)(h)
(conduct reasonably expected to threaten or harass a customer in debt collection activity)
cannot be sustained as a class action unless the conduct is specifically defined in an adminis-
tratke rule or appellate court decision.
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to customers who so request it within a reasonable time, no dam-
ages will be granted in the class action. This provision is particu-
larly helpful to merchants since after notification, the remedy will
only haver to be given to those customers who request the remedy
or "opt in" to the class. On the other hand the procedure should
also satisfy consumer groups since the merchant must cease the
alleged violative activity and compensate customers who have sus-
tained damages and request payment.
Subsection (4)(e) does permit injunctive action to prevent an
alleged violation without the necessity of the notification to the
merchant under subsection (4)(a).
Section 426.110(5) and (6) basically repeat the provisions of
Federal Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure concern-
ing the determination of maintenance of class actions.
The remaining portions of section 426.110 are mainly proce-
dural provisions with regard to maintenance of the class action.'
XVII. TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS AND EFFECTIVE DATE OF ACT
The WCA became effective on March 1, 1973, and will apply
to all consumer transactions or modifications of consumer credit
transactions entered into on or after that date. The transitional
provisions included with the bill containing the provisions of the
WCA, however, provide that, with certain exceptions, all "rights,
duties and interests" flowing from consumer transactions entered
into before the effective date of the WCA may be terminated,
completed, consummated or enforced as required or permitted by
any statute, rule of law, or other law modified or repealed by the
Act as though such repeal, amendment, or modification had not
occurred.' 7
196. In the case of Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973) cert.
granted 94 S.Ct. 235 (1973), the court indicated that notice in class actions would have to
be given to the class at the expense of the plaintiff which expense could be recovered upon
ultimate victory of the plaintiff. Section 426.110(16) provides that in class actions, the
Administrator shall bear the costs of all notices although the Administrator may recover
all costs if eventually judgment is entered for plaintiff. The cost of notification in class
actions could he substantial, but subsection (16) removes one of the obstacles to maintaining
class actions under the WCA which could be presented by the Eisen case if eventually
upheld. Note that the Administrator must bear such costs whether or not he is a party to
the action.
197. Wis. Laws 1971, ch. 239, Section 39. That section states:
TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS (1) Except as otherwise provided in this sec-
tion, this act takes effect at 12:01 a.m. on March I, 1973.
(2) Consumer transactions entered into before the effective date of this act and
the rights, duties and interests flowing from them thereafter may be terminated,
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The only exception to the above rule is that (i) any refinancing,
consolidation or deferral, (ii) any open-end credit plan and (iii) the
enforcement provisions contained in chapter 425 of the WCA,
except for sections 425.103,425.203, and 425.209, will apply to any
transaction regardless of the original date of consummation.
In this connection, it is important to note that transactions
entered into prior to the effective date of the WCA may be en-
forced under the status of the law as it existed prior to said effective
date unless otherwise provided. Therefore, for example, the limita-
tions on merchants contained in the WCA, any rules or regulations
promulgated by the Administrator and the prohibited debt collec-
tion practices under chapter 427 do not apply to consumer transac-
tions and the enforcement of consumer transactions consummated
prior to March 1, 1973.
XVIII. CONCLUSION
On the whole, the WCA would appear to be a reasonable com-
promise between consumer and creditor interests. The Act re-
sponds to many of the long standing complaints of consumer
groups, but usually attempts to do so without placing unrealistic
limitations on Wisconsin creditors. This is not to deny that some
of the language in the statute is confusing and contradictory, but
to some extent such problems are inherent in any new law, espe-
cially when new and untested provisions are adopted. Such prob-
lems were undoubtedly magnified in the passage of the WCA be-
cause many of the provisions were compromises resulting from
intense negotiations between consumer and credit groups con-
ducted over an extremely abbreviated period of time. Hopefully,
however, the legislature will respond to the technical problems,
completed, consummnated or enforced as required or permitted by any statute, rule
of la" or other law amended, repealed or modified by this act as though the repeal,
amendment, or modilication had not occurred, but this act applies to:
(a) Relinancing, consolidation and deferral agreements made after the
effective date of this act, of consumer transactions whenever made;
(b) Consumer transactions made after the effective date of this act pur-
suant to open-end credit plans entered into, arranged or contracted for before
the effective date of this act; and
(c) All consumer transactions made before the effective date of this act
insol'ar as ch. 425 of the statutes on remedies and penalties limits the remedies
of merchants. except that the provisions of 425.103, 425.203 and 425.209
of tile statutes shall not apply to consumer transactions made before the
effective date of this act and as to all matters governed by said provisions such
transactions shall he governed by the law of this state in effect before the
effective date of this act.
[Vol. 57
W.C.A.-A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
many of which were mentioned in this article, so that creditor
compliance will be faciliated and unintended violations kept to a
minimum.
However, despite these imperfections, the WCA would cer-
tainly appear to be a worthwhile experiment in consumer credit
protection. Consumer groups have long protested that credit laws
simply do not provide adequate protection for consumers, and the
WCA does provide comprehensive protection against those prac-
tices which national consumer groups have long deemed most op-
pressive. The fact that most major Wisconsin creditor groups sup-
ported the Act and have deligently attempted to implement its
provisions, makes the WCA an ideal testing ground for determin-
ing the workability of these consumer created solutions.
In all fairness to creditors, it should be remembered that the
WCA was the result of considerable compromise on the part of
creditor groups, and consumer advocates, as well as those obli-
gated to enforce the law, should be willing to abide by the provi-
sions of the law as drafted. They should not seek expansion of the
WCA beyond its boundaries in an attempt to regulate activities
which are not specifically covered by the statutory language of the
Act.
After some experience is gained under the law, the legislature
will have the opportunity to determine the effects of the "experi-
ment" and review the substantive provisions of the Act as well as
the effect such provisions have had in accomplishing the purposes
of the Act. In those instances where creditor abuses are shown to
still exist, certainly appropriate additional provisions should be
adopted to eliminate such activities. Concommitantly, where such
additional provisions are adopted, consumer groups must be will-
ing to recognize the increased expenses to creditors and be willing
to support increased finance charge rates to creditors to cover
those expenses where necessary.
On the other hand, the legislature should also take a critical
look at the consumer protection provisions to determine if the
benefits of the provisions are worth the cost to the public. It must
be remembered that the consumer groups which proposed and
negotiated the WCA emphasized the problems of lower economic
level consumers. Because of this fact, it may well be found after
some experience is gained under the WCA, that many of the "pro-
tection provisions", while purporting to represent the best interests
of all consumers, in fact only reflect the interests of a relatively
minor segment of the borrowing public. Since most of the "protec-
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tions" of the Act are aimed at protecting debtors who do not make
their payments when due or otherwise breach terms of contracts
so that creditors are forced to resort to collection through court
proceedings or seizure of collateral, the legislature must determine
if the increased finance charges paid by all consumers, many of
whom pay on time and never are in a default situation, are worth
the protection provided to the few.
Also, the legislature should review the provisions of the WCA
to determine if the "consumer protection" provisions which limit
creditors activities are being used by some consumers to harass or
avoid payment of legitimate obligations, thereby unduly increasing
delinquencies. Such additional delinquencies can only be reflected
in higher finance charges, again with the effect that the majority
of consumers who pay on time must bear the increased cost of
collection against individuals who intentionally use the provisions
of the Act to delay or avoid paying their indebtednesses.
Finally, the legislature should review the effect that the WCA
has on the availability of credit, especially on the availability to
lower economic level borrowers. Since the WCA provisions make
it more costly and more difficult for creditors to obtain payment
of obligations from recalcitrant borrowers, it is natural to assume
that creditors' standards for extending credit will be raised. This
in turn could result in the elimination of credit to many marginal
borrowers, who are often low income consumers. If this is the case,
the WCA provisions would have the paradoxical effect of cutting
off substantial availability of credit to the very group of people that
most of the provisions are intended to protect.
These questions and others, however, can be determined only
after substantial experience is gained under the WCA. For the
present, the legislature should permit both consumers and creditors
to gain experience under the Act to determine exactly where the
problem areas are.
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